

THE PROVENANCE OF MAN
A SUNNI APOLOGETIC
OF THE ORIGINAL CREATION OF
ĀDAM (ʿALAYH AL-SALĀM)
TAHSEEN N. KHAN

THE PROVENANCE OF MAN

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A SUNNI APOLOGETIC OF THE ORIGINAL CREATION OF ĀDAM ﷺ

TAHSEEN N. KHAN

Cover picture

Al-Ṭabari (d. 310 h) narrates that the mountain on which Ādam ﷺ landed upon is in the region, Sarandib, known today as Sri Lanka.[1] The picture on the cover of this book is believed to be that mountain by many people. It is referred to as "Ādam's peak."

Allah ﷻ knows best.

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1 Franz Rosenthal, *The History of al-Tabari*, (New York: SUNY Press, 1989), 1:292.



To my respected parents, from whom I first heard about our primeval father, Abū Muḥammad[2] *Ādam ﷺ, when they read to us from Qaṣaṣ al-Anbiyā' while we were mere children.*



2 Ādam ﷺ is known as "Father of Mankind" (*Abū al-Bashar*) on Earth and will be known as "Father of Muḥammad" (*Abū Muḥammad*) in Paradise as mentioned by al-Suyūṭī (d. 911 h) in his *al-Durr al-Manthūr* under verse 2:37.

TRANSLITERATION KEY

ḍ	ض	‘	ء(إأ)
ṭ	ط	a, ā	ا
ẓ	ظ	b	ب
a, ‘i, ‘u’ ,’	ع	t	ت
gh	غ	th	ث
f	ف	j	ج
q	ق	ḥ	ح
k	ك	kh	خ
l	ل	d	د
m	م	dh	ذ
n	ن	r	ر
h	ه	z	ز
w, u, ū	و	s	س
y, i, ī	ي	sh	ش
		ṣ	ص

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَٰنِ الرَّحِيمِ

الحمد لله رب العالمين والصلاة والسلام على أشرف الأنبياء والمرسلين نبيّنا محمد وعلى آله وصحبه أجمعين ومن تبعهم بإحسان إلى يوم الدين

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Acknowledgement

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Introduction

In the name of Allah, the most Gracious, the most Merciful. All praise is due to Allah who taught Ādam ﷺ the names, honored the scholars with knowledge of His religion, and made the disciplinary sciences a cornerstone for the comprehension of His Book, which He then raised above as a firmament. He alone safeguards the true meanings of all things by His perspicuous clarifications and subtle indications; whose eloquence disables the rhetoricians and whose wisdom incapacitates the sages. May Allah ﷻ send blessings upon His Prophet, Muḥammad, by whom He sealed the succession of prophets and by whose conveyance, the light spread. May He show His mercy to the pure and chaste Companions, and may His blessings be upon them all.[3]

A few years prior to writing this book, one of my teachers requested that I teach the cannoned primer in Sunni doctrine, *al-ʿAqīda al-Taḥāwiyya*, to a group of high-school students in a nearby mosque. It quickly became clear that the students were lackadaisical on the subject. However, as we switched lanes into New Atheism and the theory of evolution, they effused with engagement. "My biology teacher told me that evolution is a *fact*!", "I told my teacher that I believe Ādam was the first man, and he said that is a *myth*!", "Ādam was not the first man!" began to bounce across the classroom walls. Their excitement was vastly different from my own when I was their age. Conversely, when I first encountered the theory in high school biology, I, by the grace of Allah ﷻ, did not find the theory of evolution to pose an existential threat to my faith (*īmān*). At the time, I had found a robust,

3 ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Suhaylī (d. 581h), *al-Taʿrīf wa al-Aʿlām fīmā Ubhima fī al-Qurʾān min al-Asmāʾ al-Aʿlām* (Tarablous: Lajnat al-Huffāẓ ʿalā al-Turāth al-Islāmī, 1992), 49-50. The opening lines from the introduction of al-Suhaylī's book immediately captured my attention for aptly serving as the "*barāʿat al-istihlāl*" for this book, as the reader will soon come to know why *in shāʾ Allah*.

intellectual sanctuary in resorting to Nuh Keller's *Islam and Evolution*.[4] It gave me clear answers, despite my having barely tapped into its depths. It wasn't until much later, after having graduated from college, that I realized the ways in which the theory of evolution gripped the global Muslim mind.

Since its inception, the theory of evolution has been controversial for Muslims. Through years of examining arguments *for* or *against* it, I have seen that accepting the theory of evolution is viewed as a sign of intellectual maturity. In contrast, adhering to the standard theological model of the origin of humanity is seen as dogmatic, possessing blind faith, or simply gross ignorance. In almost every Islamicate language, numerous books, articles, and pamphlets speak to the contention of whether Ādam ﷺ was an original creation.

Reconciliation with the theory of evolution came as numerous influential figures, both past and present, have taken the view that the Qur'ānic narrative of Ādam ﷺ not having biological parents is connotatively speculative (*ẓannī al-dalāla*). The Grand Mufti of Egypt of his time, Muḥammad ʿAbduh (d. 1323 h), proffered the view that the belief of Ādam ﷺ being the progenitor of all humans on Earth today is not definitively (*qaṭʿī*) known from the Qur'ān.[5] Others, such as Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1315 h) and Ahmet Hamdi Akseki[6] (d. 1370 h), went further in suggesting that the entire Ādamic narrative can be made to fit the dictates of the theory of evolution. In fact, Muzaffar Iqbal expands the list to include many other Muslim notables who held similar beliefs: Abdullah Yusuf Ali (d. 1373 h), Fazlur Rahman (d. 1408 h), Ghulam Ahmad Pervez (d. 1405 h), Murtaza Mutahhari (d. 1399 h), Mohammad Husayn Behishti (d. 1401 h), Javad Bahonar (d. 1401 h), Maurice Bucaille (d. 1418 h), Muhammad Hamidullah (d. 1423 h), and Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1357 h).[7] In addition to these notables, we can also include the influential Egyptian physician, Muhammad Tawfiq Sidqi (d. 1338 h), the Turkish scholar, Suleyman Ateş (d. 1398 h), and the Syrian philosopher, Muhammad Shahrour[8] (d. 1441 h). More recently, we

4 Keller, Nuh. "Islam and Evolution a Letter to Suleman Ali." Evolution and Islam, http://www.masud.co.uk/ISLAM/nuh/evolve.htm.

5 Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr al-Manār*, see section under verse 4:1.

6 Uriya Shavit, "The Evolution of Darwin to a "Unique Christian Species" in Modernist-Apologetic Arab-Islamic Thought." Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 26, no. 1, (2015): 23.

7 Muzaffar Iqbal, "On the Sanctity of Species", Islam & Science, 4.2, (Winter 2006): 89.

8 Nidhal Guessoum. "Islamic Theological Views on Darwinian Evolution." Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Religion, (2016): 9-11.

can include the following influential Muslim contemporaries who held that Ādam ﷺ *could* have had biological parent(s): Abd al-Sabur Shahin, Nidhal Guessoum, Rana Dajani, Iyad A. Hijazi, Abd al-Wahhab al-Sinnary, Usama Hasan, DS Adnan Majid, Adnan Ibrahim, Amr Sherif, Basil Altaie, Caner Taslaman, Ahmad Bashamil, T.O. Shanavas, 'Abu Layth' Nahiem Ajmal, Daud Abdul-Fattah Batchelor, Ehab Abouheif, Shabir Ally, Israr Ahmad, Enis Doko, Gary Dargan, amongst many others who have not been mentioned for the sake of brevity. Finally, in 1999, al-Azhar's Islamic Research Council (Majmaʿ al-Buḥūth al-Islāmiyya), did *not* believe that the Egyptian literary scholar, Abd al-Sabur Shahin's (d. 1431 h) suggestion that Ādam ﷺ may have had parents, would amount to violating fixed principles of creed or amount to contradicting religious tenets known by necessity.[9]

The contention here, between the two opinions, is truly contradictory: The **affirmation** of biological parents for Ādam ﷺ by Muslim evolutionists is not reconcilable with the complete **negation** of biological parentage for him.[10] While all the individuals mentioned above may have employed distinct methodologies for how they arrived at aligning the Qurʾānic nar-

9 Sohaib Saeed. "The Shāhīn Affair and the Evolution of uṣūl al-tafsīr". Journal of Qurʾānic Studies, 21.3 (2019):119-120.

10 The explanation is as follows: We know by virtue of being humans and witnessing that the entirety of the human race begets and is begotten, that we inherently possess this ability to reproduce. Allah ﷻ refers to Ādam ﷺ as an "*insān*" (verses: 15:26, 23:12, 55:14), a "*bashar*" (verses 38:71, 15:28, 15:33), having a wife (verses 2:35, 4:1, 7:19, 7:189, 20:117), and being a "father" having children (verses 4:1, 5:27-31, 7:27), all of which suggests him possessing the capability (*malaka*) of being born to parents. Once it has been confirmed that he possesses this disposition to have been begotten by virtue of being a "human", we can then conclude that he must have either had biological parentage or he did not, with no third alternative. This is unlike the case of say, a wall, where it does not possess this capability in any way, shape, or form. Thus, the question of whether a wall is begotten or not, is wholly inapplicable. Although this is self-evident in this case, nevertheless, this initial pre-analysis helps in determining if a "true" contradiction even exists before embarking on a solution. Oftentimes we hear of a "contradiction" between what scientists are saying and what scripture is conveying, but upon further scrutiny it does not qualify as a true contradiction. An example of this will be provided shortly in the forthcoming footnotes. The following explanation from al-Sanūsī (d. 895 h) highlights this analysis where he explains the different types of mutual contradictions (*al-munāfā*):

وأما العدم والملكة فهما ثبوت أمر ونفيه عما من شأنه أن يتصف به كالبصر والعمى مثلا فالبصر وجودي وهو الملكة والعمى نفيه عما من شأنه أن يتصف به بالبصر ولهذا لا يقال في الحائط أعمى لأنه ليس من شأنه أن يتصف بالنظر عادة وبهذا فارق هذا النوع النقيضين

rative of Ādam ﷺ with the theory of evolution, the following pages will give exposition to generally represent how Muslim evolutionists engage with the scriptural narrative of human creation.

The contemporary UAE-based Algerian astrophysicist, Nidhal Guessoum, explains that those Muslims who firmly believe in the original creation of Ādam ﷺ employ a "literalistic reading of the Qur'ānic verses relating the story of Ādam's creation" and further expresses how he believes

---

فإن كلا من النوعين وإن كان هو ثبوت أمر ونفيه لكن النفي في تقابل العدم والملكة مقيد بنفي الملكة عما من شأنه أن يتصف بها وفي النقيضين لا يتقيد بذلك...وأهل الأصول... يجعلون العدم والملكة داخلين في النقيضين.

Muḥammad al-Sanūsī, *Sharh al-ʿAqīda al-Ṣughrā* (Damascus: Dār al-Taqwā, 2019), 177-179.

Furthermore, al-Kātibī (d. 675 h) mentions several conditions that need to be fulfilled for a true contradiction to exist between two singular propositions: They must be identical in terms of their subject, predicate, place, time, potentiality or actuality, conditions or requisites, wholeness or partialness, and ascription.

ولا يتحقق التناقض في المخصوصتين إلا عند اتحاد الموضوع ويندرج فيه وحدة الشرط والجزء والكلّ وعند اتحاد المحمول ويندرج فيه وحدة الزمان والمكان والإضافة والقوة والفعل.

Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Taḥrīr al-Qawāʿid al-Manṭiqiyya fī Sharḥ al-Risāla al-Shamsiyya*, (Lebanon: DKI, 2014), 238.

In this vein, the dispute regarding Ādam ﷺ having parents or not, qualifies as a genuine contradiction. The benefit of expressing this plainly now will be appreciated by the reader later in the "Objections" section where heterodox opinions will be addressed.

Ibn Amīr Ḥājj al-Ḥalabī al-Ḥanafī (d. 879) further explains such contradictions found within rationally possible occurrences (*mumkināt*):

أنّ معنى عدم احتمال العلم للنقيض هو أن العقل لا يجوز بوجه من الوجوه كون الواقع في نفس الأمر نقيض ذلك الحكم حينئذٍ، وإن كان من الأمور الممكنة لامتناع إمكان اجتماع النقيضين، وهذا ممنوع ثبوته في العلوم العادية كما في العلوم المستندة إلى الحسّ وغيرها فكما أنّه إذا شاهد حركة زيد وبياض جسم لا يجوّز العقل ألبتّة في ذلك الوقت كونَ زيد ساكنا والجسم أسود بل يقطع بأنّ الواقع هو هذه النسبة لا غير فالعلم العادي كذلك.

Ibn Amīr Ḥājj al-Ḥalabī al-Ḥanafī, *al-Taqrīr wa al-Taḥbīr* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1983), 1:40-41.

this "literalist mindset" is not an "intelligent" one.[11] In his review of David Soloman Jalajel's *Islam and Biological Evolution: Exploring Classical Sources and Methodologies*, Guessoum states:

> And there lies the main issue I have with this work, namely the fact that the author limits the possible position(s) on evolution on the basis of what the 'mainstream' is, while noting that these 'orthodox' Islamic theologies were formulated many centuries ago. Even on the various aspects of evolution, including biological, he sees no paradox in relying on the views of scholars of a thousand years ago when discussing issues that have only become understood in, at earliest, the past century, thus completely disregarding the intellectual, scientific, philosophical, and theological developments that humanity has witnessed in recent times.[12]

In developing his critique against the "orthodox" opinion, Guessoum makes a crucial assumption, namely, the notion that Ādam ﷺ having had parents was either never entertained by Islamic scholars prior to the advent of Darwinian evolution, or the possibility itself was never fully appreciated on account of not having access to the information we have today about the theory of evolution. This idea of rejecting past exegeses and claims of consensus on the original creation of Ādam ﷺ prior to Darwinian evolution is vocalized by many Muslim evolutionists. The assertion that past exegeses or claims of consensus (*ijmāʿ*) are now obsolete due to the "consensus amongst the scientific community" on accepting the theory of evolution will be challenged in a subsequent chapter.

Guessoum's writings host much criticism of those Muslim scholars who utilize traditional hermeneutical methodologies in understanding the Qur'ānic account of the creation of Ādam ﷺ. Yet his book, *Islam's Quantum Question: Reconciling Muslim Tradition and Modern Science*, features no attempt to lay out a coherent methodology in understanding the relevant verses or narrations pertaining to human origin. Instead, he merely resorts to citing Ibn Rushd (d. 595 h) who asserts that:

> "[when] the Revealed text contradicts the conclusions reached by Reason/Philosophy (and for us later, science) the (religious) Text

11 Nidhal Guessoum. "Kalam's Necessary Engagement with Modern Science". Kalam Research & Media, (2014): 12-13.

12 Nidhal Guessoum. "Book Review of Islam and Biological Evolution: Exploring Classical Sources and Methodologies". (2011): 476-477.

must be allegorically understood and subjected to interpretation by those whom the Qur'ān calls "rooted in knowledge" (Q 3:7)."[13][14]

It is important to note how Guessoum inserts in parentheses: "and for us later, science", illustrating how he believes "science" today is not only on par with "reason" but should supplant it as a means of understanding and interpreting the Qur'ān. This is frequently heard from those who subscribe to a worldview of philosophical naturalism. "Science" being contrasted here with "reason" by Guessoum, is only concerned with that which is material, and its scope is restricted to what can be empirically tested. Using Guessoum's methodology would call into question every verse that speaks of

13 Nidhal Guessoum, *Islam's Quantum Question* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), xx.

14 Guessoum is referring to a dichotomy that Ibn Rushd employs in his *Faṣl al-Maqāl* (see quote below) that distinguishes how scripture should be understood between the "People of Demonstrative Proof" ("*ahl al-burhān*") and the common folk. Ibn Rushd states that when it comes to apparently problematic scripture such as the verse of "*istiwā'*" and the *ḥadīth* of "*nuzūl*", the People of Demonstrative Proof are obligated (*wājib*) in interpreting them figuratively (*ta'wīl*), and it would be blasphemous (*kufr*) for them to understand it literally (*ẓāhir*); while the common folk are obligated in understanding them literally, and it would be blasphemous or heretical (*bid'a*) for them to understand them figuratively. At first glance, the interpretive method he uses and one that Guessoum seemingly supports, appears to be a plausible way to reconcile disparate understandings. However, upon closer scrutiny, Ibn Rushd's approach results in the conclusion that **believing in falsehood is an obligation (wājib) for the common Muslim.** With over forty-five (45) instances of the Qur'ān using the word "intellect" (*'aql*) and its various linguistic derivatives encouraging reason, one can only wonder on what basis Ibn Rushd decided to confine its application to only one, small group of Muslims, i.e., "the People of Demonstrative Proof". As is self-evident from the above, adopting Ibn Rushd's dichotomy can certainly lead to the affirmation of what is rationally impossible for Allah ﷻ. And as the reader will soon come to realize, adopting his methodology in certain matters pertaining to the theory of evolution also leads to similar consequences.

وههنا أيضا ظاهر يجب على أهل البرهان تأويله، وحملهم إيّاه على ظاهره كفر. وتأويل غير أهل البرهان له وإخراجه عن ظاهره كفر في حقهم أو بدعة. ومن هذا الصنف آية الاستواء وحديث النزول...والسبب في ذلك أن الصنف من الناس الذين لا يقع لهم التصديق إلا من قِبل التخيل - أعني أنهم لا يصدقون بالشيء إلا من جهة ما يتخيلونه - يعسر وقوع التصديق لهم بموجود ليس منسوباً إلى شيء متخيل.

Ibn Rushd, *Faṣl al-Maqāl* (Beirut: Manshūrat al-Jamal, 2009), 46-47.

metaphysical matters, miracles, and even physical phenomena for which we do not presently have empirical evidence (or for which the empirical evidence is inconclusive). Guessoum and many other Muslim evolutionists fail to explain why the methods of science, despite its obvious limitations, should be given this lofty status as the absolute criterion against which the apparent meanings of scripture should be judged. In the following chapter, I will discuss how using "science" to definitively say that Ādam ﵇ had parents is based on inductive reasoning which by its very nature is provisional.

Ibn Rushd's approach cited above prerequires understanding the Arabic language and its related scholastic disciplines in understanding the Qurʾān, a tenet overlooked by Guessoum in his comments. Ibn Rushd explicitly states that any transition towards allegory must correspond to the rules of Arabic allegory (*ʿalā qānūn al-taʾwīl al-ʿarabī*)[15] and the conventional usages of the Arabic language.[16] One cannot resort to an "allegorical understanding" (*taʾwīl*) of the Qurʾān without first ascertaining what the literal meaning of the text is. Thereafter, transitioning to an allegorical understanding of the text still needs to be confined to the literary norms of the given language. In his *Faṣl al-Maqāl*, Ibn Rushd does not invent a new framework of how to allegorically understand scripture, nor does he criticize the existing rules governing scriptural interpretation during his time.[17] Therefore, we can safely assume that by "allegorically understanding" certain verses, Ibn Rushd meant that it must be done so without flouting the known precepts of allegorical interpretation as detailed in the classical manuals of Arabic linguistics and hermeneutics.[18] As such, the bulk of this monograph will highlight the significance of just one verse from the Qurʾān, in accordance with the rules and conventional usages found in the Arabic language, which Muslim evolutionists, both past and present, have failed to properly understand.

Furthering his conclusion, Guessoum leaves out a critical caveat mentioned by Ibn Rushd when resorting to an allegorical understanding. When asked if it would be permitted for an axiomatic proof (*burhān*) to lead to an allegorical understanding while there already remains a pre-existing consensus (*ijmāʿ*) upon its apparent (*ẓāhir*) meaning, Ibn Rushd replies that if the consensus has been reached through a means which is certain

15 Ibn Rushd, *Faṣl al-Maqāl* (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1968), 36.

16 Ibn Rushd, *Faṣl al-Maqāl* (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1968), 35.

17 This is obviously limited only to the "People of Demonstration" according to Ibn Rushd as noted earlier.

18 Saʿīd Fūda, *Mawqif Ibn Rushd al-Falsafī min ʿIlm al-Kalām wa Atharuhu fī al-Ittijāhāt al-Fikriyya al-Ḥadītha* (Amman: Dār al-Fatḥ, 2009), 109.

(*yaqīnī*) then it would *not* be correct.[19] On these grounds, Guessoum fails to explain his claim of why consensus *cannot* genuinely exist upon the "apparent meaning" of the verses that speak to Ādam's ﷺ original creation. I will also provide details about the matter of consensus later in this study.

Instead of Guessoum presenting an application of Ibn Rushd's methodology towards understanding the relevant verses and narrations, he simply refers to Muhammad Shahrour's book[20] as an example of someone who "constructs a story of human evolution from the Qur'ānic verses that read in total accordance with the modern theory."[21]

The above from Guessoum are merely samples of typical arguments that are found in the works of other Muslim evolutionists. The common assertion found within their critiques is that the normative, interpretive hermeneutic employed by previous Muslim scholars cannot be used when dealing with the verses and narrations that speak about the creation of Ādam ﷺ. They contend that exegesis of the relevant verses regarding Ādam ﷺ must begin by conceding that he was a product of two parents and not an original creation, due to the overwhelming evidence that the theory of evolution has presented. However, this concession would only be acceptable if on one hand, the scientific evidence decisively (*qaṭʿī*) proves that Ādam ﷺ indeed had parents, while on the other hand, the scriptural evidence that speaks of him not having parents is merely speculative (*ẓannī*), either by way of how that scripture reached us and/or by what its words actually connote. This is primarily because it is inconceivable that the Omniscient and All-Wise would reveal something whose import (*dalāla*) is completely at odds with or even belies reality:[22]

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19 Ibn Rushd, *Faṣl al-Maqāl* (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1968), 37

20 Muhammad Shahrour's *al-Kitāb wa al-Qur'ān*

21 Nidhal Guessoum, *Islam's Quantum Question* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 313.

22 Abū al-Muʿīn al-Nasafī (d. 508 h) writes in his *Tabṣirat al-Adilla* that the Qur'ān cannot contradict other decisive proofs or else it would result in attributing ignorance and foolishness to Allah ﷻ:

> وهي كلها حجج الله ومن تناقضت حججه فهو سفيه جاهل بمآخذ الحجج ومقاديرها والله تعالى حكيم لا يجوز عليه السفه عالم لا يجهل...وثبوت المناقضة أوجب كونه من عند غيره على ما قال تعالى: «أَفَلَا يَتَدَبَّرُونَ ٱلْقُرْءَانَ ۚ وَلَوْ كَانَ مِنْ عِندِ غَيْرِ ٱللَّهِ لَوَجَدُوا فِيهِ ٱخْتِلَـٰفًا كَثِيرًا».

Abū al-Muʿīn al-Nasafī, *Tabṣirat al-Adilla* (Damascus: al-Jaffan & al-Jabi, 1990), 129.

Likewise, al-Shāṭibī (d. 790 h) mentions that it is not possible for the Qur'ān to

"Do they not then reflect on the Qur'ān? Had it been from anyone other than Allah, they would have certainly found in it many inconsistencies."

The following chapters will attempt to show that the scriptural evidence for Ādam ﷺ not having any parents is decisive (*qaṭʿī*). The crux of this monograph will be dedicated towards proving that the Qur'ān itself decisively[23] indicates this. To the best of my ability, I have written the main text of this work bearing in mind the needs and understandings of the contemporary Muslim reader, while the footnotes were added as supplementary aids for teachers and advanced students of Sunni doctrine. Finally, the forthcoming chapters will only benefit the one who places as an axiomatic premise (*musallam*) that Allah ﷻ is the only Divine ascribed with the most perfect and complete attributes, transcendent beyond blemishes and defects of any kind, Who revealed His inimitable Qur'ān to His most trustworthy and truthful servant, Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allah ﷺ as *the* criterion (*furqān*) between truth and falsehood, free of discrepancies, untruths, and doubts.

Success is from Allah ﷻ alone.

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state other than the truth when Allah ﷻ Himself has referred to it as the "criterion", "guidance", and a "clarification of everything":

ولكن الدليل على صحته من نفس الحكاية وإقرارها، فإن القرآن سمي فرقانا، وهدى، وبرهانا، وبيانا، وتبيانا لكل شيء، وهو حجة على الخلق على الجملة والتفصيل والإطلاق والعموم، وهذا المعنى يأبى أن يحكى فيه ما ليس بحق ثم لا ينبه عليه.

Abū Isḥāq al-Shāṭibī, *al-Muwāfaqāt* (Saudi Arabia: Dār Ibn ʿAffān, 1997), 4:160.

23 "Decisively" here means that any other potential, alternative meaning is barred:

«قطعا» أي: على وجه يقطع الاحتمال الناشئ عن دليل.

Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ al-Talwīḥ ʿalā al-Tawḍīḥ* (Beirut: DKI, 1996), 1:60-61.

In the coming pages, it will be explained why this definition in specific was adopted.



Empirical Methods, Miracles, and Ādam

Many Muslims subscribe to the view that Ādam was a product of evolution. Many of whom believe this not by any persuasion in the cogency of evolutionary science, but rather because they cannot fathom the thought of a human being created without a pair of biological parents. The very idea of such a notion is "miraculous" and as such does not fit into their philosophical naturalist worldview. This same worldview is further used in negating the occurrence of miracles performed by the prophets of Allah and others. To address this issue, I will begin by discussing the nature of all created things followed by explaining how Allah is a freely-willing agent (*al-fāʿil al-mukhtār*) necessarily attributed with omnipotence (*qudra*). Integrated within this will be a discussion about what empiricism *can* and *cannot* tell us and how all of this relates back to the creation of Ādam.

Behind the use of the scientific method lie certain rational, first principles that underpin empiricism. No natural scientist could ever reject the use of these rational principles, without which every empirical judgment could be contradicted. Every scientist investigates and researches the explanations of phenomena because he fully understands that there must have been a cause for its occurrence. Scientists usually observe natural phenomenon and then conclude that it must have had a cause, due to their firm belief in the principle of causality. Indeed, it is this fundamental belief that drives them to discover the explanations for these natural phenomena.[24] Our ra-

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24 Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī (d. 1373 h) says that skepticism in the principle of causality necessitates doubting the real-world existence of sensory stimuli:

يحق القول بأن: «الشبهة في مبدأ العلية، تستلزم الشبهة في وجود المحسوسات».

Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī, *Mawqif al-ʿAql wa al-ʿIlm wa al-ʿĀlam min Rabb al-ʿĀlamīn wa ʿIbādih al-Mursalīn* (Damascus: Dār al-Tarbiya, 2007), 2:163-164.

tional conclusions rest on our expectation that causes underlie everything. This is also the case with the conclusions of the scientific method, which presupposes certain philosophical and rational assumptions. Empiricism relies on inductive reasoning whereby incomplete, particular results are interpreted and then universalized to reach broader conclusions. This very act of "universalizing" is not rooted in empiricism itself but rather is a judgment of the rational mind. Thus, there are certain accepted, rational constants[25] upon which judgments are built:

i. Principle of Identity (PI) (*mabda' al-huwiyya*):[26] each thing is identical with itself and different from another. For example, if a "triangle" is essentially a plane figure with three straight sides and three angles, then it is not a "square". Moreover, if at any point, this triangle no longer has three straight sides and three angles but rather possesses four angles or four straight sides, then it would cease to be a "triangle" due to $3=3$ and $3\neq4$.

ii. Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) (*mabda' ʿadam al-tanāquḍ*): a proposition cannot be both true and false at the same time i.e., never both: (P and *not* P).[27] For example, it is a

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25 Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī explains that every human uses these foundational first principles, and they form the last protection to whatever man knows and seeks to know about that which is real, without which no truth would ever remain:

فكل إنسانٍ يستخدمها، وربما لا يعرفها في حالته الابتدائية، أي يستخدمها من حيث لا يشعر، وهي آخِرُ تأمين على ما يعرف الإنسان، وما يريد أن يعرفه من الحقائق؛ ولولاها، لما تقررت أي حقيقة في الأذهان.

Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī, *Mawqif al-ʿAql wa al-ʿIlm wa al-ʿĀlam min Rabb al-ʿĀlamīn wa ʿIbādih al-Mursalīn* (Damascus: Dār al-Tarbiya, 2007), 2:164.

26 Al-Taftāzānī (d. 791 h) defines this principle as:

حقيقة الشيء وماهيته ما به الشيء هو هو.

Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ al-ʿAqā'id al-Nasafiyya* (Damascus: Muḥammad Adnān Darwish, 2005), 57.

27 In this sense, PNC relies on PI to form a logical statement.
Both al-Zarkashī (d. 794 h) and Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī (d. 926 h) include the breaking of this principle to be extramentally impossible as well as rationally impossible:

(والصحيح لا فرق) بينهما في استحالة وقوع اجتماع المتقابلين فكما يستحيل ذلك حسًا يستحيل عقلا وإن كان للعقل أن يفرض المحال إذ لا يلزم من فرض الشيء وقوعه.

contradiction to say that something is present in one location and simultaneously *not* present in that very same location in every respect.[28]

These two foundational principles revolve around the simple understanding (*mafhūm*) of affirmation (*wujūd*) and negation (*ʿadam*). From these two principles, many other rational principles that are used in the field of theology have been derived.[29]

According to Sunni theology, rational judgments (*al-aḥkām al-ʿaqliyya/al-manṭiqiyya*) regarding all things fall into the following three categories:[30]

Zakariyyā b. Muḥammad al-Anṣārī, *Fatḥ al-Raḥmān Sharḥ Luqaṭat al-ʿAjlān* (Amman: Dār al-Nūr, 2016), 102-103.

See also Ibn Balbān al-Ḥanbalī's (d. 1083 h) inclusion of this in his work on *ʿaqīda*:

Ibn Balbān al-Ḥanbalī, *Qalāʾid al-ʿIqyān* (Jeddah: Dār al-Minhāj, 2015), 283.

28 For example, within the field of quantum mechanics, some scientists have concluded that objects can simultaneously exist in contrary physical states, thereby *allegedly* disproving PNC. However, upon further scrutiny, scientists have not proven that a particle in superposition has *actually* manifested in more than one eigenstate at the very same time but have merely shown the *potential* for it to exist in more than one eigenstate. See the earlier footnote where it was shown from *al-Risāla al-Shamsiyya* that for two propositions to be in contradiction with one another, the two must be the same in actuality (*bi al-fiʿl*), not merely one of them being in actuality while the other in potential (*bi al-quwwa*).

29 Such as an effect needing a cause, a physical body occupying space, that which goes through change is contingent, that which is rationally impossible is nonexistent, a compound's existence is dependent upon the collection of its constituents, etc. Al-Rāzī states that many other principles found in mathematics, natural sciences, philosophy, and theology are based on PNC.

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Arbaʿīn fī Uṣūl al-Dīn* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Kulliya al-Azhariyya, 1986), 2:322-324.

30 Aḥmad al-Dardīr (d. 1201 h) writes in his famous didactic poem on creed, *al-Kharīda al-Bahiyya*:

فالواجبُ العقليُّ ما لم يَقبَلِ الانتِفا في ذاتِه فابتَهِل

والمسْتَحيلُ كلُّ ما لم يَقْبَلِ في ذاتِه الثُّبوتَ ضِدَّ الأوَّل

وكُلُّ أَمْرٍ قَابِلٍ للانْتِفا

وللثُّبوتِ جائزٌ بلا خَفا




Table I.

i.	Necessary (*wājibāt*)	Its nonexistence is inconceivable by virtue of what its very essence implies, i.e., the proposition must always be true. An example of a necessary judgment would be that a physical body must be bound by the six spatial directions of above, below, front, back, right, and left.
ii.	Impossible (*mustaḥīlāt*)	Its existence is inconceivable by virtue of what its very essence implies, i.e., the proposition must always be false. An example of an impossible judgment would be that a physical body is simultaneously in motion and stationary with respect to the same plane.
iii.	**Possible** (*mumkināt*)	Its existence and nonexistence are both conceivable by virtue of what its very essence implies, i.e., the proposition may equally be true or false. An example of a possible judgment would be that a physical body at times can be in motion while other times at rest.

The metaphysical essence of a given thing (*dhāt*[31]), in conjunction with PI and PNC,[32] is at the heart of determining which rational judgment is given

31 The intellect is not independently assigning the rational judgment at random nor is it imposing a given rational judgment upon that thing. Rather, the judgment is inherent to the metaphysical reality of the thing itself as opposed to the intellect independently fixing a judgment upon it.

والتحقيق أن أحكام العقل من حيث هي غير مجعولة فليست الإرادة هي التي جعلت الواجب واجبا ولا الإرادة هي التي جعلت الممكن ممكنا ولا الإرادة هي التي جعلت المحال محالا فهذه الأحكام ذاتية للأمور وليست جعلية.

Saʿid Fūda, *Maqālāt Naqdiyya fī al-Ḥadātha wa al-ʿIlmāniyya* (Amman: al-Aslein, 2021), 52.

32 Al-Juwaynī (d. 478 h) states:

"The result of the preceding inquiry requires, therefore, that intellect is the necessary knowledge of the possibility of things that are possible and the impossibility of things impossible – such as the knowledge of the impossibility of uniting contraries."

to that thing. These rational judgments are derived from understanding the essence (*māhiyya/ḥaqīqa/dhāt*) of the thing being judged (*al-maḥkūm ʿalayh*)[33] in view of PI and PNC.

Paul E. Walker, *A Guide to Conclusive Proofs for the Principles of Belief* (Reading: Garnet Publishing, 2000), 10.

Al-Ghazālī states:

> "The impossible consists in affirming a thing conjointly with denying it, affirming the more specific while denying the more general, or affirming two things while negating one [of them]. What does not reduce to this is not impossible, and what is not impossible is within [divine] power."

Michael E. Marmura, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers* (Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2000), 175.

The meaning of "affirming two things while negating one [of them]" is to affirm a compound whilst negating one of its components.

Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (d. 324 h) states:

> فيما جانس هذه المسائل على هذا النحو إن كل ذلك ما لم يؤد إلى نوع من المحال الذي بينا من اجتماع الضدين في المحل.

Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan b. Fūrak (d. 406 h), *Mujarrad Maqālāt al-Shaykh Abī al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Thaqāfa al-Dīniyya, 2005), 133.

Al-Bāqillānī (d. 403 h) also includes PNC as a means for acquiring certitude. Abū Bakr Muḥammad al-Bāqillānī, *al-Taqrīb wa al-Irshād* (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Risāla, 1998), 1:190.

Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī (d. 1373 h) includes within the possible all that does not violate PNC, circular reasoning, and infinite regression.
Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī, *al-Qawl al-Faṣl* (Cairo, 1942), 27.

33 Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d. 690 h) states:

> أقول: ينبغي أن يُعلم أن المراد بالاقتضاء في الواجب والممتنع والممكن إنما هو بحسب نفس الأمر يعني بالنظر إلى أنفسها مع قطع النظر عن الخارج والذهن كما مرّ في تحقيق نفس الأمر.

Shams al-Dīn Muḥammd al-Samarqandī, *al-Maʿārif fī Sharḥ al-Ṣaḥā'if* (Cairo: al-Maktabat al-Azhariyya lil-Turāth, 2018), 1:582.

al-Sharqāwī (d. 1227 h) states:

> أن الواجب واجب في نفسه وجد عقل عاقل أو لم يوجد.

Given the definition above for the "possible" rational judgment category, we know that these are things that have the potential to either exist or not exist. In other words, with respect to its quiddity (*māhiyya*), the possible's existence (*wujūd/ḥudūth*) is not an impossibility nor is its nonexistence (*ʿadam*) an impossibility. Said differently, the possible does not imply existence or nonexistence by its very quiddity and thus these two properties (existence and nonexistence) are equal with respect to it. Therefore, for the possible to exist, it would need something besides its very self; or else, had it been on account of its own nature to exist, it would have fallen into the "necessary" category;[34] thereby resulting in a violation of PNC. As a result, a pre-existing preponderator (*murajjiḥ*)[35] would be needed for the actual existence of the possible, or else, it would result in the impossibility of simultaneously affirming "equality" between a.) the two properties of existence and nonexistence in tandem, along with b.) the affirmation of the state of already existing.[36] This would be equivalent to affirming the

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ʿAbd Allah b. Ḥijāzī al-Sharqāwī, *Ḥāshiyat al-Sharqāwī ʿalā Sharḥ al-Hudhudī ʿalā al-ʿAqīda al-Sanūsīyya* (Cairo: Dār al-Iḥsān, 2017), 139.

34 Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭār (d. 1250 h) states:

اعلم أن المدعى هو احتياج الممكن لمؤثر خارج هو واجب الوجود وتقرير الدليل هكذا: لو حدث الممكن بنفسه لترجح أحد طرفيه على الآخر بلا سبب والتالي باطل فبطل المقدم فثبت نقيضه وهو احتياجه في الوجود لخارج عنه إذ لا واسطة بين وجود الشيء بنفسه وهو الوجود الواجب وبين وجوده من غيره وهو الوجود الإمكاني.

Ḥasan b. Muḥammad al-ʿAṭṭār, *Risāla fī Ḥudūth al-ʿĀlam* (Amman: KR&M, 2018), 62.

35 al-Ghazālī (d. 505 h) defines this principle of causality as:

ونحن لا نريد بالسبب إلا المرجح.

Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *al-Iqtiṣād fī al-Iʿtiqād* (Jeddah: Dār al-Minhāj, 2019), 131. A "*murajjiḥ*" causes the state of existence to preponderate over that of non-existence, and what is meant by cause (*sabab*) here is nothing more than preponderance. Sunni scholars assert the principle of causality purely on rational grounds, not from empirical observations.

36 Ibn ʿĀshir (d. 1042 h) states in his famous poem:

حاجة كل محدث للصانع لو حدثت لنفسها الأكوان لاجتمع التساوي والرجحان وذا محال.

Muḥammad al-Marakshi, *Sharḥ Ibn ʿĀshir* (Beirut: al-Maktaba al-ʿAṣriyya, 2005), 13.

existence and nonexistence of a thing at the very same time, an obvious contradiction.[37] Thus, establishing the need for something other than the possible itself for its existence to be actualized.[38] This "need" indicates that after coming into existence (i.e., being preceded by nonexistence), every existent thing (*hādith*) by virtue of this very "need" is imperfect (*nāqiṣ*), and thus cannot be necessarily existent (*wājib al-wujūd*). The need for every originated event to have a preceding cause, and for *that* "preceding cause" to have a preceding cause of its own, will continue until this chain of causes and effects must necessarily come to an end with what is necessarily existent (*wājib al-wujūd*), i.e., Allah ﷻ, lest we fall into affirming infinite regression,[39] an impossibility. Moreover, to simultaneously attribute independence and dependence to this first "cause" would result in a further contradiction.[40]

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37 Due to PNC.

38 This is unlike that which is currently nonexistent. For the nonexistent does not require a preponderator.
Abū al-Muʿīn al-Nasafī states:

العدم نفي فلا يقتضي تعليلا ولا مخصصا بخلاف الوجود.

Abū al- Muʿīn al-Nasafī, *Tabṣirat al-Adilla* (Damascus: al-Jaffan & al-Jabi, 1990), 78.

39 Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī (d. 1373 h) states:

فإذا كان «لا بد لكل حادث من علة»، وإلا «لزم منه الرجحان من غير مرجح»، ولزم منه «التناقض»؛ فإما أن تكون العلة أيضاً حادثةً كالمعلول، أو قديمة واجبةً. فعلى الشق الثاني، يثبت المطلوب؛ أعني وجود الواجب، الذي يكنى به عن الله، كما يكنى عنه في اصطلاح فلاسفة الغرب بـ «المطلق». وعلى الشق الأول، يلزم أن تكون هذه العلة القريبة، المتصلة بالمعلول، مستندة إلى علة أخرى بعيدة، وهي علة العلة. فإن كانت هذه البعيدة قديمة واجبةً، ثبت المطلوب في المرحلة الثانية، وإن كانت ممكنة احتاجت إلى علة أخرى، أبعد من الثانية، التي هي علة العلة. وهكذا دواليك، إلى أن تتسلسل العلل، أي علل الحادثات، الحادثةُ إلى غير نهاية، فيلزمَ التسلسل المحالُ، أو ينقطع التسلسل في علة تكون قديمةً واجبةً، ويثبت المطلوب.

Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī, *Mawqif al-ʿAql wa al-ʿIlm wa al-ʿĀlam min Rabb al-ʿĀlamīn wa ʿIbādih al-Mursalīn* (Damascus: Dār al-Tarbiya, 2007), 2:166.

40 al-Sanūsī (d. 895 h) defines divinity as independence and freedom from having any need from anyone or anything, while all else are in need of it.

إذ معنى الألوهية استغناء الإله عن كل ما سواه وافتقار كل ما عداه إليه.

Bearing the above in mind, it can further be asserted that based on the aforementioned definition for the possible category, by its very quiddity, having the characteristic to either "possibly" exist or *not* exist must be an intrinsic attribute (*ṣifa dhātiyya*) that cannot be removed from it since the very conception of the quiddity of the possible necessitates this, or else it would result in an inversion (*inqilāb*) of the realities of things as we know them,[41] whereby the possible now becomes the necessary, resulting in a violation of PNC. This is different from other attributes that are extrinsic (*ʿaraḍiyya*) such that its removal or modification would not prevent conceiving the essence of that possible thing.[42] Furthermore, when the attribute of "possibility" for the possible is intrinsically necessary (*wājib dhātī*), then it necessarily follows that the possible cannot have an independent effectuation (*taʾthīr dhātī*) of its own;[43] neither to originate itself

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Ibrāhīm al-Bājūrī, *Ḥāshiyat al-Bājūrī ʿalā Matn al-Sanūsiyya* (Damascus: Dār al-Farfūr, 2001), 18.

41 Saʿīd Fūda, *Aqsām al-Ḥukm al-ʿAqlī wa Bayān Maʿnāhā wa al-ʿAlāqa bayn al-ʿAql wa bayn al-Naql* (Amman: al-Rāzī.net), 9-10.

42 Ibn Sīnā (d. 427 h) states that an example of this type would be the color of a human:

> الذاتي ما إذا فهم معناه وأخطر بالبال وفهم ما هو ذاتي له وأخطر بالبال معه لم يمكن أن تفهم ذات الموصوف إلا بعد فهم ذلك المعنى أولا كالإنسان والحيوان فإنك إذا فهمت ما الحيوان وفهمت ما الإنسان فلا تفهم الإنسان إلا وقد فهمت أولا أنه حيوان وأما ما ليس ذاتيا فقد تفهم ذات الموصوف مجردا دونه ككونه أبيض أو موجودا مثلا.

Saʿīd Fūda, *Tadʿīm al-Manṭiq* (Amman: Dār al-Nūr, 2013), 97.

43 al-Dīmānī (d. 1244 h) states:

> ككون الشيء من الخلق يؤثر بطبعه أو على سبيل التعليل أو يؤثر بقوة أودعها الله أي في تأثير القدرة الحادثة أو يؤثر باختياره بقدرة خلقها الله له. ومذهب أهل السنة لبن خالص من دم القدرية وفرث الجبرية. (ويلزم) أي: لو كان للقدرة الحادثة تأثير للزم (فيه) أي: في تأثير القدرة الحادثة (أيضا استحالة ما علم إمكانه) أي: لو كان للقدرة الحادثة تأثير للزم استحالة ما علم إمكانه (إذ الأفعال يصح تعلق القدرة القديمة بها قبل تعلق القدرة الحادثة فلو منعتها القدرة الحادثة للزم ما ذكر) أي: استحالة ما علم إمكانه وهو الممكن الذي فرض أن القدرة الحادثة أثرت فيه فيستحيل أن توجده لما في إيجاده من تحصيل الحاصل. ويستحيل أن تبقيه على عدمه لما في إبقائه على عدمه من رفع الواقع.

Aḥmad b. al-ʿĀqil al-Dīmānī, *Sharḥ al-ʿAqīda al-Kubrā lil-Sanūsī* (Tunisia: Nizār

nor for its continued existence thereafter. If supposedly we were to assign the property of independent effectuation to the possible, this would result in it no longer being subject to the omnipotence of Allah ﷻ, or that He is unable to oppose this independent effectuation.[44] If one were to argue that the decree of Allah ﷻ could just fall in agreement with each instance of the possible's independent effectuation, this would result in a metaphysical overdetermination (*taḥṣīl al-ḥāṣil*)[45] thereby rendering the omnipotence of Allah ﷻ superfluous. Worse yet, an assertion that the possible's independent effectuation could defy the decree of Allah ﷻ or can entirely take the place of it would result in an inversion of realities such that the omnipotence of Allah ﷻ is no longer absolute and omnipotent over all possible beings.[46] This would entail that a certain thing can come into existence without the decree of Allah ﷻ which is impossible since the omnipotence of Allah ﷻ

Hammādī), 137.

44 Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī states:

ولا يجوز القول بالأسباب في دين التوحيد إلا على تقدير أن تكون سببيتها مجعولة مستعارة لا أصلية غير قابلة للتبديل والتغيير ولا يقول لشيء من الأشياء في الكائنات بخاصة ناشئة من ذاته غير قابلة للانفكاك عنه إلا الطبيعي المنكر للإله بالمرة أو المعترف بالإله غير المختار.

Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī, *Mawqif al-ʿAql wa al-ʿIlm wa al-ʿĀlam min Rabb al-ʿĀlamīn wa ʿIbādih al-Mursalīn* (Damascus: Dār al-Tarbiya, 2007), 4:34.

45 Once something has been effectuated, then it would not require any other effector to effect anything. In other words, once the cause of a given effect has been determined, assigning to it a second cause is impossible. Therefore, this is an impossibility.

46 al-Ghazālī states regarding the impossibility of the occurrent-power (*al-qudra al-ḥāditha*) being independent:

واستحالته راجعة إلى عموم تعلق القدرة وأن خروجه عن القدرة مبطل عموم تعلقها وهو محال ثم موجب للعجز والتمانع...أن الحادثات كلها جواهرها وأعراضها الحادثة منها في ذات الأحياء والجمادات واقعة بقدرة الله سبحانه وتعالى وهو المستبد باختراعها وليس تقع بعض المخلوقات ببعض بل الكل يقع بالقدرة وذلك ما أردنا أن نبين من إثبات صفة القدرة لله تعالى وعموم حكمها وما اتصل بها من الفروع واللوازم.

Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *al-Iqtiṣād fī al-Iʿtiqād* (Jeddah: Dār al-Minhāj, 2019), 225-226.
See also: ʿIzza Ramaḍān al-ʿĀbida, *al-Qudra al-Ilāhiyya wa ʿĀlam al-Asbab* (Abū Dhabi: Tabah Foundation, 2018), 50.

being absolute is a rational judgment that cannot be restricted or qualified (*takhṣīs*).[47] Additionally, if one insisted on simultaneously affirming a.) the absolute omnipotence of Allah ﷻ in that He alone brings into being all possible things, as well as b.) the independent effectuation of the possible, then this would result in the possible being from the impossible. Given that this consequent is observably false, it then follows that its antecedent must also be false at the outset.[48]

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47 Al-Ghazālī states:

> إن قدرته تعالى متعلقة بكل ممكن فإن الإمكان لا ينحصر في عدد ومناسبة ذات القدرة لا تختص بعدد دون عدد فلا يمكن أن يشار إلى حركة فيقال إنها خارجة عن إمكان تعلق القدرة بها مع أنها تعلقت بمثلها إذ بالضرورة نعلم أن ما وجب للشيء وجب لمثله.

Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *al-Iqtiṣād fī al-Iʿtiqād* (Jeddah: Dār al-Minhāj, 2019), 207-208.

The Amman-based, Palestinian specialist in *kalam*, Saʿīd Fūda states:

> والأحكام العقلية لا يجوز تخصيصها...إن مما يتميز به أهل السنة والجماعة هو أنهم لم يخرجوا ممكنا موجودا من أن يكون متعلقا من متعلقات قدرة الله سبحانه وتعالى.

Saʿīd Fūda, *Tafrīʿ al-Sharḥ al-Ṣawt al-Musajjal ʿalā Mukhtaṣar Matn al-Kharīda al-Bahiyya* (Amman: al-Aslein), 13-14.

Likewise, Ibn Amīr Ḥājj al-Ḥalabī al-Ḥanafī explains how things that do not undergo abrogation, such as rational necessities for Allah ﷻ, are not subject to change:

> في التجويز العقلي ونفي الاحتمال في نفس الأمر فلا يكون الحق أن يقال ما موجبه لا يحتمل التبدّل نعم العلم بالأمور التي لا تقبل النسخ لذاتها كالعلم بوجوب وجود الواجب لذاته وبامتناع شريكه ونحو ذلك لا يحتمل النقيض بالمعنى المذكور لا يتأتّى فيها التجويز العقلي للنقيض.

Ibn Amīr Ḥājj al-Ḥalabī al-Ḥanafī, *al-Taqrīr wa al-Taḥbīr* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1983), 1:40-41.

48 The **absolute** omnipotence of Allah ﷻ requires that all possible things be subject to the omnipotence of Allah ﷻ. This extends to the perceived omnipotence that we possess by which we carry out our actions. For any action X we do will only come to actualization after the omnipotence needed in ourselves to carry it out is first actualized before it. But as is obvious, this created-omnipotence within us is likewise subject to the omnipotence of Allah ﷻ. Therefore, for one to simultaneously claim to affirm both the absolute omnipotence of Allah ﷻ as well as the independent effectuation by the possible, would necessitate that this

Therefore, it is Allah ﷻ alone Who originated the universe and all that it contains along with its continued existence due to the intrinsic "need" of the possible for the necessarily-existent (*wājib al-wujūd*), Allah ﷻ Himself.[49]

created-omnipotence in us prevents the interrelationship (*taʿalluq*) of the omnipotence of Allah ﷻ with action X. Such a consequence would further result in action X being from the impossible by definition, on account of it no longer being subject to the omnipotence of Allah ﷻ.
Al-Dusūqī (d. 1296 h) explains:

تقرير هذا البرهان أنه لو كان للقدرة الحادثة تأثير للزم عود الممكن مستحيلا لكن التالي باطل فبطل المقدم. وبيان الملازمة أن كل فعل للعبد قبل أن يوجد قدرته عليه ممكن وكل ممكن مقدور لله تعالى. ينتج: كل فعل للعبد وجود قدرته عليه مقدور لله. ثم إذا خلق الله قدرة في العبد وكانت مانعة من تعلق قدرة الله تعالى كما يقول الخصم لزم ما ذكر من عود الممكن مستحيلا.

Muhammad b. ʿArafa al-Dusūqī, *Ḥāshiyat al-Dusūqī ʿalā Sharḥ al-ʿAqīda al-Kubrā lil-Sanūsī* cf. Aḥmad b. al-ʿĀqil al-Dīmānī, *Sharḥ al-ʿAqīda al-Kubrā lil-Sanūsī* (Tunisia: Nizār Hammādī), 137.

Note that we affirm that everything needs a cause by metaphysical necessity, yet we also deny that any contingent thing can be a cause also by metaphysical necessity. Therefore, it follows that the totality of contingent beings proceeds from a single, necessary cause. The Sunni definition of causation is not founded in sense experience.

49 Al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d. 816 h) explains that the possible's requirement for a cause (*muʾaththir*) for its initial occurrence will still remain for its continued existence every moment thereafter by virtue of its metaphysical essence not inherently possessing an entitlement to exist due to eternally possessing the two properties of existence and nonexistence in equality:

أنّ اتصاف الممكن بالوجود في زمان حدوثه كما لم يكن مقتضى ذاته إلى طرفي وجوده وعدمه كذلك انضمام ذلك الوجود إليه وبقاء اتصافه به في الزمان الثاني ليس مقتضى ذاته لأن استواء نسبته إلى طرفيه أمر لازم له في حدّ ذاته فكما استحالة اقتضاؤه الوجود في الزمان الأوّل استحال اقتضاؤه إياه في الزمان الثاني فكما أن اتصافه بالوجود في زمان الحدوث مستند إلى المؤثر كذلك اتصافه به في الزمان الثاني والأول هو اتصافه بأصل الوجود والثاني هو اتصافه ببقاء الوجود فهو في وجوده ابتداء وفي استمراره محتاج إلى المؤثر الذي يفيده الوجود ويديمه له وحاجته إليه في حال بقائه ودوامه كحاجته إليه في ابتداء وجوده فلو فرض انقطاع فيضان نور الوجود من الصانع تعالى على العالم في آن لم يبق موجودا.

Al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī, *Ḥāshiyat al-Tajrīd* (Istanbul: ISAM, 2020), 2:226.

We also know that Allah ﷻ is *the* freely-willing agent (*al-fā'il al-mukhtār*),[50] first, by virtue of the universe coming into existence,[51] and second, by observing the specification of it and all that it contains,[52] including prophethood,[53] the bedrock of this religion. If Allah ﷻ is not a

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Ibn Kamāl Pāshā (d. 940 h) similarly states in his *Risāla fī Taḥqīq Luzūm al-Imkān lil-Mumkin*:

> إن الإمكان الذاتي الذي كلامنا فيه مستند إلى الذات من حيث هي هي فلا يتصور انفكاكها عنه وإلا لم تكن تلك الذات لانتفاء مقتضاها من حيث هي هي.

Ibn Kamāl Pāshā, *Majmū' Rasā'il Bin Kamāl Bāshā* (Istanbul: Dār al-Lubāb, 2018), 6:470.

Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Samarqandī likewise states:

> إن الممكن حالة البقاء لا يستغني عن المؤثر: بأنا بينا أن علة الحاجة إنما هي الإمكان والإمكان لازم للماهية لامتناع الانقلاب والماهية محتاجة أبدا.

Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Samarqandī, *al-Ma'ārif fī Sharḥ al-Ṣaḥā'if* (Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya lil-Turāth, 2018), 1:696.

50 Allah ﷻ states in the Qur'ān: "Your Lord creates what He wills and chooses" – 28:68.

Al-Zabīdī (d. 1205 h) states regarding this verse:

> الفاعل المختار كامل في ذاته وصفاته وله الاختيار قبل الفعل ومع الفعل وبعد الفعل والكامل في ذاته وصفاته فاعل مختار «وربك يخلق ما يشاء ويختار».

Murtaḍā al-Zabīdī, *Itḥāf al-Sādat al-Muttaqīn bi Sharḥ Ihyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn* (Damascus: Dār al-Fikar), 9:455.

51 See al-Ghazālī's proofs for the universe being contingent: Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *al-Iqtiṣād fī al-I'tiqād* (Jeddah: Dār al-Minhāj, 2019), 129-143, 234-235.

52 Al-Sanūsī states that due to the creator having specified one equal property in place of another for the universe, it becomes incumbent that He is a freely-willing originator:

> وفاعل العالم قد خصّص مثلا عن مثل فتعيّن أن يكون موجدا بالاختيار.

Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Sanūsī, *Sharḥ al-'Aqīda al-Kubrā* (Damascus: Dār al-Taqwā, 2019), 200.

53 Allah ﷻ states in the Qur'ān (14:11):

> قَالَتْ لَهُمْ رُسُلُهُمْ إِن نَّحْنُ إِلَّا بَشَرٌ مِّثْلُكُمْ وَلَـٰكِنَّ ٱللَّهَ يَمُنُّ عَلَىٰ مَن يَشَآءُ مِنْ عِبَادِهِۦ

freely-willing agent, then it would be inconceivable for one *specific* man to have been selected to receive His revelation amongst many other men.

Once it is understood that i.) all things that have come into existence must require Allah ﷻ for their initial origination and for their continued existence and that ii.) He is a freely-willing agent, then any miraculous or supernatural event that results in the rupture of the norm would be possible so long as it does not result in a violation of PI/PNC. This is because it would be illogical to suggest that something that intrinsically requires Allah ﷻ for its initial origination and for its continued existence at every moment thereafter, can somehow be independent from His Divine discretion (*irāda*). The very nature (*māhiyya*) of the staff of Prophet Mūsā ﷺ, for example, requires it to be from the possible, and therefore susceptible to nonexistence at any given moment after its existence.[54] After the staff's

"Their messengers said to them, "We are indeed only humans like you, but Allah favors whoever He chooses of His servants."

وَأَنَا ٱخْتَرْتُكَ فَٱسْتَمِعْ لِمَا يُوحَىٰٓ

"I have chosen you, so listen to what is revealed." – 20:13.

Presumably, it was on account of these verses that led al-Rāzi (d. 606 h) to state in his final book that if Allah ﷻ were not a freely-willing agent, it would impair the concept of prophethood whereby one man amongst many was chosen to receive revelation:

لا شك إن هذه الحوادث المعتادة منتهية إلى أول. وإلا لزم القول بحدوث حوادث لا أول لها وذلك يوجب قدم العالم وقدم العالم يقدح في إثبات الفاعل المختار والقدح في الفاعل المختار يمنع من القول بصحة النبوة فثبت أنه لا بد من الاعتراف بوجوب انتهاء هذه الحوادث المعتادة إلى أول ومبدأ.

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Maṭālib al-ʿĀliyya* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1999), 8:34.

54 Al-Rāzī explains that everything aside from Allah ﷻ is contingent (*muḥdath*) and that every contingent is susceptible to existence or nonexistence, and that this property is intrinsic (*lāzim*) to its very quiddity (*māhiyya*). Moreover, all that is intrinsically necessary to the essence must necessarily be, in perpetuity, for as long as the essence is. Thus, the susceptibility of nonexistence for the possible is always plausible:

لنا: إنا بينا في مسألة حدوث العالم: أن كل ما سوى الله تعالى فهو محدث، وكل محدث فان حقيقته قابلة للعدم والوجود. وهذه القابلية من لوازم الماهية. وكل ما كان من لوازم الماهية، فانه واجب الدوام في جميع زمان دوام الماهية. فإذن قابلية العدم من لوازم ماهية كل ما سوى

initial origination, it only remained in existence for every moment thereafter because Allah ﷻ willed its continued existence; its quiddity alone cannot sustain its own existence, as explained above. Combining this with knowing that Allah ﷻ is a freely-willing agent having omnipotence over all things possible, entails the possibility of changing this staff into a serpent at any given moment.[55]

الله تعالى. وهذا يقتضي جواز العدم على كل ما سوى الله تعالى.

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Arbaʿīn fī Uṣūl al-Dīn* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Kulliya al-Azhariyya, 1986), 2:44.

55 An objection may arise that such supernatural transformations conflicts with what was said earlier about inversions (inqilāb) of the realities (*ḥaqāʾiq*) of things not being permitted. However, al-Ālūsī (d. 1270 h) elucidates that according to many of the *mutakallimūn* such a transformation is in reality just a rearrangement of atoms that leads to the formation of new substances with different properties, akin to what we know occurs in a chemical reaction. What would in fact be impossible is to assert that the object was a staff and a serpent simultaneously at the very same moment.

والآية ظاهرة في جواز انقلاب الشيء عن حقيقته كانقلاب النحاس إلى الذهب وبه قال جمع، ولا مانع في القدرة من توجه الأمر التكويني إلى ذلك وتخصيص الإرادة له، وقيل: لا يجوز لأن قلب الحقائق محال والقدرة لا تتعلق به والحق الأول بمعنى أنه تعالى يخلق بدل النحاس مثلا ذهبا على ما هو رأي بعض المحققين أو بأن يسلب عن أجزاء النحاس الوصف الذي صار به نحاسا ويخلق فيه الوصف الذي يصير به ذهبا على ما هو رأي بعض المتكلمين من تجانس الجواهر واستوائها في قبول الصفات، والمحال إنما هو انقلابه ذهبا مع كونه نحاسا لامتناع كون الشيء في الزمن الواحد نحاسا وذهبا، وانقلاب العصا حية كان بأحد هذين الاعتبارين والله تعالى أعلم بأيهما كان، والذي أميل إليه الثاني فإن في كون خلق البدل انقلابا خفاء كما لا يخفى.

Muḥammad Shihāb al-Dīn al-Ālūsī, *Rūḥ al-Maʿānī* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1994), 8:493-494.

Finally, Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī states that once it is known that Allah ﷻ is a freely-willing agent attributed with omnipotence, then no one has a right to claim the impossibility of the universe behaving contrary to its observed norms:

والله تعالى سنّ تلك السنة مختاراً لا مجبوراً، وفي يد قدرته تغييرها متى شاء، وليس لأحد أن يدعي عدم إمكان أن تكون سنة الكون على خلاف ما كانت.

Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī, *Mawqif al-ʿAql wa al-ʿIlm wa al-ʿĀlam min Rabb al-ʿĀlamīn wa*

Coming back to the discussion regarding the creation of Ādam ﷺ, it may be argued that a human (*insān/bashar*) is normally born from two biological parents, and since Ādam ﷺ is described as a "bashar" in scripture, he must be attributed with a pair of biological parents. However, the words *insān* and *bashar* in Arabic do not analytically require that one must be born to two biological parents.[56] Furthermore, as the following pages will demonstrate, being born from a pair of two parents is **not** an intrinsic (*dhātī*) necessity for a human. As such, no violation of PNC is entailed by believing that Ādam ﷺ was created without a pair of biological parents.[57] The Qur'ān itself attests to this by stating that 'Īsā ﷺ was created without a biological father,[58] yet his humanity was never brought into question.[59] If a Muslim decides to obdurately reject the possibility of an insān/bashar being created without a parent(s), he would fall into disbelief (*kufr*) for

'Ibādih al-Mursalīn (Damascus: Dār al-Tarbiya, 2007), 2:248-249.

56 Al-Ash'arī states that due consideration to lexical connotations will be given when specialists of that language include such connotations in the meaning of that word. Here, al-Ash'arī suggests that Arabic linguists have *not* included the word "insān" to mean that it must be a product of semen:

وهكذا اعتبارنا في الإنسان الذي هو من نطفة بأنه هل كان إنسانا لأنه من نطفة وهل معنى أنه من نطفة؟ فإذا وجدنا أهل اللغة يشيرون إلى ما كان بهذا التركيب المخصوص/المؤلف على هذه البنية بأنه إنسان لأجل ما هو عليه من التركيب والبنية علمنا أنه كان إنسانا لأجل أنه بهذا التركيب فقضينا بأن كل ما كان على مثل تركيبه أنسان ورجعنا في إطلاق الاسم عليه إلى توقيف أهل اللغة.

Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan b. Fūrak, *Mujarrad Maqālāt al-Shaykh Abī al-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī* (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1987), 291.

See further definitions in:
Manṣūr 'Abd al-Ḥakīm, *Qiṣṣat Abīnā Ādam min al-Ṭīn ilā al-Janna* (Damascus: Dār al-Kitāb al-'Arabi, 2012), 20-32.

57 Al-Bājūrī (d. 1276 h) states:

ولا يرد: أن في ذلك قلب الحقائق وهو ممتنع لأن امتناع قلب الحقائق مختص بأقسام الحكم العقلي فلا ينقلب الواجب جائزا مثلا.

Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad al-Bājūrī, *Tuḥfat al-Murīd* (Amman: Dār al-Nūr, 2016), 491.

58 In propositional logic, the case of 'Īsā ﷺ would function as the particular negative (*sāliba juz'iyya*) in contradiction (*naqīḍ*) of the universal judgment that "all humans possess a pair of biological parents."

59 See verses 4:172, 19:19, 19:29, 19:30, and 43:59 regarding 'Īsā ﷺ being a human.

rejecting the humanity of ʿĪsā ﷺ. If on the other hand, he was to affirm a father for ʿĪsā ﷺ, then consequently it would lead to affirming a consort for Maryam ﷺ, another blasphemy (*kufr*).[60] Thus, the Muslim evolutionist who denies that an insān/bashar could have been created without a parent is left with only two choices, both equating to kufr. Moreover, Allah ﷻ mentions in the Qurʾān that after dying, each human will be resurrected and judged on the Day of Judgment:

> "To Him is your return all together. Allah's promise is always true. Indeed, He originates the creation then resurrects it so that He may justly reward those who believe and do good. But those who disbelieve will have a boiling drink and a painful punishment for their disbelief."[61]

Allah ﷻ further states how the disbelievers deny the bodily resurrection[62] in the Hereafter:

> Do people not see that We have created them from a sperm-drop, then—behold! —they openly challenge Us? And they argue with Us—forgetting they were created—saying, "Who will give life to decayed bones?" Say, [O Prophet], "They will be revived by the One Who produced them the first time, for He has [perfect] knowledge of every created being. [He is the One] Who gives you fire from green trees, and—behold! —you kindle [fire] from them. Can the One Who created the heavens and the earth not easily resurrect these [deniers]?" Yes, [He can]! For He is the Master Creator, All-Knowing. All it takes, when He wills something to be, is simply to say to it: "Be!" And it is![63]

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60 See verses 3:47, 4:171, and 19:16-23 regarding ʿĪsā ﷺ not having a father.

61 10:4

إِلَيْهِ مَرْجِعُكُمْ جَمِيعًا ۖ وَعْدَ ٱللَّهِ حَقًّا ۚ إِنَّهُۥ يَبْدَؤُا۟ ٱلْخَلْقَ ثُمَّ يُعِيدُهُۥ لِيَجْزِىَ ٱلَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوا۟ وَعَمِلُوا۟ ٱلصَّٰلِحَٰتِ بِٱلْقِسْطِ ۚ وَٱلَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا۟ لَهُمْ شَرَابٌ مِّنْ حَمِيمٍ وَعَذَابٌ أَلِيمٌۢ بِمَا كَانُوا۟ يَكْفُرُونَ

62 Abū al-Barakāt al-Nasafī (d. 710 h) relates agreement of the Muslims on the resurrection being bodily:

أهل الإسلام متفقون على إثبات المعاد الجسماني.

Abū al-Barakāt al-Nasafī, *al-Iʿtimād fī al-Iʿtiqād* (Damascus: Maktabat Dār al-Fajr, 2020), 323.

63 36:77-82

As well as:

> "Do people think We cannot reassemble their bones? Yes [indeed]! We are most capable of restoring [even] their very fingertips. Still people want to deny what is yet to come, asking [mockingly], "When is this Day of Judgment?"[64]

As per these verses, each human will be resurrected in the Hereafter without being a product of sexual reproduction again and subsequently born a second time. Setting aside the creation of Ādam ﷺ for a moment, we can infer from the above that Allah ﷻ has informed us of at least three different ways in which He creates humans: sexual reproduction, asexual reproduction,[65] and without reproduction.[66] Again, the Muslim evolutionist must question himself on what grounds can he affirm the bodily resurrec-

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أَوَلَمْ يَرَ ٱلْإِنسَـٰنُ أَنَّا خَلَقْنَـٰهُ مِن نُّطْفَةٍ فَإِذَا هُوَ خَصِيمٌ مُّبِينٌ وَضَرَبَ لَنَا مَثَلًا وَنَسِيَ خَلْقَهُۥ قَالَ مَن يُحْيِ ٱلْعِظَـٰمَ وَهِيَ رَمِيمٌ قُلْ يُحْيِيهَا ٱلَّذِيٓ أَنشَأَهَآ أَوَّلَ مَرَّةٍ وَهُوَ بِكُلِّ خَلْقٍ عَلِيمٌ ٱلَّذِي جَعَلَ لَكُم مِّنَ ٱلشَّجَرِ ٱلْأَخْضَرِ نَارًا فَإِذَآ أَنتُم مِّنْهُ تُوقِدُونَ أَوَلَيْسَ ٱلَّذِي خَلَقَ ٱلسَّمَـٰوَٰتِ وَٱلْأَرْضَ بِقَـٰدِرٍ عَلَىٰٓ أَن يَخْلُقَ مِثْلَهُم بَلَىٰ وَهُوَ ٱلْخَلَّـٰقُ ٱلْعَلِيمُ إِنَّمَآ أَمْرُهُۥٓ إِذَآ أَرَادَ شَيْـًٔا أَن يَقُولَ لَهُۥ كُن فَيَكُونُ.

64 75:3-6

أَيَحْسَبُ ٱلْإِنسَـٰنُ أَلَّن نَّجْمَعَ عِظَامَهُۥ بَلَىٰ قَـٰدِرِينَ عَلَىٰٓ أَن نُّسَوِّيَ بَنَانَهُۥ بَلْ يُرِيدُ ٱلْإِنسَـٰنُ لِيَفْجُرَ أَمَامَهُۥ يَسْـَٔلُ أَيَّانَ يَوْمُ ٱلْقِيَـٰمَةِ.

65 Via immaculate conception in the case of Maryam ﷺ with ʿĪsā ﷺ.

66 It bears mentioning here that independent of considering any current experiences or observations, when there is an effect that could have been a result of any one of a multitude of different causes, then the mere appearance of the effect itself can only point towards the necessity of *a* "cause" but cannot decisively indicate its *specific* cause. Al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī states:

فإن وجود المعلول لا يدلّ على وجود علة بعينه بل يدلّ على وجود علة ما...والعلم بالمعلول المعيّن لا يستلزم إلا العلم بعلة ما.

Ḥasan b. Muḥammad al-ʿAṭṭār, *Ḥāshiyat al-ʿAṭṭār ʿalā al-Tadhhīb Sharḥ ʿalā Tahdhīb al-Manṭiq wa al-Kalām* (Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābi al-Ḥalabī, 1936), 422.

Likewise, al-Juwaynī states:

لا يتقرّر تأثير العلّة إلا مع القطع بأن الحكم لا يثبت دونها.

tion of a human on Earth without any parents on the Day of Judgment[67] but deny the possibility of it on Earth now?[68] We observe time after time that animals are created by means of sexual reproduction involving a pair of two biological parents. However, we have also come to know that many different organisms, amphibians, crustaceans, reptiles, and insects are also known to reproduce both sexually and asexually, while even some mammals have been found to reproduce asexually in laboratories. Furthermore, as mentioned above, Allah ﷻ informed us in the Qurʾān regarding the case of ʿĪsā ﷺ, the she-camel of Ṣāliḥ ﷺ, the serpent of Mūsā ﷺ, and the bird of ʿĪsā ﷺ all of whom were created without sexual reproduction. These examples and those narrated in unequivocal terms in the Qurʾān indicate to us that while being created through sexual reproduction is the norm, it is by no means the only possible process by which animals can be created. Our ability to arrive at this is a rational conclusion. Based on this rational conclusion, the mind immediately recognizes that no violation of first principles, such as PNC, occurs in these examples and incidents. For that which can be different from the norm (*takhalluf*) **in actuality** could never be in violation of a rational constant such as PNC nor could it be posited that this norm is a necessary concomitant[69] with the essence of that very

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ʿAbd al-Mālik b. Yūsuf al-Juwaynī, *al-Shāmil fī Uṣūl al-Dīn* (Tehran: Tehran University, 1981), 63.

Al-Ghazālī elaborates further by stating that the necessary relationship between a cause and its effect is only certain when the number of causes is limited to one. In the case that more than one cause is conceivable then the mere negation of just one cause does not necessitate the negation of the effect:

العلاقة التي بين العلة والمعلول ويلزم من تقدير عدم العلة عدم المعلول إن لم يكن للمعلول إلا علة واحدة فإن تصوّر أن تكون له علة أخرى فيلزم من تقدير نفي كلّ العلل نفي المعلول ولا يلزم من تقدير نفي علة بعينها نفي المعلول مطلقا بل يلزم نفي معلول تلك العلة على الخصوص.

Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *al-Iqtiṣād fī al-Iʿtiqād* (Jeddah: Dār al-Minhāj, 2019), 379.

67 Similarly, the example of the resurrection would function as the particular-negative (sāliba juzʾiyya) of the judgment that "all humans are created through either sexual or asexual reproduction".

68 In fact, every Muslim must admit that from the time of the creation of the first man on Earth till after the Day of Judgment, the number of times a human will be created without any means of sexual or asexual reproduction will outnumber the times a human will be created through both kinds of reproduction combined.

69 i.e., *lāzim lil-dhāt/māhiyya*

thing. Accordingly, hearing of a human being created without a parent(s) would admittedly be atypical (read: "*kharq al-ʿāda*") but not irrational.[70]

To Whom Do We Attribute Cause?

At this juncture, it will help to flesh out the difference between what is meant by the metaphysical reason (*wajh al-iqtirān*) for a given occurrence versus its actual conjunction (*nafs al-iqtirān*). This difference is succinctly explained in al-Ghazālī's example that every rational person would immediately acknowledge the certain death of anyone whose neck has been severed. A philosophical naturalist would attribute the outcome here to be one of absolute rational necessity (*luzūm ḍarūrī*) such that it would be impossible for it to ever be otherwise; while the Muslim will attribute the metaphysical cause here to be a result of the governance of Allah ﷻ as per His pre-eternal will. In other words, neither of the two disagree in the constant conjunction (*nafs al-iqtirān*) between death and the severance of the neck, rather, the disagreement lies in the metaphysical cause.[71] Likewise, there is no dispute

70 Al-Ghazālī states that there are many wondrous and strange things we have never witnessed before that fall into what is possible for Allah ﷻ. Why then, should we deny their possibility and judge them to be impossible?

وفي مقدورات الله غرائب وعجائب ونحن لم نشاهد جميعها فلِمَ ينبغي أن ننكر إمكانها ونحكم باستحالتها؟

Michael E. Marmura, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers* (Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2000), 172.

Furthermore, al-Ghazālī states that if the impossibility of a thing cannot be proven demonstratively then denying its possibility sheerly due to its strangeness is not correct:

ما لا برهان على إحالته لا ينبغي أن ينكر بمجرّد الاستبعاد.

Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *al-Iqtiṣād fī al-Iʿtiqād* (Jeddah: Dār al-Minhāj, 2019), 374.

71 Al-Ghazālī states:

فإن قال قائل: كيف تعتقدون هذا يقينا؟ والمتكلمون شكوا فيه وقالوا: ليس الجز سببا للموت ولا الأكل سببا للشبع ولا النار علة للإحراق. ولكن الله تعالى يخلق الإحراق والشبع عند جريان هذه الأمور لا بها. قلنا: قد نبهنا على غور هذا الفصل وحقيقته في كتاب «تهافت الفلاسفة» والقدر المحتاج إليه الآن أن المتكلم إذا أخبره بأن ولده جزت رقبته لم يشك في موته وليس في العقلاء من يشك فيه وهو معترف بحصول الموت وباحث عن وجه الاقتران. وأما النظر في أنه هل هو لزوم ضروري ليس في الإمكان تغييره؟ أو هو

in that for any given man's existence, whom we meet in *this* world, there is the conjunction of sperm meeting egg. The dispute lies in someone claiming that this is an absolute rational necessity such that the chance of an anomaly is impossible, while the Muslim will metaphysically consider sexual reproduction to be in accordance with the customary order of affairs in the world as set by Allah's ﷻ will. Had Allah ﷻ willed a rupture in this norm, then a human could be created via another means, as was done in the past and will occur in the Hereafter.

Demystifying the Parentless Human

It could further be argued that we have never heard of a man being born without a set of biological parents, and so the default judgment regarding any individual should be exactly this. Doesn't this "default judgment" carry any probative value?

In answering this question, it will help to recall what Guessoum stated that when "the Revealed text contradicts the conclusions reached by Reason/Philosophy (and for us later, science)...the (religious) Text must be allegorically understood."[72] The use of "science" as a criterion for forcing allegorical interpretations of the Qur'ān is highly problematic for various reasons. First, it must be understood what exactly is being said when scientists issue normative judgments arrived at by means of the scientific method regarding a given incident or phenomenon.

The physical sciences (i.e., science) only indicate that which materially exists or materially does not exist and are confined to physical observation or detection. The scientific method cannot ascend to making metaphysical judgments regarding whether a given thing must necessarily exist, necessarily cannot exist, or could possibly exist and possibly not exist[73]— meta-

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بحكم جريان سنة الله تعالى لنفوذ مشيئته الأزلية التي لا تحتمل التبديل والتغيير؟ فهو نظر في وجه الاقتران لا في نفس الاقتران. فليفهم هذا وليعلم أن التشكك في موت من جزت رقبته وسواس مجرد. وأن اعتقاد موته يقين لا يستراب فيه.

Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *Miʿyār al-ʿIlm* (Egypt: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1961), 190-191.

By this, the notion that Muslims cannot function as evolutionary biologists without facing some kind of internal contradiction is dispelled. The Muslim scientist will simply be in the pursuit of determining the conventional laws by which the universe has been designed to operate on by its Maker, while the atheist will be in the pursuit of determining what he believes is an absolutely necessary cause.

72 Nidhal Guessoum, *Islam's Quantum Question* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), xx.

73 Refer to Table I. for definitions of these terms.

physical questions are not amenable to the scientific method. Rather, the assertion of universal, perennial judgments of this kind (i.e., metaphysical) regarding existence and nonexistence fall squarely within the ambit of pure reason, not empirical science.[74] The drawbacks of using scientific inquiry as a criterion in making judgments regarding when the Qur'ān should be allegorically interpreted can readily be perceived by the following description given by Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī:

> In relation to existence, the scope of potential possibility of existence (*imkān*)[75] is vastly broader in scope than the scope of actualized-existence (*wuqūʿ*);[76] while the scope of actualized-existence (*wuqūʿ*) is broader than the scope of necessary-existence (*ḍarūrat al-wuqūʿ*);[77] and finally the scope of non-existence (*lāwuqūʿ*)[78] is broader than the scope of impossibility of existence (*istiḥāla*).[79] Thus, empirical/nomic judgments (read: "science") only pertain to the two categories of actualized-existence (*wuqūʿ*) and non-existence (*lāwuqūʿ*) while the remaining three categories of »existence« (*imkān*, *ḍarūrat al-wuqūʿ*, and *istiḥāla*) can only be ascertained by reason. Moreover, even within these two categories that empirical judgments relate to (actualized-existence and non-existence), it alone **cannot** universalize a given judgment that lies in the non-existence (*lāwuqūʿ*) category.[80]

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74 Saʿīd Fūda states in this vein:

والدلالة العادية من شأنها أن تدل على ما وقع فإنه دال على ما دل عليه ووقوعه معلوم بالحس أما دلالته فبالعقل بتوسط العادة فالعادة هنا واسطة الدلالة على الثبوت فهي قاطعة بذلك وليس من شأن العادة أن تدل على استحالة ألا تقع المعجزة لأن عدم وقوعها مجرد احتمال عقلي.

Saʿīd Fūda, *al-Sharḥ al-Kabīr* (Beirut: Dār al-Dhakhā'ir, 2014), 1:468.

75 All that could exist.

76 All which has ever existed or will exist in the future.

77 That which preeternally has always existed, continues to do so, and will forever eternally exist.

78 Includes all that does not exist.

79 All that can never possibly exist.

80 Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī states:

لم يميّزوا ما هو غير واقع بالنظر إلى تجريبتنا عما هو محال في حين أن بينهما فرقا عظيما لأن المحال أخصّ مما ليس بواقع فهو يزيد على غير الواقع بعدم إمكان الوقوع وفي حين أن

Figure 1 is a visual representation of the scopes for existence and non-existence as explained by Ṣabrī:




Figure 1.1:
Scope for existence.

التجربة الدالة على مجرد الوقوع أو اللاوقوع لا تصعد إلى مرتبة الحكم بضرورة الواقع ولا باستحالة غير الواقع إذ الحكم بالضرورة أو الاستحالة أو الإمكان من اختصاص العقل وليس من شأن التجربة فالإمكان أوسع نطاقا من الوقوع بكثير والوقوع ضيق وضرورة الوقوع أضيق كما أن الاستحالة التي هي بمعنى عدم الإمكان أضيق من عدم الوقوع فها هنا خمس مراتب: الإمكان والوقوع وضرورة الوقوع وعدم الوقوع واستحالة الوقوع فتحكم التجربة في الوقوع واللاوقوع فقط حتى إن حكمها في اللاوقوع لا يكون كليًا بتمام معنى الكلمة أما الثلاثة الباقية فالحاكم فيها العقل.

Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī, *Mawqif al-ʿAql wa al-ʿIlm wa al-ʿĀlam min Rabb al-ʿĀlamīn wa ʿIbādih al-Mursalīn* (Damascus: Dār al-Tarbiya, 2007), 4:31.




Figure 1.2:
Scope for non-existence.

The reason why Ṣabrī asserts that science cannot universalize a given judgment of those things that are from the non-existence (*lāwuqūʿ*) category is because sense-perceptions, observations, experimentation, and induction are only useful for affirmative propositions whereas some inferential reasoning is required to infer negative propositions. Thus, the extent of what the scientific method can tell us with surety is that whatever we have experimented or perceived is indeed exactly what was detected, but it cannot go further in informing us regarding the rational possibility or impossibility of something occurring that is anomalous to what has been tested, without resorting to reason.[81] In other words, empirical methods alone cannot conclude the rational impossibility of an experimental anomaly, just as empirical methods alone cannot reveal the rational necessity of an obtained experimental result.[82] How then can it be rationally said

81 Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī states in this vein:

إذ ليس للعلوم الحديثة المبنية على التجارب الحسية، حق الكلام بالنفي أو الإثبات في
الوجوب والاستحالة، اللذين هما فوق متناول التجربة، والقولُ فيهما للعقل وإنما حدود
التجربة قاصرة على إدراك وقوع الشيء إلى جانب التجربة. أن هذا الضرب من المعرفة هو
ما تنزع إليه عقولنا بصفة خاصة، فالتجربة توقظ العقل، أكثر مما، أو لا وقوعه، العاديين،
دون بلوغ الوقوع حد الوجوب، واللاوقوع حد الاستحالة.

Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī, *Mawqif al-ʿAql wa al-ʿIlm wa al-ʿĀlam min Rabb al-ʿĀlamīn wa ʿIbādih al-Mursalīn* (Damascus: Dār al-Tarbiya, 2007), 2:121.

82 Saʿid Fūda, *Tafrīʿ al-Sharḥ al-Ṣawt al-Musajjal ʿalā Mukhtaṣar Matn al-Kharīda al-Bahiyya* (Amman: al-Aslein), 16.

that a certain miraculous event mentioned in scripture is "impossible" or "possible" based on empirical methods alone? Our nomic, or "default," judgment (*ḥukm ʿādī*) that every human has a set of two parents, is undoubtedly correct from our repeated observation of it. But if we were to imagine, for just a moment, that we have never witnessed or heard about the creation of man except that we knew it could be equally created by means of different processes; then the mere first instance of us witnessing a man would not yield to us by which of these processes it was created from.[83] This first ever observation would only provide us with the fact that there had to have been a process behind its creation.[84] Knowing that it is rationally possible to conceive[85] of a human not having full biological parentage, the nomic judgment of possessing full biological parentage cannot ascend to the level of declaring the **absolute** and **categorical** impossibility of a human without parent(s).[86] This is precisely why al-Rāzī related that it was the position of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, the eponymous Imam of

83 Again, based on what was previously mentioned that man can be created through sexual reproduction, asexual reproduction, and without reproduction, it then follows that the mere affirmation of a human (i.e., the consequent) does not by itself necessitate the affirmation of sexual reproduction being its antecedent. This is due to the possibility of the consequent being a result of several other potentially viable antecedents. Al-Yazdī (d. 981 h) explains this oft-repeated fallacy:

وأما وضع التالي فلا ينتج وضع المقدّم ولا رفع المقدّم ينتج رفع التالي لجواز أن يكون اللازم أعمّ فلا يلزم من تحققه تحقق الملزوم ولا من انتفاء الملزوم انتفاؤه.

ʿAbd Allah al-Yazdī, *Sharḥ Tahdhīb al-Manṭiq* (Amman: Dār al-Nūr, 2018), 330.

84 Al-Māturīdī (d. 333 h) explains how the observation of an effect need not tell us the realities and specifics of its cause, but just the necessity of *a* "cause":

فإن الكتابة تدلّ على الكاتب ولا تدلّ على كيفيّته أو مثله لما يجوز أن يكون ملكا أو بشرا أو جنّا فتكون الكتابة غير دالّة على مائية الكاتب وكيفيّته ولا مثلها وهي تدلّ على كاتب مّا فمثله العالم بما فيه يدلّ على محدث مّا ولا يدلّ على كيفيّته ومائيته وكذلك البناء والنسج والنجر والصناعات.

Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd* (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 2010), 93.

85 See previous footnotes above for how rationality is defined.

86 Recall from Figure 1.1 that the scope of actualized-existence (*wuqūʿ*) is broader than the scope of necessary-existence (*ḍarūrat al- wuqūʿ*). Consequently, affirmation of the more general does not necessitate the affirmation of the specific. Therefore, that which is nomically necessary need not always be rationally necessary, as is the case here.

the Sunni Ashʿarite school of systematic theology, that the occurrence of a man without a set of two biological parents is from the rationally possible.[87] From the definition of nomic judgements (*aḥkām ʿādiyya*), as given by al-Sanūsī,[88] it is clear that our nomic judgments regarding the natural world are primarily based on repeated observations of the order found within the universe.[89] How we normally judge what *can* and *cannot* occur in the universe returns to this ingrained and intuitive nomic judgment. It is only when we step back and analyze things for what they truly are (*fī dhātihi*), based on first principles, that we discover their associated rational judgments. The key lies in understanding each judgment, nomic (*ʿādī*) and rational (*ʿaqlī*), for what each of them truly delineates.[90] Determining

87 Al-Rāzī states regarding Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī's position:

إن مذهبه أنه...يجوز حدوث الإنسان من غير الأبوين.

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Maṭālib al-ʿĀliyya* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1999), 8:21.

88 Al-Sanūsī defines nomic judgments as the affirmation of a relationship between two things through repeated sense-perception with the rational acceptability of a possible anomaly, along with denying any causal influence of any one of those two upon the other. He defines the nomic judgment slightly differently in two different works:

وأما الحكم العادي فهو إثبات الربط بين أمر وأمر وجودا أو عدما بواسطة التكرر مع صحة التخلف وعدم تأثير أحدهما في الآخر ألبتة.

Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Sanūsī, *Sharḥ al-Muqaddimāt* (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Maʿārif, 2009), 68.

وأما الحكم العادي فحقيقته إثبات الربط بين أمر وأمر وجودا أو عدما بواسطة تكرر القران بينهما على الحس.

Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Sanūsī, *Sharḥ Umm al-Barāhīn* (Cairo: Muʾassasat al-ʿAllāma lil-Khidma al-Thaqāfiyya wa al-ʿIlmiyya, 2015), 10.

89 It is erroneously believed by some that because of the immediacy by which our minds believe and accept certain natural phenomena, they then fall under being rational judgments as opposed to nomic judgments. However, nomic judgments would be inclusive of even such judgments that we have blindly accepted as truth from science even though we have not personally witnessed them or even understood them. See to this effect: Abū Isḥāq al-Bannānī (1091 h.), *al-Mawāhib al-Rabbāniyya fī Sharḥ al-Muqaddimāt al-Sanūsiyya* (Cairo: Kashida, 2015), 69.

90 To summarize, the distinguishing difference between a rationally certain

the correct *rational* judgment of a thing relates to what the essence of that thing implies in conjunction with first principles, while the *nomic* judgment of a thing is concerned with the correlations we typically observe in the mundane world. For example, 1+1=2 is from the rationally necessary. This is because PI demands that if you understand what is meant by "1", then by virtue of this identity, "1" must be equivalent to "1" and cannot be equivalent to "*not* 1". As a result, the judgment of "1" plus "1" equaling "2" is a rational necessity. Knowing what is meant by "1" entails that to suggest 1+1≠2 results in a violation of first principles. At the same time, nomically speaking, we have never witnessed a single incident where 1+1 did not equal 2. Thus, the nomic judgment of 1+1=2 would similarly be from the

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judgment and a nomically certain judgment lies in the former's certainty being bi-conditional (*ṭardan wa ʿaksan*) while the latter's certainty being that of co-presence (*ṭardan*) only. The difference between co-presence (*ṭardan*) and co-absence (*ʿaksan*) is that the former merely establishes the relationship that "A is B" while the latter establishes that "A cannot be *not* B". Fulfilling this "bi-conditional" relationship is what gives the rationally certain judgment a type of compounded-certainty while in relation to it the nomically certain judgment is one of simple-certainty. To put it differently, nomically certain judgments generally permit the rational possibility of its opposite (*naqīḍ*) while the rationally certain judgment negates and bars its opposite. Thus, the epistemic value of the rationally certain judgment is greater than the epistemic value of the nomically certain judgment. Saʿīd Fūda explains:

> الفارق بين الحكمين هو فيما يأتي: إنّ الحكم العقلي القطعي يكون فيه الجزم طردا وعكسا وأما الحكم القطعي العادي فإنما يكون فيه الحكم طردا فقط ولا يشترط فيه العكس أيضا. ولنبيّن معنى الطرد والعكس فإذا علمت مثلا أ هي ب فإن علمت على سبيل القطع أي إذا قطعت أن أ هي ب فهذا حكم قطعي على سبيل الطرد فإن أضفت إلى ذلك حكما آخر بأن أ لا يمكن ألا أن تكون ب فهذا هو القطع بالعكس...فهذا حكم قطعي بنفي النقيض أو بانتفاء الاحتمال العقلي للنقيض...فهذا هو الحكم العقلي القطعي طردا وعكسا ويمكن أن يسمّى بالقطع لمركب لأنه يتألّف من قطعين كما ترى. أما القطعي العادي... فهذا العلم إذن فيه تجويز النقيض ويسمّى بناء على ذلك بالعلم العادي ويمكن أن يسمّى بالقطع البسيط أو القطع بالطرد فقط.

Saʿīd Fūda, *Bayān Tawjīh al-Imām al-Taftāzānī Dalālat Qawlih Taʿālā "Law Kāna fīhimā Āliha illā Allah lafasadatā" ʿalā al-Waḥdāniyya* (Amman: al-Aslein, 2022), 35-36.

Given the certainty found within the rationally certain judgment being "compounded", this monograph intentionally sought out to meet this higher degree of "certainty" (qaṭʿī) in proving the original creation of Ādam ﷺ as stated at the outset in footnote 23.

nomically necessary category. However, it must be highlighted here that the crucial difference between the two judgments, rational and nomic, is that the latter was arrived at through physical experimentations or observations while the former was not. Likewise, we too have never witnessed a disruption of the average acceleration on Earth, generally being 9.807 m/s^2. Therefore, the nomic judgment for the average acceleration on Earth being 9.807 m/s^2 would also be from the nomic necessities. However, a change in the average acceleration on Earth to be 10.5 m/s^2 would not result in a violation of any rational principles. Conceiving the rational possibility of the average force of gravity being other than 9.807 m/s^2 does not result in an internal contradiction, in contrast to conceiving $1+1\neq2$. As such, the rational judgment regarding a change in the average force of gravity on Earth would be from the rationally possible category.

Therefore, every supernatural event that is from the rational possibilities can never be denied in **absolute**[91] terms on the basis of nomic judgments[92] alone, since rational judgments are not susceptible to restriction or qualification (*takhṣīṣ*).[93] Said differently: Nomic judgments cannot be universalized to the extent of overriding rationally decisive judgments

91 Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī states:

فإن قيل: «هذا محالٌ عادةً»، أي بالتجربة، فالمحال فيه، غير المحال الحقيقي.

Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī, *Mawqif al-ʿAql wa al-ʿIlm wa al-ʿĀlam min Rabb al-ʿĀlamīn wa ʿIbādih al-Mursalīn* (Damascus: Dār al-Tarbiya, 2007), 2:249.

92 Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī states:

وفي الحقيقة، لو اجتمعت تجارب الدنيا على مسألةٍ، ما أفادت معنى فوق أن تكون تلك المسألة ثابتةً، متحققة الوقوع. أما كونها ضرورية، مستحيلة الخلاف، فخارج عن حدود التجربة، متعالٍ عن أن يكون مدلولًا لها؛ فلا يُجرب الوجوب والضرورة، أو بالأصلح لا يُعلمان بالتجربة، وكل ما أظهرت التجارب المديدة من وقوع حادثة عقب حادثة، من غير تخلف، فالحكم المتيقن منه، كون ذلك التعقيب عادةً -كما قال «هيوم»- لا ضرورة. إلا إذا علم كون المقدم منهما علة للمؤخر، فحينئذٍ يكون التعقيب ضروريا، لكن العلّية أمر خفي، لا سبيل للعلم إليه بالتجربة.

Ibid, 2:248.

93 See previous footnotes 47 and 48 for more information.
Saʿīd Fūda states:

إن القاعدة العقلية صحيحة والواقع المشاهد أيضا صحيح لكن دون أن نخصص القاعدة العقلية ودون أن نرفع الواقع المشاهد بالحس إلى مرتبة الواجب العقلي.

in an absolute fashion.[94] The following breakdown of the types of nomic judgments in Table II. will aid in understanding what a nomic judgment *can* and *cannot* tell us:

Table II.

i.	The necessary nomic judgment (*wājib ʿādī*)	That which is based on repeated observation with no actual occurrence of an anomaly, e.g., water boiling at 100°c on Earth under normal atmospheric conditions.
ii.	The impossible nomic judgment (*mustaḥīl ʿādī*)	The anomaly of the "necessary nomic judgment", e.g., water boiling at other than 100°c on Earth under normal atmospheric conditions.
iii.	The possible nomic judgment (*mumkin ʿādī*)	That which is observed but at other times not observed, e.g., snow in Miami.[95]

Saʿīd Fūda, *Tafrīʿ al-Sharḥ al-Ṣawt al-Musajjal ʿalā Mukhtaṣar Matn al-Kharīda al-Bahiyya* (Amman), 16.

94 Abū al-Barakāt al-Nasafī states:

كل ما ورد السمع به ولا يأباه العقل يجب قبوله.

Abū al-Barakāt al-Nasafī, *Sharḥ al-ʿUmda fī ʿAqīda Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamāʿa* (Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya lil-Turāth, 2014), 428.

Likewise, Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī explains:

وربما يعبر عن الأول (أي: الوجوب) بـ«ضرورة الوجود»، وعن الثاني (أي: الاستحالة) بـ«ضرورة العدم»، وعن الثالث (أي: الإمكان) بـ«سلب الضرورة عن الطرفين»؛ إنما يُصدرها العقل، لا التجارب، التي تقتصر أحكامها على الوقوع، أو اللاوقوع، من غير أن يبلغ الوقوع مبلغ الوجوب، واللاوقوع مبلغ الاستحالة؛ لكونهما من الأحكام العالية، التي لا تدخل في متناول التجربة.

Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī, *Mawqif al-ʿAql wa al-ʿIlm wa al-ʿĀlam min Rabb al-ʿĀlamīn wa ʿIbādih al-Mursalīn* (Damascus: Dār al-Tarbiya, 2007), 2:288.

95 ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ḥabannaka al-Mīdānī, Ḍawābiṭ al-Maʿrifa (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 2015), 322.

Furthermore, Ibn Amīr Ḥājj explains how the nomic judgment can permit contraries when dealing with what is from the rationally possible due to nothing within the essence of the possible preventing an occurrence of change in it in a manner that would result in a rational impossibility:

Although the *necessary* nomic judgment dictates that water boil at 100°C under normal atmospheric conditions, our minds can still *rationally* conceive that it is within the realm of possibility for water to boil at 150°C (an otherwise *impossible* nomic judgment) had Allah ﷻ decreed as such.[96] For the One who initially specified for water to boil at 100°C could specify it later to boil at 150°C. The "impossible nomic judgment" is with respect to what we repeatedly observe, not with respect to the metaphysical nature of the thing itself. No violation of PNC occurs when we conceive of water boiling at other than 100°C. The nomic judgment that water boils at 100°C on Earth under normal atmospheric conditions is undoubtedly true, but only due to our repeated observations of its occurrence,[97] *not* due to the

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أنّ معنى احتمال العاديات تجويز النقيض أنّه لو فرض وقوع ذلك النقيض بدلها لم يلزم من ذلك محال لذاته لأنّ الأمور العادية ممكنة في حدّ ذاتها والممكن لا يستلزم شيء من طرفيه محالا لذاته ولا يخفى أنّ هذا جارٍ في جميع الممكنات الواقعة.

Ibn Amīr Ḥājj al-Ḥalabī al-Ḥanafī, *al-Taqrīr wa al-Taḥbīr* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1983), 1:40-41

96 Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī states:

وبعض الممكنات يُستبعد وقوعه، فيُظن مستحيلاً عند العقل، كمعجزات الأنبياء الخارقة لسنة الكون، وهو خطأ، إذ لا مانع لها عند العقل، فهي خارقة للعادة، التي هي سنة الكون، لا خارقة للعقل، كـ «اجتماع النقيضين»، أو «ارتفاعهما»؛ لأن سنة الكون من الممكنات، بالنسبة إلى واضعها جل شأنه، فيمكنه خرقها، كما أمكنه سَنها.

Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī, *Mawqif al-ʿAql wa al-ʿIlm wa al-ʿĀlam min Rabb al-ʿĀlamīn wa ʿIbādih al-Mursalīn* (Damascus: Dār al-Tarbiya, 2007), 2:132.

97 Al-Dusūqī states that the repeated sense-perception of many particulars over time prompts the rational soul to eventually accept the universality of what it perceives.

الإحساس بالجزئيات الكثيرة يصيّر النفس قابلة للحكم الكلي؛ لأن العقل إنما يدرك الأم ور الكلية.

Ibrāhīm al-Dusūqī, *Ḥāshiyat al-Dusūqī ʿalā al-Risāla al-Shamsiyya* (Egypt: Maṭbaʿat Kurdistan al-ʿIlmiyya, 1909), 2:243.

Al-Ghazālī states that the continuous occurrence of the same event or outcome, time after time, unshakably fixes in our minds, belief in their future occurrence according to past habit:

واستمرار العادة بها مرة بعد أخرى يرسخ في أذهاننا جريانها على وفق العادة الماضية ترسّخا

metaphysical essence of water itself.[98] This extends to all other natural laws of the universe, be it the force of gravity on Earth, the time it takes for Earth to travel around the sun, the melting point of iron, etc.[99] As such, all "miracles" can only result in a breach of our nomic judgments concerning the natural laws of the universe, and never in a breach of our rational judgments.[100] Said differently: all naturally observed laws of the universe fall under the **rational** judgment of the possible while simultaneously falling into either the necessary or impossible **nomic** judgment.

لا تنفكّ عنه.

Michael E. Marmura, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers* (Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2000), 170.

98 The continuous and repeated observation of two events occurring one after another does not indicate a necessary causal relationship between the two. Khojah Zādah (d. 893 h) states:

ومن البيّن المكشوف أن ترتب الشيء دائما أو أكثريا وهو المسمى بالدوران لا يدلّ على العلّيّة.

Khojah Zādah, *al-Tahāfut fī al-Muḥākama bayn al-Ghazālī wa al-Falāsifa* (Damascus: Dār al-Risāla al-ʿĀlamiyya, 2018), 306.

99 Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī states that natural laws are rooted in empirical methods and observations of a particular set of data points. Even when such laws are accepted as scientific theories/facts they still do not ever reach a point of rational necessity whereby their contradictories are rationally impossible:

لأن قوانين العلم الطبيعي مبنية على التجارب والمشاهدات، والأحكام المستفادة من التجربة والمشاهدة واقعات جزئية إن ارتقت بفضل اطرادها إلى درجة الكلية والقانونية، فلا ترتقي إلى درجة الضرورة القاضية باستحالة نقائضها، بخلاف قوانين الهندسة والمنطق، المبنية على حكم العقل، المؤيد ببرهانه، فيكون كليا، وضروريا من أول صدوره. وهذا الفرق هو الذي يجعل الدليل العقلي المنطقي أفضل، وأقوى من الدليل التجربي، بالرغم من اعتقاد الجهلاء المقلدين عكس ذلك.

Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī, *Mawqif al-ʿAql wa al-ʿIlm wa al-ʿĀlam min Rabb al-ʿĀlamīn wa ʿIbādih al-Mursalīn* (Damascus: Dār al-Tarbiya, 2007), 2:296.

100 Al-Ghazālī argues that once the Sharīʿa establishes the actual occurrence of something, it goes without saying that it must be from the rational possibilities.

مهما دل الشرع على وقوعه فقد دل لا محالة على جوازه.

Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *al-Iqtiṣād fī al-Iʿtiqād* (Jeddah: Dār al-Minhāj, 2019), 181.

Differentiating Between the Rational and Nomic

Here, it is important to make a distinction between phenomena whose cause-and-effect conjunction (*iqtirān*) rests upon a rational condition (*sharṭ ʿaqlī*) versus those whose cause-and-effect conjunction is unconditionally nomic. Al-Ghazālī explains this difference when addressing the question of whether Allah ﷻ can move a hand that is immersed in water while keeping the water that surrounds it immobile in the same space without any change. He astutely responds that for a substance to move to another location, the location that is directly adjacent to it must first be vacant for it to cross into it. But, if the water that surrounds the hand is not permitted to move, then as a result the hand will likewise not be able to move due to the rational principle that no two physical substances can equally occupy the same space at the very same time in every respect.[101] As a result, the question is an irrational absurdity by virtue of understanding what it essentially means to be a physical "body" (*jism*) along with the essential meaning of "space" (*ḥayyiz*). All such cases conditioned upon violating a rationally sound principle (*ḥukm ʿaqlī*) are impossible (*muḥāl*) and thus inapplicable to Allah's ﷻ omnipotence (i.e., *ghayr maqdūr*). In contrast to this, al-Ghazālī explains, are those phenomena whose cause-and-effect correlations (*iqtirān*) are merely nomic. Included in this would be how fire burns cotton and the sensation of coldness when touching snow; all of which fall under the rubric of matters that are applicable to Allah's ﷻ omnipotence.[102] Such matters do not hinge upon a rational necessity and thus the intellect can rationally conceive an anomaly, as in the case of the

101 The Pauli Exclusion Principle also lends support to this in stating that different physical matter cannot occupy the same exact space at the very same time.

102 Al-Ghazālī states:

المحال غير مقدور ووجود المشروط دون الشرط غير معقول، والارادة شرطها العلم والعلم شرطه الحياة وكذلك شرط شغل الجوهر لحيز فراغ ذلك الحيز، فإذا حرك الله تعالى اليد فلا بد أن يشغل بها حيزاً في جوار الحيز الذي كانت فيه، فما لم يفرغه كيف يشغله به؟ ففراغه شرط اشتغاله باليد، إذ لو تحرك ولم يفرغ الحيز من الماء بعدم الماء أو حركته لاجتمع جسمان في حيز واحد وهو محال، فكان خلو أحدهما شرطاً للآخر فتلازما فظن أن أحدهما متولد من الآخر وهو خطأ فأما اللازمات التي ليست شرطاً فعندنا يجوز أن تنفك عن الاقتران بما هو لازم لها، بل لزومه بحكم طرد العادة كاحتراق القطن عند مجاورة النار وحصول البرودة في اليد عند مماسة الثلج، فإن كل ذلك مستمر بجريان سنة الله تعالى، وإلا فالقدرة من حيث ذاتها غير قاصرة عن خلق البرودة في الثلج والمماسة في اليد مع خلق الحرارة في اليد بدلاً عن البرودة. فإذاً ما يراه الخصم متولداً قسمان: أحدهما شرط فلا

fire not burning Prophet Ibrāhīm ﷺ.[103] A further example of this crucial difference is found in the Qur'ān:

> "Surely those who receive our revelations with denial and arrogance, the gates of heaven will not be opened for them, nor will they enter Paradise *until a camel passes through the eye of a needle.* This is how We reward the wicked."[104]

When the mind conceives the size of a normal "camel" and the size of the typical "eye of a needle," it immediately understands that it is rationally impossible (*muḥāl*) for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle.[105] The exegetes remarked that because the entry of those people into Paradise hinges on a condition (*shart ʿaqlī*) that is rationally impossible to be fulfilled, it will likewise be impossible for them to enter Paradise.[106] Although when observed in isolation without any such conditions, the mere entrance

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يتصور فيه إلا الاقتران، والثاني ليس بشرط فيتصور فيه غير الاقتران إذ خرقت العادات.

Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *al-Iqtiṣād fī al-Iʿtiqād* (Jeddah: Dār al-Minhāj, 2019), 223-225.

103 21:69
"We ordered, "O fire! Be cool and safe for Ibrāhīm!"

قُلْنَا يَـٰنَارُ كُونِى بَرْدًا وَسَلَـٰمًا عَلَىٰٓ إِبْرَٰهِيمَ.

104 7:40

إِنَّ ٱلَّذِينَ كَذَّبُوا۟ بِـَٔايَـٰتِنَا وَٱسْتَكْبَرُوا۟ عَنْهَا لَا تُفَتَّحُ لَهُمْ أَبْوَٰبُ ٱلسَّمَآءِ وَلَا يَدْخُلُونَ ٱلْجَنَّةَ حَتَّىٰ يَلِجَ ٱلْجَمَلُ فِى سَمِّ ٱلْخِيَاطِ ۚ وَكَذَٰلِكَ نَجْزِى ٱلْمُجْرِمِينَ.

105 To suggest otherwise would be to claim that a larger substance is smaller than or equal to another substance that is smaller in relation to it. This would be akin to saying that $2 \leq 1$, an obvious violation of PI/PNC.

106 Al-Rāzī comments on this verse:

وانما خص الجمل من بين سائر الحيوانات لأنه أكبر الحيوانات جسماً عند العرب...فجسم الجمل أعظم الأجسام وثقب الإبرة أضيق المنافذ، فكان ولوج الجمل في تلك الثقبة الضيقة محالاً فلما وقف الله تعالى دخولهم الجنة على حصول هذا الشرط وكان هذا شرطاً محالاً وثبت في العقول أن الموقوف على المحال محال وجب أن يكون دخولهم الجنة مأيوساً منه قطعاً.

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Tafsīr al-Fakhr al-Rāzī* (Beirut: Dār al-Fikar, 1981), 14:81-82. Al-Ghazālī explains that it is impossible for an effect that is stipulated upon a rational necessity to occur without the prior fulfilment of said rational necessity:

of them into Paradise would be rationally possible, but due to it being conditional on something that is rationally impossible, it thus becomes an impossibility itself.

Following in this line of reasoning, there is no such rational stipulation found within the theory of evolution, scipture, or in our experiences and observations of mankind being born from two parents, that absolutely restricts their creation to just this process alone. ʿĪsā's ﷺ alternative birth method indicates there *cannot* be a rational condition confining human creation solely to conventional sexual reproduction.[107]

Rationalizing the Supernatural

In sum, every necessary or impossible nomic judgment that is rationally possible is subject to the will and omnipotence of Allah ﷻ by virtue of Him being the freely-willing agent and omnipotent God that He must necessarily be. A rare, supernatural occurrence is as easy for Allah ﷻ to execute as the normal occurrences we commonly witness. For the common denominator between both the rare and the common is their innate metaphysical disposition of being contingent, i.e., from the possible. Once this shared commonality between them is understood, it becomes evident that the omnipotence of Allah ﷻ equally applies to both without any difference or difficulty.[108]

المحال غير مقدور ووجود المشروط دون الشرط غير معقول.

Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *al-Iqtiṣād fī al-Iʿtiqād* (Jeddah: Dār al-Minhāj, 2019), 224.

107 Al-Bāqillānī highlights this by suggesting that whatever is from the possible, such as the creation of Ādam ﷺ, means that it is subject to Divine will, and can thus be created *ex nihilo*:

> فيقال لهم ما الذي أردتم بقولكم إن هذه الأمور مستحيلة ممتنعة أعنيتم بذلك أنها مستحيلة في العادة أو في قدرة الصانع تعالى فإن قالوا في قدرة الصانع ألحدوا وتركوا دينهم وقيل لهم ما الدليل على إحالة ذلك وإن قالوا لأننا لم نجد أحدا فعله ولا يقدر عليه ولا رأينا ذلك قط ولا جرى مثل ما تدعون قيل لهم فيجب أن تحيلوا أيضا أن يخلق الله تعالى الأجسام وألا يوجد آدم إلا من ذكر وأنثى وألا يخلق دجاجة إلا من بيضة أو بيضة إلا من دجاجة أو نطفة إلا من إنسان أو إنسانا إلا من نطفة لأن ذلك أجمع لم يوجد قط ولم يشاهد فإن مروا على ذلك لحقوا بأهل الدهر.

Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī, *Tamhīd al-Awāʾil wa Talkhīṣ al-Dalāʾil* (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Kutub al-Thaqāfiyya, 1987), 1:135-136.

108 Ismāʿīl b. Muṣṭafā Gelenbevī (al-Kalanbawī) (d. 1205 h) explains how the

In his argument against the occurrence of miracles, Guessoum states the following:

> …because He is omnipotent it does not mean that He is just going to violate His own laws. So I am not saying that God *cannot*; I am saying that God put together the laws so that things function in an orderly manner. Otherwise, what is the point of putting together laws, and then doing what one wants every now and then? The world is ordered and harmonious; the Qur'ān itself emphasizes that. On the contrary, God is saying 'I am omnipotent but even I, omnipotent, put together laws by which creation proceeds, and I want you to follow laws, and I want you to be orderly, to follow theorder.'[109]

Firstly, asking "what is the point of" why Allah ﷻ does something is essentially asking for the divine wisdom (*ḥikma*) behind that action. The wisdom of Allah ﷻ is a reflection of His omniscience and omnipotence.[110]

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omnipotence of Allah ﷻ applies evenly to all possibles by virtue of them being subject to His omnipotence due to all of them being innately contingent:

> (قوله فإذا ثبت قدرته في البعض إلى آخره) تقرير الدليل إنه كلما ثبت قدرته تعالى على البعض ثبت قدرته على الكلّ من الأزل إلى الأبد لكن المقدم حقّ فكذا التالي أما المقدم فلما ثبت قدرته على العالم الحادث المستند إليه تعالى ابتداء بلا واسطة وأما الملازمة فلأن قدرته تعالى مقتضى ذاته فلا يمكن انفكاكها عنه تعالى ليتصور كونه قادرا في وقت دون وقت ومصحح مقدورية ذلك البعض و الإمكان الذاتي وهو مشترك بين جميع الممكنات الغير القديمة وإذا وجد المقتضى والمصحح وارتفع الموانع يلزم أن يكون قادرا على جميع الممكنات مادامت ممكنات.

Ismā'īl b. Muṣṭafā al-Kalanbawī, *Ḥāshiya 'alā Sharḥ al-Dawānī 'alā al-'Aqā'id al-'Aḍudiyya* (Turkey: Dār al-Ṭibā'ah al-'Āmira, 1898), 2:86.

109 Stefano Bigliardi, *Islam and the Quest for Modern Science: Conversations with Adnan Oktar, Mehdi Golshani, Mohammed Basil Altaie, Zaghloul El-Naggar, Bruno Guiderdoni and Nidhal Guessoum* (Istanbul: The Swedish Research Institute, 2014), 175.

110 Al-Sanūsī states:

> الحكمة المنسوبة إليه تعالى: عبارة عن علمه بالأشياء وقدرته على إحكامها وإتقانها فهي تقتضي العلم والقدرة وهما واجبان له تعالى.

Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Sanūsī, *Sharḥ al-'Aqīda al-Kubrā* (Damascus: Dār al-

Guessoum's ignorance of what Allah ﷻ knows does not then necessitate that the action is void of any wisdom.[111] As for the wisdom of miracles, this will be discussed shortly below. Secondly, where in the Qur'ān does it state that Allah ﷻ created the universe on certain immutable natural laws *and* that He Himself will never violate them? Guessoum did not, and *cannot*, bring forth even one verse from the Qur'ān to substantiate this point. Rather, the Qur'ān is full of verses that speak to the miracles of the Prophets as well as others, and how the disbelievers denied their occurrences.[112] Thirdly, is there any logical sense in making a case for Allah ﷻ not allowing miracles to occur at the hands of His prophets when prophethood itself is a miracle? Indeed, it is ludicrous to suggest that Allah ﷻ initiates the prophethood of a man by way of an angel conveying His revelation to him,[113] an act that is supernatural itself, but then would not allow any further supernatural events, such as miracles, to occur thereafter. According to Guessoum's logic,

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Taqwā, 2019), 534.

111 Allah ﷻ states in the Qur'ān:

وَإِذْ قَالَ رَبُّكَ لِلْمَلَٰٓئِكَةِ إِنِّى جَاعِلٌ فِى ٱلْأَرْضِ خَلِيفَةً ۖ قَالُوٓا۟ أَتَجْعَلُ فِيهَا مَن يُفْسِدُ فِيهَا وَيَسْفِكُ ٱلدِّمَآءَ وَنَحْنُ نُسَبِّحُ بِحَمْدِكَ وَنُقَدِّسُ لَكَ ۖ قَالَ إِنِّىٓ أَعْلَمُ مَا لَا تَعْلَمُونَ.

"And when your Lord said unto the angels: Lo! I am about to place a viceroy in the earth, they said: Will you place therein one who will do harm therein and will shed blood, while we, we hymn your praise and sanctify you? He said: Surely I know that which you know not." (2:30).

112 Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī lists at least thirty-one (31) verses that either explicitly or implicitly allude to the Prophet Muḥammad ﷺ having performed miracles, let alone other prophets and non-prophets.
Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī, *al-Qawl al-Faṣl* (Cairo, 1942), 183-185.

113 Allah ﷻ states in the Qur'ān:

قُلْ مَن كَانَ عَدُوًّا لِّجِبْرِيلَ فَإِنَّهُۥ نَزَّلَهُۥ عَلَىٰ قَلْبِكَ بِإِذْنِ ٱللَّهِ مُصَدِّقًا لِّمَا بَيْنَ يَدَيْهِ وَهُدًى وَبُشْرَىٰ لِلْمُؤْمِنِينَ.

"Say (O Muḥammad, to mankind): Who is an enemy to Jibrīl! For he it is who has revealed (this Scripture) to your heart by Allah's leave, confirming that which was (revealed) before it, and a guidance and glad tidings to believers." – 2:97.

prophethood itself should not have occurred[114] because it goes against the natural laws of an invisible,[115] extraterrestrial-being possessing multiple wings,[116] genderless, yet having the ability to transform into a human form,

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As well as:

قل إِنَّمَآ أَنَا بَشَرٌ مِّثْلُكُمْ يُوحَىٰٓ إِلَىَّ.

"Say: I am only a man like you. My Lord reveals to me." – 18:110.

114 Al-Ghazālī states how rejecting certain supernatural occurrences like the conversations between the Prophet Muḥammad ﷺ and Jibrīl ﷺ will necessitate the rejection of the sacred law and that the root cause of such beliefs is disbelief in the omnipotence of Allah ﷻ:

فهذا يلزم منه أن ينكر مشاهدة رسول الله عليه وسلم لجبريل عليه السلام وسماعه كلامه وسماع جبريل جوابه ولا يستطيع مصدّق بالشرع أن ينكر ذلك...فإنكار هذا مصدره الإلحاد وإنكار سعة القدرة.

Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, ***al-Iqtiṣād fī al-I'tiqād*** (Jeddah: Dār al-Minhāj, 2019), 373.

Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī states:

لأن تأويل المعجزات بما يخرجها عن خوارق العادة، يخرجها أيضا عن كونها معجزات، ويؤدي إلى إنكار نبوات الأنبياء مع المعجزات، لما في إنزال الوحي والكتب عليهم، وإرسال الملك إليهم خرقاً لسنن الكون، ولا تكون المعجزات معجزات بدون خرقها.

Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī, *Mawqif al-ʿAql wa al-ʿIlm wa al-ʿĀlam min Rabb al-ʿĀlamīn wa ʿIbādih al-Mursalīn* (Damascus: Dār al-Tarbiya, 2007), 1:46.

115 Allah ﷻ states in the Qur'ān:

يَٰٓأَيُّهَا ٱلَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوا ٱذْكُرُوا نِعْمَةَ ٱللَّهِ عَلَيْكُمْ إِذْ جَآءَتْكُمْ جُنُودٌ فَأَرْسَلْنَا عَلَيْهِمْ رِيحًا وَجُنُودًا لَّمْ تَرَوْهَا ۚ وَكَانَ ٱللَّهُ بِمَا تَعْمَلُونَ بَصِيرًا.

"You who believe! Remember Allah's favor unto you when there came against you forces (of the unbelievers), and We sent against them a great wind and forces (of angels) you could not see. And Allah is ever Seer of what you do." (33:9).

116 Allah ﷻ states in the Qur'ān:

ٱلْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ فَاطِرِ ٱلسَّمَٰوَٰتِ وَٱلْأَرْضِ جَاعِلِ ٱلْمَلَٰٓئِكَةِ رُسُلًا أُولِىٓ أَجْنِحَةٍ مَّثْنَىٰ وَثُلَٰثَ وَرُبَٰعَ ۚ يَزِيدُ فِى ٱلْخَلْقِ مَا يَشَآءُ ۚ إِنَّ ٱللَّهَ عَلَىٰ كُلِّ شَىْءٍ قَدِيرٌ.

"Praise be to Allah, the Creator of the heavens and the earth, who appointed the angels as messengers having wings two, three and four. He multiplies in creation what He will. Lo! Allah is able to do all things." (35:1).

speaking and revealing information to a human in Arabic.[117] Moreover, taking the position that Allah ﷻ does not allow the violation of natural laws entails that the Qur'ān itself is not a miracle.[118] If Guessoum believes the Qur'ān to be a literary miracle, then again, he bears the burden of ex-

See verses 43:19 and 53:27. Allah ﷻ states in the Qur'ān:

فَٱتَّخَذَتْ مِن دُونِهِمْ حِجَابًا فَأَرْسَلْنَآ إِلَيْهَا رُوحَنَا فَتَمَثَّلَ لَهَا بَشَرًا سَوِيًّا.

"And had chosen seclusion from them. Then We sent unto her Our *Rūh* and it assumed for her the similitude of a perfect man." (19:17).

See also verses 51:24-34 and 11:77-83.

117 Allah ﷻ states in the Qur'ān:

وَكَذَٰلِكَ أَوْحَيْنَآ إِلَيْكَ قُرْءَانًا عَرَبِيًّا.

"And thus, We have revealed to you an Arabic Qur'ān". – al-Shūrā:7.
See also verses 26:193-195, 42:194, and 53:5-6.

118 Allah ﷻ states in the Qur'ān:

وَإِن كُنتُمْ فِى رَيْبٍ مِّمَّا نَزَّلْنَا عَلَىٰ عَبْدِنَا فَأْتُوا بِسُورَةٍ مِّن مِّثْلِهِۦ وَٱدْعُوا شُهَدَآءَكُم مِّن دُونِ ٱللَّهِ إِن كُنتُمْ صَـٰدِقِينَ فَإِن لَّمْ تَفْعَلُوا وَلَن تَفْعَلُوا فَٱتَّقُوا ٱلنَّارَ ٱلَّتِى وَقُودُهَا ٱلنَّاسُ وَٱلْحِجَارَةُ أُعِدَّتْ لِلْكَـٰفِرِينَ.

"If you are in doubt concerning that which We reveal unto Our slave (Muḥammad), then produce a chapter of the like thereof and call your witnesses beside Allah if you are truthful. If you do it not—and you can never do it—then guard yourselves against the Fire prepared for disbelievers, whose fuel is men and stones." (2:23-24).

Al-Sanūsī states that the Qur'ān is the greatest miracle of the Prophet Muḥammad ﷺ whereby mankind was challenged by it, and that all Muslims agree that it is inimitable:

معجزته العظمى التي تحدّى بها على الكافّة: القرآن وقد اجتمع المسلمون قاطبة على أنه معجز.

Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Sanūsī, *Sharḥ al-ʿAqīda al-Kubrā* (Damascus: Dār al-Taqwā, 2019), 582.

See also Nizār Ḥammādī's epistle on the Qur'ān being the greatest miracle brought forth by the Prophet Muḥammad ﷺ:
Nizār Ḥammādī, *Risāla fī Kawn al-Qur'ān al-ʿAẓīm Aʿẓama Muʿjizāt Nabiyyinā Muḥammad* ﷺ (Tunis: Dār al-Imām Ibn ʿArafa, 2022).

plaining how some miracles, like prophethood and the Qur'ān,[119] qualify as such whereas other "miracles" mentioned by the Qur'ān and witnessed by many, do not.

Therefore, to proffer that "science" ought to be *the* standard of today by which the Qur'ān should be judged against to determine if a "contradiction" exists, such as the occurrence of a "miracle", is a gross curtailment of Qur'ānic hermeneutics and defies rationality. Yet, none of this entails that traditional Qur'anic hermeneutics opposes scientific observation but rather seeks to use it for its God-assigned functions. Most notably, scientific observation can be used to discover teleological explanations for the immaculate, fine-tuned order of the universe, which implies, in the strongest terms, the necessity of an omniscient and independently freely-willing divine agent. Guessoum asks what is the "point of" Allah ﷻ assigning natural laws and then violating them—the answer is that it is this very "order" that enables us to identify when a true miracle occurs—and by extension, a true prophet—when that natural order is breached. The reliable testimonies and accurate reports of miracles by which prophets were identified were all primarily based on sense-perception. Thus, the implication that somehow traditional Islamic hermeneutics and epistemology opposes science by relegating it to being entirely speculative, in favor of rationalism alone, is false.[120] Rather, *Ahl al-Sunna* has always used an epis-

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119 Al-Qurṭubī states consensus upon the *faṣāha* and *balāgha* of the Qur'ān being an inimitable miracle that is a rupture from the literary norm and incapacitates anyone from matching it in this regard:

> قاله النظام وبعض القدرية أن وجه الإعجاز هو المنع من معارضته والصرفة عند التحدي بمثله وأن المنع والصرفة هو المعجزة دون ذات القرآن وذلك أن الله تعالى صرف هممهم عن معارضته مع تحديهم بأن يأتوا بسورة من مثله وهذا فاسد لأن إجماع الأمة قبل حدوث المخالف أن القرآن هو المعجز فلو قلنا إن المنع والصرفة هو المعجز لخرج القرآن عن أن يكون معجزا وذلك خلاف الإجماع وإذا كان كذلك علم أن نفس القرآن هو المعجز لأن فصاحته وبلاغته أمر خارق للعادة إذ لم يوجد قط كلام على هذا الوجه فلما لم يكن ذلك الكلام مألوفا معتادا منهم دل على أن المنع والصرفة لم يكن معجزا.

Abū ʿAbd Allah al-Qurṭubī, *al-Jāmiʿ li Aḥkām al-Qur'ān* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2004), 1:54-56.

120 This can be gleaned from major works of classical Islamic logic that include sense-perception (*ḥissiyyāt*) and empirical methods (*tajriba*) as tools that at times can yield certainty (*yaqīn*). Aḥmad al-Mallawī (d. 1181 h) writes in his gloss on Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī's commentary on the *Īsāghūjī*:

temological framework that sought to uphold[121] and harmonize empirical observations, ratiocination, and testimony[122] by *utilizing them within their due scope*.[123] For the most important tenet of Islam after belief in Allah ﷻ, namely the prophethood of Muḥammad ﷺ, is established by the miracles he performed that breached our nomic judgments of the natural order we constantly observe, followed by the reliable mass-transmitted testimonials of these miracles to those who were not present.[124] The very understanding of the constancy of the natural order is what enabled them to identify these anomalies (*read*: miracles) while cognizance of the epistemic value of mass

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قوله: (إلى تكرار المشاهدة): أي: المفيدة لليقين بواسطة قياس خفي وهو أن الوقوع المتكرر على نهج واحد لا بد له من سبب وإن لم يعرف ماهية ذلك السبب وكلما علم وجود السبب علم وجود المسبب قطعا.

Aḥmad al-Mallawī, *Ḥashiyat al-Maṭla' Sharḥ Īsāghūjī* (Kuwait: Dār al-Ḍiyā', 2017), 684.

121 Abū al-'Abbās b. al-Qāṣṣ al-Shāfi'ī (d. 335 h) states:

فمن أنكر بينة الحس أنكر نفسه ومن أنكر العقل أنكر صانعه ومن أنكر عموم القرآن أنكر حكمته ومن أنكر خبر الآحاد أنكر الشريعة ومن أنكر إجماع الأمة أنكر نبيه ومن أنكر اللغة أسقطت محاورته لأن اللغات للمسميات سمات ومن أنكر العبرة أنكر أباه وأمه.

Al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, *al-Faqīh wa al-Mutafaqqih* (Dammam: Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 1996), 2:36-37.

122 Al-Nasafī (d. 537 h) states:

أسباب العلم للخلق ثلاثة: الحواس السليمة والخبر الصادق والعقل.

Sa'd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ al-'Aqā'id al-Nasafiyya* (Damascus: Muḥammad 'Adnān Darwīsh, 2005), 60.

123 This is unlike those philosophical naturalists that claim to uphold natural law yet belie all those who have witnessed miracles. On one hand they advocate use of all forms of natural law, while on the other hand preclude the use of observation when it comes to witnessing miracles. A clear contradiction of their own terms.

124 Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī states:

ويعلم أيضا تفوق الدليل العقلي على الدليل التجربي حيث يثبت بالأول وجود الله الواجب الوجود وبالثاني وجود النبي غير الواجب الوجود.

Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī, *al-Qawl al-Faṣl* (Cairo, 1942), 26.

testimonials confirmed to them the actual occurrence of these miracles. The likes of Guessoum must be questioned how they have concluded that the Prophet Muḥammad ﷺ was in fact a true prophet without falling into a case of circular reasoning. While it is undeniable that the Qur'ān has been mass-transmitted to us and therefore yields certainty, yet this "certainty" only means that we are certain that these words that makeup the Qur'ān were recited by the Prophet Muḥammad ﷺ who then attributed these words to Allah ﷻ. Mass-transmission (*tawātur*) alone does not yield us certainty that this attribution is indeed true. A miracle would be needed to validate this attribution such that this miracle stands in the place of Allah ﷻ saying "this man is telling the truth in what he has attributed to Me."[125] Upon establishing the truthfulness of his prophethood, the Qur'ān can only then be accepted as an evidentiary source revealed by Allah ﷻ.[126] In fact, there is no other method by which the truthfulness of the claim to prophethood can be ascertained except by way of miracles.[127] Accepting

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125 Al-Ghazālī states how miracles performed by the Prophet Muḥammad ﷺ indicate his truthfulness as a claimant to prophethood:

أن تثبت نبوته بجملة من الأفعال الخارقة للعادات التي ظهرت عليه كانشقاق القمر ونطق العجماء وتفجّر الماء بين أصابعه وتسبيح الحصى في كفّه وتكثير الطعام القليل وغيره من خوارق العادات فكلّ ذلك دليل على صدقه.

Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *al-Iqtiṣād fī al-I'tiqād* (Jeddah: Dār al-Minhāj, 2019), 363.

126 'Abd al-Ḥayy al-Laknawī (d. 1304 h) explains how the Qur'ān cannot yield certain knowledge until the truthfulness of the claim to prophethood has been established. Or else, it will lead to circular reasoning. Once his miracles fulfill the necessary conditions, the mind will rationally conclude his claim to prophethood is true.

وأما الدليل الصرف فمحال لأن النقلي الصرف بحيث لا يكون مقدمة من مقدماتها البعيدة والقريبة عقلية لا يفيد العلم إلا بعد العلم بصدق الرسول صلى الله عليه وسلم وهو لا يستفاد من العقل بل من النقل على تقدير القول بالنقلي الصرف فيلزم الدور ولما استفيد صدقه من العقل لم يبق الدليل نقليا صرفا.

'Abd al-Ḥayy al-Laknawī, *al-Hadiya al-Mukhtāriyya Sharḥ al-Risāla al-'Aḍudiyya* (Karachi: Idāra al-Qur'ān wa al-'Ulūm al-Islāmiyya, 1998), 48.

127 Al-Juwaynī explains that if prophethood were verifiable through some ordinary act then this can be potentially done by anyone, pious or impious. Thus, there is a need for an event that is a rupture of the norm coupled with a claim to prophethood that will inevitably serve as a validation of his claim.

prophethood sheerly by virtue of someone's claim to it or by their message simply being void of contradictions was only the stance of splinter groups such as the Ibāḍiyya, Khawārij, Karrāmiyya, and the Qadariyya, not that of Ahl al-Sunna.[128]

Actualizing the Supernatural

In sum, the judgment that every human must have a pair of biological parents is a **necessary nomic** judgment (*wājib ʿādī*), but a **rationally possible** judgment (*mumkin ʿaqlī*) for the reasons detailed above. As per the definition given above for the former, despite it being *nomically* necessary for every human to have a set of biological parents, the occurrence of an anomaly, i.e., a human lacking biological parentage, remains a rational

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فإن قيل: هل في المقدور نصب دليل على صدق النبي غير المعجزة؟ قلنا: ذلك غير ممكن فإنّ ما يقدر دليلا على الصدق لا يخلو: إمّا أن يكون معتادا وإمّا أن يكون خارقا للعادة فإن كان معتادا يستوي فيه البر والفاجر فيستحيل كونه دليلا دون أن يتعلّق به دعوى النبي إذ كلّ خارق للعادة يجوز تقدير وجوده ابتداء من فعل الله تعالى فإذا لم يكن بدّ من تعلّقه بالدعوى فهو المعجزة بعينها.

ʿAbd al-Mālik b. Yūsuf al-Juwaynī, *Kitāb al-Irshād ilā Qawāṭiʿ al-Adilla fī Uṣūl al-Iʿtiqād* (Cairo: Maktaba al-Thaqāfa al-Dīniyya, 2009), 262.

128 Abū Manṣūr ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī (d. 429 h) states:

زعمت الاباضية وكثير من الخوارج أن نفس قول النبي صلّى الله عليه وسلم أنا نبي ودعوته إلى ما يدعو إليه حجة ولا يحتاج عليها إلى بينة وبرهان وعلى قومه قبول قوله وإن لم يأت ببرهان، فمن لم يقبله كفر. وقد سرقت الكرّامية هذه البدعة من الاباضية فزعمت أن كل من سمع قول الرسول أو سمع الخبر عن ظهوره وعن دعوته لزمه الإقرار والتصديق به سواء علم برهانه وحجته أو لم يعلمها. وقال ثمامة وأتباعه من القدرية لا يحتاج النبي في الحجة على نبوته إلى أكثر من سلامة شرعه وما يأتي به من التناقض فيه. وقال أصحابنا إن سلامة معجزته عن المعارضة دليل على صحته. وأما سلامة شرعه عن التخليط والنقض فيه فلا يدل على صحته لأن الكاذب لو شرع شرعا وطرد فيه قياسه لم يجب به تصديقه ولا بد من علامة تدل على صدقه ليجب بها اتباعه. ولو جاز تقليده في دعواه من غير برهان لم يكن لنا دلالة على كذب الكاذب في دعوى النبوة إذا لم يكن معه برهان صحتها. وهذا باطل فما يؤدي إليه مثله.

Abū Manṣūr ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī, *Kitāb Uṣūl al-Dīn* (Istanbul: Dār Ṣādir, 1928), 175-176.

possibility.[129] There is no contradiction in describing a phenomenon as both "necessary" and "possible" because the "necessary" judgment is with respect to what we continuously observe and have never witnessed a breach thereof,[130] while the "possible" judgment is solely with respect to the rational question as to whether there is anything within the quiddity of this thing that precludes its norm from being breached based on PNC. Since each of these judgments' perspective (*iḍāfa/jiha*) differs, there is no contradiction.[131]

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129 Ibn Amīr Ḥājj al-Ḥalabī al-Ḥanafī states:

> أنّ معنى احتمال العاديات تجويز النقيض أنّه لو فرض وقوع ذلك النقيض بدلها لم يلزم من ذلك محال لذاته لأنّ الأمور العادية ممكنة في حدّ ذاتها والممكن لا يستلزم شيء من طرفيه محالا لذاته ولا يخفى أنّ هذا جارٍ في جميع الممكنات الواقعة.

Ibn Amīr Ḥājj al-Ḥalabī al-Ḥanafī, *al-Taqrīr wa al-Taḥbīr* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1983), 1:40-41.

130 Al-Sanūsī clarifies that the definition given previously for the nomic judgment to include anomalies as being "rationally possible" was due in part to the gross level of ignorance regarding nomic judgments being conceived as absolutely immutable:

> للتنبيه على تحقيق علم ودفع جهالة ابتلي بها الأكثر في الأحكام العادية حتى توهموا أنه لا معنى للربط الذي حصل في الحكم العادي إلا ربط اللزوم الذي لا يمكن معه انفكاك كاللزوم العقلي أو ربط التأثير من أحدهما في الآخر فنبهنا بهذه الجملة على أن الربط الذي حصل في الحكم العادي إنما هو ربط اقتران ودلالة جعلية لا ربط لزوم اللزوم الذي يشبه اللزوم العقلي بقولنا «مع صحة التخلف».

Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Sanūsī, *Sharḥ al-Muqaddimāt* (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Maʿārif, 2009), 69.

131 *Al-Risāla al-Shamsiyya* mentions that among the conditions needed for a true contradiction to exist between two propositions is the unity of ascription (*iḍāfa/jiha*):

> ولا يتحقق التناقض في المخصوصتين إلا عند اتحاد الموضوع ويندرج فيه وحدة الشرط والجزء والكلّ وعند اتحاد المحمول ويندرج فيه وحدة الزمان والمكان والإضافة والقوة والفعل.

Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Taḥrīr al-Qawāʿid al-Manṭiqiyya fī Sharḥ al-Risāla al-Shamsiyya*, (Lebanon: DKI, 2014), 238.

Al-Ghazālī likewise clarifies this crucial difference between things that are intrinsically possible yet extrinsically impossible, but never both intrinsically possible and intrinsically impossible:

All that remains after proving the *possibility* of the supernatural to occur is to prove its *actual* occurrence.[131] Attaining certainty of a supernatural occurrence can be ascertained by one of a variety of ways. One such way is via mass-transmitted testimonials.[133] Those who argue that miracles are within the realm of rational possibilities but do not occur in the extramental world— because that would impinge on the teleological arguments for the existence of God—run into the problem of denying mass-transmitted evidence of miracles such as the splitting of the moon[134] and many others

يجوز أن يكون الشيء الواحد ممكنا محالا ولكن ممكنا باعتبار ذاته محالا باعتبار غيره ولا يجوز أن يكون ممكنا لذاته محالا لذاته فهما متناقضان.

Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *al-Iqtiṣād fī al-Iʿtiqād* (Jeddah: Dār al-Minhāj, 2019), 209.

132 In this regard, the model of the dialecticians (*mutakallimūn*) was followed whereby the mere rational possibility of something is initially proven followed by proving its actual occurrence. Al-Ashʿarī explains this method:

مما يجب في حك النظر أن يبتدئ الناظر بالنظر في العقليات لأنها الأصل والسمعيات فرع والأصل أوّل والفرع ثان والواجب إحكام الأوّل قبل الثاني فإذا فرغ مما يوجبه العقل عرض ما حصل له على السمع.

Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan b. Fūrak, *Mujarrad Maqālāt al-Shaykh Abī al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī* (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1987), 319.

In this vein, al-Rāzī reminds us that although the mere rational possibility of something occurring can be proven through rational proofs, the actual occurrence of it can only be proven by way of transmitted evidence:

واعلم أن الجواز العقلي يمكن إثباته بدلائل العقل أما وقوع الجائز فلا سبيل إلى إثباته إلا بالسمع.

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Arbaʿīn fī Uṣūl al-Dīn* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Kulliya al-Azhariyya, 1986), 2:50.

133 al-Taftāzānī states:

أن المتواتر موجب للعلم وذلك بالضرورة فإنا نجد من أنفسنا العلم بوجود مكة وبغداد وأنه ليس إلا بالإخبار...أن العلم الحاصل به ضروري وذلك لأنه يحصل للمستدل وغيره حتى الصبيان الذين لا اهتداء لهم إلى العلم بطريق الاكتساب وترتيب المقدمات.

Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ al-ʿAqāʾid al-Nasafiyya* (Damascus: Muḥammad ʿAdnān Darwīsh, 2005), 64.

134 Ibn Kathīr (d. 774 h) states:

which are vouchsafed by the Qur'ān according to the consensus of Muslim scholars.[135] Moreover, such an argument undermines Allah ﷻ being an omnipotent, omniscient, and freely-willing agent.

Interpreting the Empirical Data

In the pre-modern era, the empirical evidence used to claim that every human, be it Ādam ﷺ or other, must have had parents was largely based on inductive reasoning.[136] Our repeated experiences and observations give

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وقد اتفق العلماء مع بقية الأئمة على أن انشقاق القمر كان في عهد رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم وقد وردت الأحاديث بذلك من طرق تفيد القطع عند الأمة.

Isma'īl b. 'Umar Ibn Kathīr, *Mu'jizāt al-Nabī* (al-Maktaba al-Tawfīqiyya, 2010), 25.

Al-Subkī (d. 756 h) states:

والصحيح عندي أن انشقاق القمر متواتر منصوص عليه في القرآن مروي في الصحيحين وغيرهما من طرق شتى.

Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Ḥajar al-Haytamī, *al-'Umda fī Sharḥ al-Burda* (Amman: Dār al-Fatḥ), 388.

135 Al-Munāwī (d. 1031 h) states:

وهذا أمر بالإجماع لا نزاع فيه لثبوته بنص القرآن والسنة وبلغ حد التواتر وحصل به العلم اليقيني السماعي أي بالسماع من الجم الغفير.

'Abd al-Ra'ūf al-Munāwī, *al-'Ujāla al-Saniyya 'alā Alfiyya al-Sīra al-Nabawiyya* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, 2004), 65.

136 Al-Khabīṣī (d. 1050 h) states that non-exhaustive inductive reasoning alone does not yield certainty due to the permissibility of something that was not accounted for to be counter to the conclusions of what has been tested and universalized therewith:

(الاستقراء) فهو (تصفح الجزئيات لإثبات حكم كلي)...وهو لا يفيد اليقين لجواز وجود جزئي لم يستقرأ.

'Ubayd Allah b. Faḍl Allah al-Khabīṣī, *al-Tadhhīb Sharḥ 'alā Tahdhīb al-Manṭiq wa al-Kalām* (Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābi al-Ḥalabī, 1936), 413.

'Abd al-Raḥmān Ḥabannaka states:

وظاهر أن الاستقراء الناقص الصحيح قد يفيد الظن بالحكم الكلي ولكنه لا يفيد اليقين به لاحتمال أن يكون ما لم يدرس على خلاف ما درس ولجواز أن يظهر في المستقبل خطأ

us a sense of certainty whereby we confidently generalize those experiences. After encountering countless people, all of whom were born of two parents, we conclude that *every* human is undoubtedly the product of two parents.[137] Nevertheless, Muslim scholars expressed caution when relying on empirical methods alone to construct universal judgments. ʿAbd al-ʿAlī al-Anṣārī al-Laknawī (d. 1225 h) explains that it is very important to pay heed to any provisos or clauses attached to particulars (*al-juzʾiyyāt*) that are observed during scientific experimentation. He gives the example that for someone who only ever witnessed Africans being black-skinned, can legitimately construct a universal judgment stating, "every African man is black-skinned," but **not**, "every *man* is black-skinned". Al-Laknawī then offers a reflection by stating that the mind has a penchant for constructing universals from causes or correlations that were only found during experimentation, as opposed to stepping back, contemplating, and concluding that the causes and correlations may very well be broader and more general.[138] Al-Laknawī's words here are a keen reminder that is oftentimes overlooked when drawing conclusions based on empirical methods.

Furthermore, in addition to simply using empirical methods in drawing conclusions through inductive reasoning, modern evolutionary science today states that there are multiple lines of evidence that suggest exactly

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الحكم الكلي المستند إلى القياس الناقص.

ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ḥabannaka, *Ḍawābiṭ al-Maʿrifa* (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 2015), 195.

137 al-Dusūqī states that the repeated sense-perception of many particulars over time prompts the rational soul to eventually accept the universality of what it perceives.

الإحساس بالجزئيات الكثيرة يصيّر النفس قابلة للحكم الكلي؛ لأن العقل إنما يدرك الأم ور الكلية.

Ibrāhīm al-Dusūqī, *Ḥāshiyat al-Dusūqī ʿalā al-Risāla al-Shamsiyya* (Egypt: Maṭbaʿat Kurdistan al-ʿIlmiyya, 1909), 2:243.

138 Al-Laknawī states:

إن التجربة لا بد فيها من أن يراعى قيود شوهد الجزئيات معها فمن شاهد الزنجي أسود لا بد أن يحكم أن كل إنسان زنجي أسود، لا أن كل إنسان أسود. فإن الذهن إنما ينتقل إلى علية ما وجد فيه الحكم أو ملازمته إياها دون ما هو أعمّ.

ʿAbd al-ʿAlī al-Laknawī, *Sharḥ Baḥr al-ʿUlūm* (Kuwait: Dār al-Ḍiyāʾ, 2017), 720.

why we do not observe humans being created without a parent(s). In this vein, Muslim logicians made a distinction between (i) conclusions inductively drawn solely via empirical methods (*istiqrā'*); and (ii) conclusions in which an implicit inference (*qiyās khafī*) underpinning the conclusions was consistently detected through a valid rationale indicating that this repeated occurrence is not merely due to chance or at random (*tajriba*). They usually assert the first type (i), istiqrā', will *not* yield certainty, as explained above, while the latter type (ii), tajriba, would in fact yield what is nomically certain.[139] Given the sheer amount of evidence presented by evolutionary scientists in discovering and presenting these "implicit inferences", it will further bolster the conclusion that every human needing a pair of biological parents is nomically certain[140].

Al-Taftāzānī expounds that what is obtained even through empirical methods will stand as evidence (*dalīl*) and a proof (*ḥujja*)[141] absent stronger

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139 Aḥmad al-Mallawī writes in his gloss on Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī's commentary on the *Īsāghūjī*:

قوله: (إلى تكرار المشاهدة): أي: المفيدة لليقين بواسطة قياس خفي وهو أن الوقوع المتكرر على نهج واحد لا بد له من سبب وإن لم يعرف ماهية ذلك السبب وكلما علم وجود السبب علم وجود المسبب قطعا.

Aḥmad al-Mallawī, *Ḥashiyat al-Maṭla' Sharḥ Īsāghūjī* (Kuwait: Dār al-Ḍiyā', 2017), 684.

140 Al-Rāzī explains that this type of evidence, despite it not being rationally necessary, will in fact still yield knowledge:

إذا عرفت ذلك ثبت أن دلالة هذه الأمور على مدلولاتها دلالات عرفية أعني أنها غير واجبة عقلا وهي مع ذلك تفيد العلم بمدلولاتها.

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Nihāyat al-'Uqūl fī Dirāyat al-Uṣūl* (Beirut: Dār al-Dhakhā'ir, 2015), 3:510.

141 Although inductive conclusions are not rational necessities, they are still cogent in that the evidence seems to be generally convincing. As such, it can be universally applied and stand as a proof. Al-Taftāzānī states:

الاستقراء هو الحجة التي يستدلّ فيها من حكم الجزئيات على حكم كلّيها.

'Abd Allah al-Yazdī, *Sharḥ Tahdhīb al-Manṭiq* (Amman: Dār al-Nūr, 2018), 334. Likewise, Sa'id Fūda states that the nomically certain judgment will still yield knowledge and will be considered decisive despite it not barring the rational possibility of its opposite:

evidence to the contrary.[142] Ashraf ʿAlī al-Thānvī (d. 1362 h) elaborates that despite such nomic judgments being in effect permanently at all times (*bi al-dawām*), they do not imply rational necessity (*ḍarūra*) by precluding anomalies.[143] Rather, an independent piece of evidence (*dalīl mustaqill*) would be required to preclude any possible occurrence of an anomaly. To date, no such evidence has been found to definitively state with certainty that *this* particular individual, namely Ādam ﷺ, *himself* had a parent(s), thereby precluding the rational possibility of him being an original creation without biological parentage. Moreover, as explained above in great detail, a human lacking parentage does not result in a violation of PNC nor does it contravene any inviolable rational condition (*sharṭ ʿaqlī*).

Considering the combined knowledge obtained through empirical methods and the many lines of evidences provided by modern evolutionary science, it can be said that the nomic judgment, "all humans possess a pair of biological parents,"[144] should, in theory, lead us to inductively conclude that since Ādam ﷺ was a human, he too must have possessed a pair of biological parents.[145] However, al-Thānvī echoes al-Ghazālī's earlier rule that if stronger evidence contrary to this universal, nomic judgment

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أن العلم لا يشترط فيه عدم احتمال النقيض بالمعنى الذي ذكرناه بل غاية ما يشرط فيه إنما هو القطع بالحكم ولذلك يدخل في العلم والقطع كلّ من العلم العادي والعلم العقلي.

Saʿīd Fūda, *Bayān Tawjīh al-Imām al-Taftāzānī Dalālat Qawlih Taʿālā "Law Kāna fīhimā Āliha illā Allah lafasadatā" ʿalā al-Waḥdāniyya* (Amman: al-Aslein, 2022), 36.

142 Al-Ghazālī states:

فهذا (الاستقراء) لا يفيد بردَ اليقين.

Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *al-Qisṭās al-Mustaqīm* (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 2007), 96.

143 His use of "permanence" (*dawām*) here is a term from Islamic temporal logic and must be understood in contradistinction to "*ḍarūra*". The former refers to perpetuality (*shumūl al-nisba jamīʿ al-azmina*) while the latter refers to necessity (*imtināʿ infikāk al-nisba ʿan al-mawḍūʿ*). See details regarding the difference in: Muḥammad ʿImād al-Dīn al-Shayrkūtī, *al-Mirʾā Ḥāshiya ʿalā al-Mirqā* (Karachi: Maktabat al-Bushrā, 2011), 52. A break from the "*dawām*" does not result in a logical contradiction (*tanāquḍ*) while a break in "*ḍarūra*" would.

144 However, this universal judgment will not be regarded as being absolute for all the reasons stated above.

145 This is because mere, unsupported suppositions or bare rational permissiveness is not enough to negate what stands as an accepted nomic proof. Saʿīd Fūda states in this regard:

is found, then it becomes necessary (*wājib*) to apply it and that no call towards metaphorical interpretations (*ta'wīl*) of scripture can then be adopted and applied.[146] Although this does beg the question that in cases when a universal, nomic judgment has been applied, what kind of "stron-

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وإنّ مجرد الاحتمالات العقلية والافتراضات غير المدعمة بدليل يعينها لا تنافي ولا تعارض
ما يقوم في النفس من العلوم العادية.

Sa'īd Fūda, *al-Sharḥ al-Kabīr* (Beirut: Dār al-Dhakhā'ir, 2014), 1:467.

Al-Dusūqī similarly states:

ولا يضرّ إمكان تخلف العادي: ألا ترى أنك تكذّب بمقتضى العادة من يقول: الجبل
الفلاني ذهب مع إمكان تخلف العادة عقلا وكونه ذهبا؟ إذ لو فرض أنّ الله خلقه من أول
الأمر ذهبا لم يلزم عليه محال والحاصل أن القطع بجامع الأمر العادي.

Ibrāhīm al-Dusūqī, *Ḥāshiyat al-Dusūqī 'alā Umm al-Barāhīn* (Beirut: DKI, 2001), 229.

Al-Rāzī says likewise:

واعلم أن الجواز العقلي يمكن إثباته بدلائل العقل أما وقوع الجائز فلا سبيل إلى إثباته
إلا بالسمع.

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Arba'īn fī Uṣūl al-Dīn* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Kulliya al-Azhariyya, 1986), 2:50.

This should not be taken as an admission that everything the theory of evolution asserts is true. The proposition being made here simply revolves around the validity of the default assumption of every human having parents.

146 Ashraf 'Alī al-Thānvī states:

في الاستقراء إنما يشاهد الرجل بعض الجزئيات، فيرى فيها قدراً مشتركاً، فيحكم بذلك
القدر المشترك على سائر الجزئيات التي لم يشاهدها، فهذا حكم غير مقطوع به. نعم، إنه
يثبت به الحكم في الجزئيات الأخرى بمرتبة الظن، والظن إنما يكون دليلاً وحجة فيما
لا يعارضه دليل أقوى منه. ثم إن الحكم الظني الذي يستفاد بالاستقراء لا يكون إلا
بالدوام، وبالدوام لا تثبت الضرورة - أي نفي الإمكان عن الجانب المخالف - بل يحتاج إلى
دليل مستقلّ على نفي الإمكان، والظن لا أثر له فيما عارضه الدليل الأقوى منه، حتى إن
الواجب حينئذ: العمل بالأقوى فحيث لا يوجد دليل على نفي الإمكان، والدليل الأقوى قائم
على خلاف الحكم الظني: فأي داع يدعوهم إلى ألا يحتجوا بالأقوى ويميلوا إلى التأويل
البعيد؟ مع أن التأويل صرف عن الظاهر فلا يصار إليه إلا عند الحاجة، ولا حاجة هنا،

ger evidence" would be required to serve as an exception to this nomic judgment's universality? In response to this pertinent question, what ought to be noted is that science does not concern itself with individuals, be it Ādam ﷺ, Genghis Khan, John Smith, Zayd, etc. Once science reaches nomological certainty that the sample set studied can be broadly applied to any absent, unobservable target by virtue of its assumed equivalence[147] in that regard to said sample set, then it will be applied universally and indiscriminately. As such, science will neither care nor concern itself with any alleged exclusivity surrounding the case of Ādam ﷺ, on grounds that it is still admittedly a "human", biologically and anatomically akin to any other human that has ever been observed. Although analogies can at times be a deductively valid proof, it would first need to be established that there is an equivalence between the two in what they are being compared.[148] But in the alleged case of an anomaly that happens to be unobservable and absent from being empirically detected, science itself would not possess the authority to distinguish this anomaly from the norm[149]. As Shams al-

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فلماذا يصار إلى التأويل؟ ولو فسح المجال لمثل هذه التأويلات لما بقي شيء من العبارات والشهادات حجة لمضمونها، لكونها عرضة للتأويلات والاحتمالات الناشئة من غير دليل.

Ashraf ʿAlī al-Tahānwī, *al-Intibāhāt al-Mufīda fī Ḥall al-Ishtibāhāt al-Jadīda* (Karāchī: Maktabat Dār al-ʿUlūm Karāchī, 2018), 96-97.

Abū al-Muʿīn al-Nasafī further elaborates that metaphorical interpretations cannot be resorted to when they go against the dictates of what is rationally necessary and/or the dictates of Islam:

فكلّ تأويل خرج بيانا لما احتمله ظاهر الكلام لغة ولا يردّه العقل والشرع فهو مقبول وما لا فلا بخلاف تأويلات الباطنية.

Abū al-Muʿīn al-Nasafī, *Sharḥ al-Taʾwīlāt* (Diyarbakir: Dicle University, 2021), 136.

147 i.e., *mithliyyah* in Arabic.

148 Burhān al-Dīn b. Maḥmūd al-Bukhārī (d. 750 h) states that if there is no proof for establishing equivalence between two things, then analogizing between them would be invalid:

اعتبار الغائب بالشاهد من غير إثبات دليل التسوية بينهما فاسد.

Burhān al-Dīn b. Maḥmūd al-Bukhārī, *Sharḥ al-Tamhīd li Qawāʿid al-Tawḥīd* (Amman: Maktabat al-Ghānam, 2021), 276.

149 Al-Bāqillānī emphatically replies to those who reject the rational possibility of a fully erect, living, and rational man without any parentage that their reliance

Dīn al-Afghānī al-Ṣawātī (d. 1398 h) explained, when empirical methods cannot even provide such a distinction nor conclusively invalidate it, and instead continue to merely refer back to their previously obtained universal judgment; then as a result, objecting to when the Qur'ān definitively conveys the occurrence of a past supernatural event will be meritless.[150] For every Muslim must believe that Allah ﷻ is omniscient of all things absent and bygone.[151] Thus, whenever the Qur'ān relates a specific supernatural

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on past existents and empirical observation does not by itself constitute a logical proof for the necessary judgment that every unobservable man must be the same as what they have observed:

> فإن قالوا: هذا محال لأنّا لم نجد إنسانا خلق حيّا عالما كاملا ابتداء من غير أصل ونطفة وغذاء وانتقال من حال إلى حال يقال لهم: ما تعلّقتم به من مجرّد الشاهد والوجود لا يجوز أن يكون دليلا على وجوب القضاء بمثله على الغائب.

Abū Bakr Muḥammad al-Bāqillānī, *Kashf Asrār al-Bāṭiniyya* (Ṣan'ā': Maktabat al-Irshād, 2021), 345.

150 Al-Ṣawātī states:

> بل إنّما يعلم بقرائن الأحوال إن وجدت أو بإخبار الأنبياء عن الله سبحانه ومن المتقرّر أن الحسّ لا سلطان له على الفرق بين المثلين ولا التميّز بين الشبيهين..ليس مدركا بالحسّ وإذا لم يكن مدركا بالحسّ جاز أن يخرق الله سبحانه العادة...وإذا جوّز العقل مثل هذا مع أن الحسّ لا مدخل له في ذلك بقي إخبار القرآن الكريم...سالما عن كلّ معارض مؤيّدا بكلّ حجّة وسقط السؤال بالكلّيّة.

Shams al-Dīn al-Afghānī al-Ṣawātī, *al-Jawāhir al-Bahiyya 'alā Sharḥ al-'Aqā'id al-Nasafiyya* (Gujarat: al-Jāmi'a al-Ḥusayniyya, 2016), 1:104.

151 According to al-Rāzī, had it been possible for Allah ﷻ to be ignorant of some things, then His omniscience of that which He *does* know would be the product of some agent specifying that knowledge for Him. Ergo, His omniscience would be dependent on the specifier—and that is unbefitting for the One attributed with self-sufficiency:

> أنه سبحانه وتعالى عالم بكلّ المعلومات من الكلّيّات والجزئيّات والموجودات والمعدومات والغائبات والحاضرات والمتغيّرات والباقيات والدليل عليه: هو أنه لو كان عالما بالبعض دون البعض لكان عالميّته بذلك البعض دون البعض بتخصيص مخصّص وذلك المخصّص يجعله عالما بذلك البعض فيكون الله تعالى في صفة كماله مفتقرا إلى الغير وهو محال.

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Ḥāshiya 'alā al-Khamsūn fī Uṣūl al-Dīn* (Amman: KRM, 2017), 147-148.

event in unequivocal terms (*qaṭʿī al-dalāla*), this would then qualify as a "stronger evidence" than a universal, nomic judgment provided by science and would further be counted as a departure from it.[152]

As such, the remainder of this work will focus on bringing forth and establishing this type of "stronger evidence".

152 This would be a case of giving preponderance to something the Qurʾān mentions specifically about a particular (i.e., *madlūl juzʾī*), namely Ādam ﷺ, above what science has only judged broadly in universal terms (*madlūl kullī*): "all humans possess a pair of biological parents."



Common *Dissent*

As mentioned in the introduction, Guessoum takes issue with Jalajel's stance of Ādamic exceptionalism:

> And there lies the main issue I have with this work, namely the fact that the author limits the possible position(s) on evolution on the basis of what the 'mainstream' is, while noting that these 'orthodox' Islamic theologies were formulated many centuries ago. Even on the various aspects of evolution, including biological, he sees no paradox in relying on the views of scholars of a thousand years ago when discussing issues that have only become understood in, at earliest, the past century, thus completely disregarding the intellectual, scientific, philosophical, and theological developments that humanity has witnessed in recent times.[153]

The assumption embedded within Guessoum's words pertains to how anyone can rely on thousand-year-old hermeneutics when the science behind evolution has only been developed recently. This assumption is being used to reject any past exegesis of verses regarding human creation and Ādam ﷺ prior to the prevalence of Darwinian evolution. However, a distinction must be made here between considering the *very* **idea** of Ādam ﷺ descending from a pair of parents vis-à-vis the consideration of a *specific* **argument** or **evidence** in favor of him descending. Do Guessoum's words conflate the two and assume that "scholars of a thousand years ago" never even contemplated the very **idea** of Ādam ﷺ descending from parents?

The Early Evolutionists, *Dahriyya*

Indeed it would be baseless to argue that scholars of the past did not contemplate that. We saw in the previous chapter where nearly 1100 years ago,

153 Nidhal Guessoum. "Book Review of Islam and Biological Evolution: Exploring Classical Sources and Methodologies". (2011): 476-477.

al-Ashʿarī considered the idea of an "insān" being created without semen. Furthermore, Muslim exegetes and ḥadīth experts of the past came across a group that bore an eerie resemblance to the Neoatheists of today in using evolution as a tool to deny the original creation of Ādam ﷺ. Al-Khaṭṭābī (d. 388 h) states that this group was known as the Dahriyya; they believed that time was pre-eternal with no beginning.[154] Al-Shahrastānī (d. 548 h) further elaborates and describes them as Arabs that disbelieved in a creator, resurrection, and restoration in an afterlife.[155] Al-Bāqillānī states that the Dahriyya believed that there could not exist any human, including Ādam ﷺ, unless he was a product of a male and a female and that no one had ever witnessed other than this.[156] The connection between the Dahriyya

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154 Al-Khaṭṭābī states:

> وكان من عادة أهل الجاهلية إذا أصابهم شدة من الزمان أو مكروه من الأمر أضافوه إلى الدهر وسبوه فقالوا: بؤسا للدهر، وتبا للدهر، ونحو ذلك من القول، إذ كانوا لا يثبتون لله ربوبية، ولا يعرفون للدهر خالقا، وقد حكى الله ذلك من قولهم حين قالوا: وما يهلكنا إلا الدهر ولذلك سموا الدهرية وكانوا يرون الدهر أزليا قديما لا أول له.

Abū Sulayman al-Khaṭṭābī, *Aʿlām al-Ḥadīth* (Mecca: Markaz al-Buḥūth al-ʿIlmiyya, 1988), 3:1904.

155 Al-Shahrastānī states:

> منكرو الخالق، والبعث، والإعادة فصنف منهم أنكروا الخالق والبعث والإعادة. وقالوا بالطبع المحيي، والدهر المفني، وهم الذين أخبر عنهم القرآن المجيد وَقَالُوا مَا هِيَ إِلَّا حَيَاتُنَا الدُّنْيَا نَمُوتُ وَنَحْيَا، إشارة إلى الطبائع المحسوسة في العالم السفلي، وقصرا للحياة والموت على تركبها وتحللها، فالجامع هو الطبع، والمهلك هو الدهر: وَمَا يُهْلِكُنَا إِلَّا الدَّهْرُ وَمَا لَهُمْ بِذَلِكَ مِنْ عِلْمٍ إِنْ هُمْ إِلَّا يَظُنُّونَ.

Abū al-Fatḥ Muḥammad al-Shahrastānī, *al-Milal wa al-Nihal* (Cairo: Muʾassasat al-Ḥalabī), 3:79.

156 Al-Bāqillānī states:

> فيقال لهم ما الذي أردتم بقولكم إن هذه الأمور مستحيلة ممتنعة أعنيتم بذلك أنها مستحيلة في العادة أو في قدرة الصانع تعالى فإن قالوا في قدرة الصانع ألحدوا وتركوا دينهم وقيل لهم ما الدليل على إحالة ذلك وإن قالوا لأننا لم نجد أحدا فعله ولا يقدر عليه ولا رأينا ذلك قط ولا جرى مثل ما تدعون قيل لهم فيجب أن تحيلوا أيضا أن يخلق الله تعالى الأجسام وألا يوجد آدم إلا من ذكر وأنثى وألا يخلق دجاجة إلا من بيضة أو بيضة إلا من دجاجة أو نطفة إلا من إنسان أو إنسانا إلا من نطفة لأن ذلك أجمع لم يوجد قط ولم يشاهد

and Ādam ﷺ can be primarily found under the commentary of the famous ḥadīth of the Prophet ﷺ: "Allah created Ādam in his image."[157] Although there is much discussion about the exact meaning of this ḥadīth and the referent of the pronoun "his," it will suffice to restrict the discussion here to what is of relevance to our topic at hand. Ibn Fūrak states that if the pronoun "his" refers back to Ādam ﷺ, then one plausible interpretation would be that the Prophet ﷺ himself was refuting the Dahriyya of his time regarding their belief that no man exists except that he was created from semen, and nor does semen exist except that it was emitted from another man, *ad infinitum*, and that people transition from one development stage to another in the customary manner that is commonly known. Ibn Fūrak suggests that the Prophet ﷺ was explaining that Ādam ﷺ was in fact the first man and was *originally created* in "his" very own image without ever being previously produced from semen or descending and transitioning through developmental stages as normally witnessed in humans. Furthermore, he states that the Prophet ﷺ is informing us of something that could not have ever been known except through revelation; that we descend from Ādam ﷺ who was not created through the loins and womb of any previous descendant nor through stages of physical development. Rather, he was created as an original creation in the form of a fully erect man infused with a soul.[158] In addition to Ibn Fūrak, other early scholars such as Abū

فإن مروا على ذلك لحقوا بأهل الدهر.

Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī, *Tamhīd al-Awā'il wa Talkhīṣ al-Dalā'il* (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Kutub al-Thaqāfiyya, 1987), 1:135-136.

157 The Prophet ﷺ said:

فَإِنَّ اللهَ خَلَقَ آدَمَ عَلَى صُورَتِهِ.

Muslim b. al-Ḥājjāj, *Saḥīḥ al-Imām Muslim* (Jeddah: Dār al-Minhāj, 2013), 8:32.

158 Ibn Fūrak states:

أن النبي، صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ، أفادنا بذلك إبطال قول أهل الدهر إنه لم يكن إنسان إلا من نطفة ولا نطفة إلا من إنسان فيما مضى، ويأتي وليس لذلك أول ولا آخر وإن الناس إنما ينقلون من نشوء إلى نشوء عَلَى ترتيب معتاد، فعرفنا تكذيبهم، وأن آدم خلق عَلَى صورته التي شوهد عليها من غير أن كان عن نطفة قبله وعن تناسل، أو تنقل من صغر إلى كبر كالمعهود من أحوال أولاده. فأكد ما دلت عليه دلائل العقول من كون هذا العالم ذا ابتداء وانتهاء وأفاد به ما لا يوصل إليه إلا بالسمع أن الأصل الذي منه توالدنا لم يكن عن توالد قبله بل خلق كما كان عليه وهو آدم عليه السلام خلق الله تعالى من صلصال كالفخار ثم

Manṣūr ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī,[159] Ibn Baṭṭāl (d. 449 h),[160] Ibn Rushd (d. 520 h),[161] and al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ (d. 544 h),[162] believed that the Prophet ﷺ was refuting the position of the Dahriyya in his era regarding Ādam ﷺ.

Moreover, al-Baghdādī describes how the Dahriyya would promote the denial of the original creation of Ādam ﷺ by suggesting that there were men before him. They used this idea to support their belief in the beginningless nature of the universe.[163] In short, well over a thousand years ago, scholars of Islam became accustomed to hearing the idea that Ādam ﷺ was created from a set of biological parents and rejected this idea based on what they believed was "stronger evidence" to the contrary.

خلق فيه الروح فلم يكن قط في صلب ولا رحم ولا كان علقة ولا مضغة ولا طفلا ولا مراهقا بل خلق ابتداء بشرا سويا كما شوهد وعهد.

Abū Bakr b. Fūrak, *Mushkil al-Ḥadīth* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Hassan, 1979), 50-51.

159 Abū Manṣūr ʿAbd al-Qāhir b. Ṭāhir al-Baghdādī, *al-Asmāʾ wa al-Ṣifāt* (Damascus: Dār al-Taqwā, 2020), 3:150-151.

160 Badr al-Dīn al-ʿAynī, *ʿUmdat al-Qārī* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2001), 22:358.

161 Abū al-Walīd b. Rushd, *al-Bayān wa al-Taḥṣīl* (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1988), 18:508.

162 al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ, *Ikmāl al-Muʿlim bi Fawāʾid Muslim* (Cairo: Dār al-Wafāʾ, 1998), 8:89.

163 Al-Baghdādī states:

وقد قال القيرواني في رسالته إلى سليمان بن الحسن: وإني أوصيك بتشكيك الناس في القرآن والتوراة والزبور والإنجيل وتدعوهم إلى إبطال الشرائع وإلى إبطال المعاد والنشور من القبور وإبطال الملائكة في السماء وإبطال الجن في الأرض وأوصيك أن تدعوهم إلى القول بأنه قد كان قبل آدم بشر كثير فإن ذلك عون لك على القول بقِدَم العالَم وفي هذا تحقيق دعوانا على الباطنية أنهم دهرية يقولون بقدم العالم.

Abū Manṣūr ʿAbd al-Qāhir b. Ṭāhir al-Baghdādī, *al-Farq Bayn al-Firaq* (Beirut: Dār Ibn Hazm, 2005), 176.

Consensus

It was mentioned in the Introduction that despite Guessoum's call for applying the exegetical approach of Ibn Rushd, he fails to recognize that the latter stated that if consensus (*ijmāʿ*) had been reached through a means which is certain (*yaqīnī*) concerning the outward import (*ẓāhir*) of a verse then it would not be correct to adopt an allegorical understanding.[164]

Consensus on the Ādamic Creation

Abū Manṣūr ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī asserted that Muslims, Christians, and Jews agree on the belief that all humans descend from Ādam ﵇ and that he was created from dust.[165] Ibn ʿAṭiyya (d. 542 h) states in his *tafsīr* that all people are in consensus that Allah ﷻ created Ādam ﵇ from dust and that he was not born from sexual reproduction.[166] Also, al-Qurṭubī (d. 671 h) states that no one from the Christians or Muslims differed regarding

164 Ibn Rushd, *Faṣl al-Maqāl* (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1968), 37.

165 Abū Manṣūr ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī states:

وأنكرت المجوس كلها: ما عليه المسلمون وأهل الكتاب في انتساب الناس إلى آدم وحواء وما ذكروه من خلق آدم عليه السلام من التراب وخلق حواء من ضلع آدم وانتشار النسل منهما بعد ذلك.

Abū Manṣūr ʿAbd al-Qāhir b. Ṭāhir al-Baghdādī, *al-Asmāʾ wa al-Ṣifāt* (Damascus: Dār al-Taqwā, 2020), 3:282.

166 Ibn ʿAṭiyya states:

الناس كلهم مجمعون على أن الله تعالى خلقه من تراب من غير فحل.

Abū Muḥammad b. ʿAṭiyya al-Andalusī, *al-Muḥarrar al-Wajīz* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2001), 1:446. Abū Ḥayyān al-Andalusī (d. 745 h) and al-Samīn al-Ḥalabī (d. 756 h) also cite Ibn ʿAṭiyya's words in their respective tafsīrs under verse 3:59.

Ādam ﷺ being created and formed without biological parents.[167] Moreover, Ibn al-Qaṭṭān al-Fāsī (d. 628 h) reports in his collection of unanimously agreed matters that Muslims reached consensus that Allah ﷻ made Ādam ﷺ the father of mankind.[168] Finally, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751) adds that from the matters that are known (*al-maʿlūm*) and no Muslim disputes is that Allah ﷻ created Ādam ﷺ from the dust of this world.[169] In sum, Muslim scholars from nearly a thousand years ago explicitly cited consensus on Ādam ﷺ being an original creation.

Guessoum[170] and others attempt to combat such calls of consensus by propagating opinions of individuals such as Jalāl al-Dīn al-Rūmī (d. 672 h), Ibn Khaldūn (d. 808 h), Ibn Miskawayh (d. 421 h), and the Brethren of Purity (*Ikhwān al-Ṣafā*) that allegedly speak about the stages of biological evolution and common descent of humans. However, these have been proven to be erroneous attempts at shoehorning evolution into the words of these classical scholars by taking them out of context.[171] Moreover, it must be asked why Guessoum does not see his own "paradox in relying on the views of scholars of a thousand years ago when discussing issues that

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167 Al-Qurṭubī states:

وَلم يخْتَلف فِي ذَلِك أحد أعنِي فِي أن آدم مكون مَخْلُوق من غير أبوين.

Abū ʿAbd Allah al-Qurṭubī, *al-Iʿlām bimā fī Dīn al-Naṣārā* (Cairo: Dār al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 1980), 137.

168 Ibn al-Qaṭṭān al-Fāsī states:

وأجمع المسلمون على أن الله تعالى خص آدم عليه السلام بأن خلقه بيده وأسجد له ملائكته وجعله أبًا.

Abū al-Ḥasan b. al-Qaṭṭān al-Fāsī, *al-Iqnāʿ fī Masāʾil al-Ijmāʿ* (Cairo: al-Fārūq al-Ḥadītha, 2004), 1:47.

169 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyya states:

فمن المعلوم الذي لا ينازع فيه مسلم أن الله سبحانه خلق آدم عليه السلام من تربة هذه الأرض.

Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyya, *Hādī al-Arwāḥ ilā Bilād al-Afrāḥ* (Cairo: Maktabat ʿIbād al-Raḥmān, 2005), 51.

170 Nidhal Guessoum, *Islam's Quantum Question* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 305-308 and 320.

171 Shoaib Ahmed Malik. "Old Texts, New Masks: A Critical Review of Misreading Evolution onto Historical Islamic Texts". Zygon, 54.2 (2019):501-522.

have only become understood in…recent times"[172] yet denying this same reliance when it opposes evolution. In the preceding chapter it was shown that the call for dismissing consensus on account of Muslims never considering the notion that Ādam ﷺ may have evolved is patently false. The fact that consensus was enacted despite the Dahriyya's claims and propaganda indicates that this is a *bona fide* consensus. Therefore, to arbitrarily reject what the scholars came to agree upon is unfounded and illegitimate.[173]

172 Nidhal Guessoum. Book Review of Islam and Biological Evolution: Exploring Classical Sources and Methodologies. (2011): 476-477.

173 Al-Ghazālī states:

لا معنى للتحكم بإنكار ما فهمه أهل الإجماع من القرآن.

Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *al-Iqtiṣād fī al-I'tiqād* (Jeddah: Dār al-Minhāj, 2019), 241.



Reason for the Revelation of Verse 3:59

The next two chapters will focus solely on the following verse which I believe is the single-most important verse in decisively proving the original creation of Ādam ﷺ:

إِنَّ مَثَلَ عِيسَىٰ عِندَ ٱللَّهِ كَمَثَلِ ءَادَمَ خَلَقَهُۥ مِن تُرَابٍ ثُمَّ قَالَ لَهُۥ كُن فَيَكُونُ

> "Indeed! the similitude of ʿĪsā, according to Allah, is just like the similitude of Ādam. He created him from dust, then He said unto him: 'Be!' and he became." - *Āl ʿImrān*:59

Erroneous Interpretations

Al-Suyūṭī (d. 911 h) describes two types of groups that err when interpreting the Qur'ān. The first group looks to interpret the Qur'ān in alignment with their preconceived beliefs without due attention to the context/co-text of the verse (*siyāq*) and what its words denote (*dalāla*) and convey (*bayān*); while the second group interprets the Qur'ān purely based on whatever would permit an Arabic speaker to intend by the given phraseology without any consideration to the i.) actual speaker (i.e. Allah ﷻ) of the verse, ii.) the one to whom it was revealed (i.e. the Prophet ﷺ), and iii.) its [immediate] audience.[174] Bearing al-Suyūṭī's description in mind, I will begin by explaining the reason for the revelation (*sabab al-nuzūl*) of verse 3:59

174 Al-Suyūṭī states:

أحدهما قوم اعتقدوا معاني ثم أرادوا حمل ألفاظ القرآن عليها والثاني قوم فسروا القرآن بمجرد ما يسوغ أن يريده من كان من الناطقين بلغة العرب من غير نظر إلى المتكلم بالقرآن والمنزل عليه والمخاطب به فالأولون راعوا المعنى الذي رأوه من غير نظر إلى ما تستحقه

followed by an analysis of the context of this verse within Sūrat Āl ʿImrān and what its words convey in the subsequent chapter.

Reason for Revelation

al-Shāṭibī states that it is mandatory to know the reason for revelation for whoever wants to understand what the Qur'ān intends to communicate. Otherwise, one falls into ignorance, doubts, and problems. One such problem, for example, is making that which is obvious to seem ambiguous, resulting in chaotic differences and disputes.[175]

Ibn ʿĀshūr (d. 1393 h) states that the reason for revelation can itself serve as a "tafsīr" for the exegete in clarifying ambiguities and explaining that which may be unobvious and terse, such that he cannot dispense with knowledge of it.[176] Furthermore, he states that properly understanding a verse rests upon knowing the reason for its revelation. Therefore, knowledge of it is a "must" in order to explain the ambiguities of the verse.[177]

ألفاظ القرآن من الدلالة والبيان والآخرون راعوا مجرد اللفظ وما يجوز أن يريد به العربي من غير نظر إلى ما يصلح للمتكلم وسياق الكلام.

Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, *al-Itqān fī ʿUlūm al-Qur'ān* (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabi, 2005), 858-859.

175 Al-Shāṭibī states:

معرفة أسباب التنزيل لازمة لمن أراد علم القرآن... أن الجهل بأسباب التنزيل موقع في الشبه والإشكالات، ومورد للنصوص الظاهرة مورد الإجمال حتى يقع الاختلاف وذلك مظنة وقوع النزاع.

Abū Isḥāq al-Shāṭibī, *al-Muwāfaqāt* (Riyadh: Dār Ibn ʿAffān, 1997), 4:146.

176 Ibn ʿĀshūr states:

إن من أسباب النزول ما ليس المفسر بغنى عن علمه لأن فيها بيان مجمل أو إيضاح خفي وموجز ومنها ما يكون وحده تفسيرا.

Muḥammad al-Ṭāhir b. ʿĀshūr, *al-Taḥrīr wa al-Tanwīr* (Tūnis: al-Dār al-Tūnisiyya, 1984), 1:47.

177 Ibn ʿĀshūr states:

الأول هو المقصود من الآية يتوقف فهم المراد منها على علمه فلا بد من البحث عنه للمفسر وهذا منه تفسير مبهمات القرآن.

Muḥammad al-Ṭāhir b. ʿĀshūr, *al-Taḥrīr wa al-Tanwīr* (Tūnis: al-Dār al-Tūnisiyya, 1984), 1:47-48.

Bearing this in mind, it behooves us to understand the reason why verse 3:59 was revealed. The contemporary Jordanian specialist in Qur'ānic sciences, ʿAlī Hānī al-ʿAqrabāwī, asserts that according to the agreement of the vast majority of exegetes and books of Prophetic biography, the first eighty (80) verses of Sūrat Āl ʿImrān were revealed concerning the debate that took place upon the arrival of the Christian delegation of Najrān to al-Madīna; which al-ʿAqrabāwī states occurred in the 2nd year of the Hijra during a period that was after the Battle of Badr yet before the Battle of Uḥud.[178] He further describes that the delegation comprised sixty individuals, fourteen of whom were noblemen, and amongst these fourteen were three individuals who would speak on behalf of the delegation: The first in command was known as the "*ʿĀqib*", whose real name was ʿAbd al-Masīḥ, he was considered to be the leader and consult of the entire tribe, such that nothing was decided except that it was in conformity with his opinion. Second in command was the deputy to the ʿĀqib, known as the "*Imām*" of the tribe, whose real name was Ayham. Finally, the third was the archbishop and erudite scholar of the tribe, whose name was Abū Ḥāritha b. ʿAlqama. This Abū Ḥāritha was a builder of many different schools of learning where he would preside as a prominent educator, eventually leading him to gain the patronage of the Eastern Roman Empire where they established churches for him to teach therein.[179] Upon the arrival of the Najrān delegation to

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178 ʿAlī Hānī al-ʿAqrabāwī states:

وأول السورة إلى بضع وثمانين آية نزل في وفد نجران فجمهور المفسرين وكتّاب السيرة متفقون على أن المناظرة التي جاء الفصل الأول في صددها كانت مع وفد نصارى نجران، ولكنهم لا يذكرون متى قدم هذا الوفد إلى المدينة، والأصح أن قدومه كان بعد بدر وقبل أحد وليس في السنة التاسعة كما قيل.

al-ʿAqrabāwī, ʿAlī Hānī. *Maqṣūd Sūrat Āl ʿImrān*. drive.google.com/file/d/1t-BHS1lq66QTgDeOcUsctGcQiBrk1Bldp/view. Page 3.

Likewise, the Damascus-based specialist in Prophetic *Sīrah* and *ʿUlūm al-Qur'ān*, Muḥammad Sāmir al-Naṣṣ, believes the incident to have occurred shortly before the Battle of Uḥud as mentioned to me via private correspondence.

179 ʿAlī Hānī al-ʿAqrabāwī states:

فقد قَدِمَ وفد نجران وكانوا ستين راكبًا على رسول الله وفيهم أربعة عشر رجلًا من أشرافهم وفي الأربعة عشر ثلاثة نفر إليهم يؤول أمرهم فالعاقب أمير القوم وصاحب مشورتهم الذي لا يصدرون إلا عن رأيه واسمه عبد المسيح والسيد إمامهم وصاحب رحلهم واسمه الأيهم وأبو حارثة بن علقمة أسقفهم وحبرهم وإمامهم وصاحب مدارسهم وكان قد شرف

al-Madīna, various accounts have been given regarding the exchange that took place between these noblemen and the Prophet ﷺ. This historic visit is found within the canonical collections of *Sahīh al-Bukhārī*[180] and *Sahīh Muslim*;[181] but the finer details surrounding the actual exchange between the parties was not included in these two books. It is important to note that Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī (d. 852 h), as well as other exegetes, such as Ṣiddīq b. Ḥasan al-Qinawjī (d. 1307 h), recognized that the general kernel of this exchange was foremost narrated in the respective collections of al-Bukhārī and Muslim (*Sahīhayn*),[182] while its details can be found in a variety of

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فيهم ودرس كتبهم حتى حسن علمه في دينهم وكانت ملوك الروم قد شرفوه ومولوه وبنوا له الكنائس لعلمه واجتهاده.

al-ʿAqrabāwī, ʿAlī Hānī. *Maqṣūd Sūrat Āl ʿImrān.*

drive.google.com/file/d/1tBHS1lq66QTgDeOcUsctGcQiBrk1Bldp/view. Pages 3-4.

180 Al-Bukhārī (d. 256 h) narrates:

حدثني عباس بن الحسين حدثنا يحيى بن آدم عن إسرائيل عن أبي إسحاق عن صلة بن زفر عن حذيفة قال جاء العاقب والسيد صاحبا نجران إلى رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم يريدان أن يلاعناه قال فقال أحدهما لصاحبه لا تفعل فوالله لئن كان نبيا فلاعنا لا نفلح نحن ولا عقبنا من بعدنا قالا إنا نعطيك ما سألتنا وابعث معنا رجلا أمينا ولا تبعث معنا إلا أمينا فقال لأبعثن معكم رجلا أمينا حق أمين فاستشرف له أصحاب رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم فقال قم يا أبا عبيدة بن الجراح فلما قام قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم هذا أمين هذه الأمة.

Muḥammad b. Ismaʿīl al-Bukhārī, *Sahīh al-Bukhārī* (Jeddah: Dār al-Minhāj, 2008), 5:171-172.

181 Muslim (d. 261 h) narrates:

حَدَّثَنَا مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ الْمُثَنَّى، وَابْنُ، بَشَّارٍ وَاللَّفْظُ لاِبْنِ الْمُثَنَّى قَالاَ حَدَّثَنَا مُحَمَّدُ، بْنُ جَعْفَرٍ حَدَّثَنَا شُعْبَةُ، قَالَ سَمِعْتُ أَبَا إِسْحَاقَ، يُحَدِّثُ عَنْ صِلَةَ بْنِ زُفَرَ، عَنْ حُذَيْفَةَ، قَالَ جَاءَ أَهْلُ نَجْرَانَ إِلَى رَسُولِ اللَّهِ صلى الله عليه وسلم فَقَالُوا يَا رَسُولَ اللَّهِ ابْعَثْ إِلَيْنَا رَجُلاً أَمِينًا فَقَالَ «لأَبْعَثَنَّ إِلَيْكُمْ رَجُلاً أَمِينًا حَقَّ أَمِينٍ حَقَّ أَمِينٍ» قَالَ فَاسْتَشْرَفَ لَهَا النَّاسُ قَالَ فَبَعَثَ أَبَا عُبَيْدَةَ بْنَ الْجَرَّاحِ.

Muslim b. al-Ḥājjāj, *Sahīh al-Imām Muslim* (Jeddah: Dār al-Minhāj, 2013), 7:129.

182 Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, *al-ʿUjāb fī Bayān al-Asbāb* (Dammām: Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 1997), 1:683.

accounts narrated by both the Companions (*ṣaḥābah*) and the Successors (*tābiʿīn*).[183] Moreover, al-Rāzī,[184] al-Khāzin (d. 741 h),[185] and Shaykhizādah (d. 951 h)[186] all claim consensus of the exegetes on verse 3:59 being revealed due to the debate that occurred when the Christian delegation of Najrān came to al-Madīna. Although the debate includes a variety of points, I will restrict myself to those that are pertinent to verse 3:59.

Ibn Kathīr in his famous tafsīr under verse 3:59, states that Ibn Isḥāq (d. 151 h) as well as others narrate that amongst the things that were said by Abū Ḥāritha, ʿAbd al-Masīḥ, and Ayham to the Prophet ﷺ was that ʿĪsā ﷺ is the son of Allah ﷻ because he did not have a known biological father. The Prophet ﷺ replied that this very claim of attributing a son to Allah ﷻ is amongst the things which have prevented them from being true believers. They, in turn, asked: "So who, then, is his father, O Muḥammad?" The Prophet ﷺ remained silent and did not reply until verse 3:59 was

183 Ḥasan al-Qinawjī states:

وقد رويت هذه القصة على وجوه عن جماعة من الصحابة والتابعين وأصلها عند البخاري ومسلم.

Ḥasan b. Ṣiddīq al-Qinawjī, *Fatḥ al-Bayān fī Maqāṣid al-Qurʾān* (Beirut: al-Maktaba al-ʿAsriyya, 1992) 2:254.

184 Al-Rāzī states:

أجمع المفسرون على أن هذه الآية نزلت عند حضور وفد نجران على الرسول صلى الله عليه وسلم.

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb* (Beirut: Dār Ihyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 1999), 8:242.

185 Al-Khāzin states:

أجمع أهل التفسير أن هذه الآية نزلت في محاجة نصارى وفد نجران.

Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlā al-Dīn al-Khāzin, *Lubāb al-Taʾwīl fī Maʿānī al-Tanzīl* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1994), 1:253.

186 Shaykhizādah states:

أجمع المفسرون على أن قوله تعالى «إن مثل عيسى عند الله كمثل آدم» نزل عند حضور وفد نجران عند رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم.

Muḥammad b. Muṣliḥ al-Dīn al-Ḥanafī, *Ḥāshiyat Muḥyī al-Dīn Shaykhizādah ʿalā Tafsīr al-Qāḍī al-Bayḍāwī* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1999), 3:81.

revealed unto him. After citing these narrations of Ibn Isḥāq, Ibn Kathīr states that Ibn Mardawayh (d. 410 h) narrates this same exchange of the debate along with additional details.[187] Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī also narrates that Ibn Mardawayh narrates this specific detail of the debate by citing this same chain.[188] In addition to this authenticated, companion-reported (*mawqūf*) narration there is also the successor-reported (*mursal*) narration of al-Azraq b. Qays (d. 111 h) mentioned by Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī under this same verse of 3:59 where it was narrated that both the archbishop and the ʿĀqib of Najrān came to the Prophet ﷺ whereupon he invited them to Islam. The two replied by saying that they have already been "muslim" before him ﷺ. The Prophet ﷺ replied that they have indeed lied, for there are three things that have prevented them from being muslim: i.) Their statement that Allah ﷻ has taken a son, ii.) their prostration to the cross, and iii.) their consuming of pork. They in turn retorted: "So who, then, is the father of ʿĪsā?" The Prophet ﷺ did not reply to them, and then Allah ﷻ revealed verse 3:59.[189]

187 By way of Ibn Isḥāq from ʿĀṣim b. ʿUmar b. Qatāda (d. 129 h), from the junior companion Maḥmūd b. Labīd (d. 96 h), who narrated it from the companion Rāfiʿ b. Khudayj (d. 74 h). Unfortunately, the complete tafsīr of Ibn Mardawayh is either lost or unavailable. According to the contemporary researcher, Muḥammad al-Khuḍayrī, as stated in his published study of Ibn Mardawayh, entitled: *al-Imām al-Mufassir Ibn Mardawayh* (Istanbul: Dār al-Lubāb, 2016), 89; Ibn Kathīr is arguably the greatest transmitter of reports narrated by Ibn Mardawayh due to him having a copy of it in his possession. Al-Khuḍayrī further mentions that it is very seldom the case that Ibn Kathīr narrates something via Ibn Mardawayh without any comment of his own. Rather, what is almost always found is that Ibn Kathīr offers his remarks (Ibid, 86). However, in this narration quoted above, Ibn Kathīr remains silent and does not criticize the chain or the contents of the narration of Ibn Mardawayh.

188 Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalani, *al-ʿUjāb fī Bayān al-Asbāb* (Dammām: Dār b. al-Jawzī, 1997), 1:682-683. The editor of this edition, ʿAbd al-Ḥakīm Muḥammad al-Anīs, states that all the narrators of this narration are trustworthy (*thiqa*). Ibn Ḥajar himself does not comment on its chain.

189 Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalani states this narration:

قال عبد بن حميد: حدثنا روح بن عبادة عن عوف الأعرابي عن الأزرق بن قيس قال: جاء أسقف نجران والعاقب إلى رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم فعرض عليهما الإسلام فقالا: قد كنا مسلمين قبلك فقال: كذبتما منع الإسلام منكما ثلاث: قولكما اتخذ الله ولدا وسجودكما للصليب وأكلكما لحم الخنزير قالا فمن أبو عيسى؟ فلم يرد عليهما فأنزل الله عز وجل إن مثل عيسى عند الله كمثل آدم خلقه من تراب.

Al-Suyūṭī[190] and al-Zarqānī (d. 1367 h)[191] both mention that if a reason for revelation is found in a successor-reported narration, it will not be accepted unless it is supported by an auxiliary successor-reported narration narrated by one of the early exegetes who were known to have taken directly from the Companions (*ṣaḥāba*), such as Mujāhid (d. 104 h), ʿIkrima (d. 104 h), Saʿīd b. Jubayr (d. 95 h), and others of their rank. Kamāl b. al-Humām (d. 861 h) also includes the successor-reports of Saʿīd b. al-Musayyib (d. 94 h), Ibrahīm al-Nakhaʿī (d. 96 h), al-Shaʿbī (d. 100 h), and al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d. 110 h) to be reliable in this regard.[192] Given this requirement, in order to support the contents of the above successor-reported narration of al-Azraq b. Qays to be accepted as a reason for the revelation of verse 3:59, the following additional successor-reported narration of al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī can be used wherein he states that two monks from Najrān came forward to the Prophet ﷺ and one of them said to him: "Who is the father of ʿĪsā?"

Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalani, *al-ʿUjāb fī Bayān al-Asbāb* (Dammām: Dār b. al-Jawzī, 1997), 1:679.

The editor of this edition, ʿAbd al-Ḥakīm Muḥammad al-Anīs, states that all the narrators of this narration are trustworthy.

Al-Suyūṭī (d. 911 h) also narrates this report and attributes it to Ibn Saʿd (d. 230 h) in the latter's *al-Ṭabaqāt*.

Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, *Lubāb al-Nuqūl fī Asbāb al-Nuzūl* (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Kutub al-Thaqāfiyya, 2002), 57.

190 Al-Suyūṭī states:

> إذا وقع من تابعي فهو مرفوع أيضا لكنه مرسل فقد يقبل إذا صح السند إليه وكان من أئمة التفسير الآخذين عن الصحابة كمجاهد وعكرمة وسعيد بن جبير.

Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, *al-Itqān fī ʿUlūm al-Qurʾān* (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 2005), 90.

191 Al-Zarqānī states:

> أما إذا روي سبب النزول بحديث مرسل أي سقط من سنده الصحابي وانتهى إلى التابعي فحكمه أنه لا يقبل إلا إذا صح واعتضد بمرسل آخر وكان الراوي له من أئمة التفسير الآخذين عن الصحابة كمجاهد وعكرمة وسعيد بن جبير.

Muḥammad ʿAbd al-ʿAẓīm al-Zarqānī, *Manāhil al-ʿIrfān* (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifa, 2005), 108.

192 Kamāl b. al-Humām, *al-Taḥrīr fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh* (Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī, 1932), 344.

The Prophet ﷺ did not hasten to reply until his Lord ordered him. Then the following verses were revealed unto him:

> "We recite this to you as one of the signs and as a wise reminder. Indeed! the similitude of ʿĪsā, according to Allah, is just like the similitude of Ādam. He created him from dust, then He said unto him: 'Be!' and he became. This is the truth from your Lord, so do not be one of those who doubt." 3:58 – 3:60.[193]

The reason for asking about the paternity of ʿĪsā ﷺ is self-evident in that the Najrān believed he was divine by virtue of not having a known biological father and thus the son of God.

It is also important to note here that not all narrations that speak to the reasons and incidents that led to the revelation of a specific verse are the *actual* reason for its revelation. Rather, at times, the narration may just be explaining what that specific verse indicates or entails in terms of its ruling or meaning.[194] Therefore, the scholars of hermeneutics explained that when

193 Ibn Abī Ḥātim al-Rāzī (d. 327 h) narrates this report in his tafsīr:

> حدثنا أبي ثنا أبو سلمة ثنا مبارك قال: سمعت الحسن قال: أتى رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم راهبان من نجران فقال أحدهما: «من أبو عيسى»؟ وكان رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم لا يعجل حتى يأمره ربه فنزل عليه «ذَٰلِكَ نَتْلُوهُ عَلَيْكَ مِنَ ٱلْـَٔايَـٰتِ وَٱلذِّكْرِ ٱلْحَكِيمِ» إلى قوله «مِّنَ ٱلْمُمْتَرِينَ».

ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Abī Ḥātim al-Rāzī, *Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿAẓīm* (Dammām: Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 2018), 3:223-224. The editor of this edition, Ḥikmat b. Bashīr b. Yāsīn, states that the narrators of this chain are all trustworthy except for Mubārak (d. 164 h), who is "*ṣadūq mudallis*". However, as is evident from the chain of the narration itself, Mubārak clarifies by saying that he directly "heard" (*samāʿ*) this narration from al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī. In this vein, the contemporary Saudi specialist of ḥadīth, al-Sharīf Ḥātim al-ʿAwnī, states that according to Yaḥya b. Saʿīd al-Qaṭṭān (d. 198 h), ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Mahdī (d. 198 h), and Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 241 h), if Mubārak narrates via direct, aural form ("*samāʿ*") from al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī then his narrations are accepted. See al-ʿAwnī's *al-Mursal al-Khafī* (Riyādh: Dār al-Hijrah, 1997), 1:345-349. After quoting numerous early ḥadīth authorities regarding the narrations of Mubārak from al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, al-ʿAwnī concludes by stating that when Mubārak clarifies that he directly heard (samāʿ) from al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, then his narration will be authentic (*ṣaḥīḥ*), Ibid, 365.

194 Al-Zarqānī states:

> ومرة أخرى لا يصرح بلفظ السبب ولا يؤتى بتلك الفاء ولا بذلك الجواب المبني على السؤال بل يقال نزلت هذه الآية في كذا مثلا وهذه العبارة ليست نصا في السببية بل

the narration either explicitly mentions that such and such was the "reason" (*sabab*) for the revelation to descend, or when the adverbial, conjunctive particle "*fā*ʾ" conveying consequence comes immediately after narrating the incident,[195] then this narration will be regarded as truly speaking about the incident that actually led to the revelation of that specific verse.[196] As such, the narration above of al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, would in fact be treated as narrating the *actual* reason for the revelation of verse 3:59 since it uses the adverbial, conjunctive particle conveying consequence immediately after narrating the incident,[197] thereby suggesting that the verse was revealed due to this specific incident. In sum, according to the rules of determining the reasons of revelation, the narration of al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī can serve as an auxiliary report to corroborate the meaning of the narration of al-Azraq b. Qays. In addition to these narrations, there are other narrations of relatively lesser degree of authenticity that also link the reason for the revelation of

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تحتملها وتحتمل أمرا آخر هو بيان ما تضمنته الآية من الأحكام والقرائن وحدها هي التي تعين أحدها هذين الاحتمالين أو ترجحه.

Muḥammad ʿAbd al-ʿAẓīm al-Zarqānī, *Manāhil al-ʿIrfān* (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifa, 2005), 109.

195 For example:

مثال ذلك ما أخرجه مسلم عن جابر قال كانت اليهود تقول من أتى امرأة من دبرها في قبلها جاء الولد أحول فأنزل الله: «نساؤكم حرث لكم فأتوا حرثكم أنى شئتم وقدموا لأنفسكم واتقوا الله واعلموا أنكم ملاقوه وبشر المؤمنين» - ٢:٢٢٣ من سورة البقرة.

Ibid.

196 al-Zarqānī states:

وتارة لا يصرح بلفظ السبب ولكن يؤتى بفاء داخلة على مادة نزول الآية عقب سرد حادثة وهذه العبارة مثل تلك في الدلالة على السببية أيضا.

Ibid.

197 Moreover, al-Zarqānī explains that if one narration explicitly mentions the "cause" or uses the Arabic letter *fā*ʾ (adverbial conjunctive particle conveying consequence), while another narration may not, then the former narration will be given precedence:

ومن هنا نعلم أنه إذا وردت عبارتان في موضوع واحد إحداهما نص في السببية لنزول آية أو آيات والثانية ليست نصا في السببية لنزول تلك الآية أو الآيات هنالك نأخذ في السببية بما هو نص ونحمل الأخرى على أنها بيان لمدلول الآية لأن النص أقوى في الدلالة من المحتمل.

Ibid.

this verse with the question of "who was the father of ʿĪsā ﷺ?" posed by the Christians of Najrān:

i. Wakīʿ (d. 197 h) narrates from Mubārak who narrates from al-Ḥasan with the wording: "Who is the father of ʿĪsā?"[198]

ii. Qatāda b. Diʿāma (d. 118 h) narrates with the wording that "every man has a father, so what is the matter of ʿĪsā for whom there is no father?"[199]

iii. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Zayd b. Aslam (d. 182 h) narrates with the wording: "Do you know of anyone who was born without a father like ʿĪsā?"[200]

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198 Al-Wāḥidī (d. 468 h) narrates:

> حدثنا وكيع عن مبارك عن الحسن قال: جاء راهبا نجران إلى رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم فعرض عليهما الإسلام فقال أحدهما: إنا أَسْلَمْنَا قَبْلَكَ، فَقَالَ: «كَذَبْتُمَا، إنه يَمْنَعُكُمَا مِنَ الْإِسْلَامِ ثَلَاثَة: عِبَادَتُكُمَا الصَّلِيبَ، وَأَكْلُكُمَا الْخِنْزِيرَ، وَقَوْلُكُمَا لِلهِ وَلَدٌ» . قَالَا: مَنْ أَبُو عِيسَى؟ فَأَنْزَلَ الله عز وجل «إِنَّ مَثَلَ عِيسَى...».

ʿAlī b. Aḥmad al-Wāḥidī, *al-Wasīṭ fī Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-Majīd* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1994), 1:443.

199 Al-Ṭabarī narrates:

> حدثنا بشر، قال: ثنا يزيد، قال: ثنا سعيد، عن قتادة قوله: (إن مثل عيسى عند الله كمثل آدم خلقه من تراب ثم قال له كن فيكون): ذكر لنا أن سيدي أهل نجران وأسقفيهم، السيد والعاقب، لقيا نبي الله (ص)، فسألاه عن عيسى؟ فقالا: كل آدمي له أب فما شأن عيسى لا أب له؟ فأنزل الله عز وجل فيه هذه الآية: (إن مثل عيسى عند الله كمثل آدم خلقه من تراب ثم قال له كن فيكون).

Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmiʿ al-Bayān fī Taʾwīl al-Qurʾān* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2009), 3:293.

200 Al-Ṭabarī narrates:

> حدثني يونس، قال: أخبرنا ابن وهب، قال: قال ابن زيد في قول الله عز وجل (إن مثل عيسى عند الله كمثل آدم خلقه من تراب) قال: أتى نجرانيان إلى رسول الله (ص) فقالا له: هل علمت أن أحدا ولد من غير ذكر فيكون عيسى كذلك؟ قال: فأنزل الله عز وجل: (إن مثل عيسى عند الله كمثل آدم خلقه من تراب ثم قال له كن فيكون) أكان لآدم أب أو أم، كما خلقت هذا في بطن هذه؟

iv. Suddī (d. 127 h) narrates with the wording: "Have you ever seen a human created without a father?"[201]

Figure 2 depicts ten (10) chains of narrations of varying grades of authenticity which explicitly mention that verse 3:59 was revealed due to the Christians of Najrān asking the Prophet ﷺ about the paternity of ʿĪsā ﷺ. It is important to bear in mind that all the chains in Figure 2 qualify as a "reason for revelation" on account of containing words that indicate the verse being revealed due to this specific reason, as opposed to those narrations that are merely indicating the verse's general meaning as was explained above.

Although the wording of these narrations may differ slightly, the exegetes did not see them as grossly conflicting each other. Rather, as can be seen from the consensus cited above, they saw the narrations as harmonizable.[202] Additionally, there are many other reports attributed to the Followers

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Ibid, 3:294.

201 Al-Ṭabarī narrates:

> حدثنا محمد بن الحسين، قال: ثنا أحمد بن المفضل، قال: ثنا أسباط، عن السدي: (إن مثل عيسى عند الله كمثل آدم خلقه من تراب) لما بعث رسول الله (ص)، وسمع به أهل نجران، أتاه منهم أربعة نفر من خيارهم، منهم: العاقب، والسيد، وماسرجس، وماريحز، فسألوه ما يقول في عيسى؟ فقال: هو عبد الله وروحه وكلمته، قالوا هم: لا، ولكنه هو الله، نزل من ملكه، فدخل في جوف مريم، ثم خرج منها فأرانا قدرته وأمره، فهل رأيت قط إنسانا خلق من غير أب؟ فأنزل الله عز وجل: (إن مثل عيسى عند الله كمثل آدم خلقه من تراب ثم قال له كن فيكون).

Ibid, 3:293-294.

202 Al-Zarqānī mentions how narrations regarding sabab al-nuzūl can be reconciled:

> إذا جاءت روايتان في نازل واحد من القرآن وذكرت كل من الروايتين سببا صريحا غير ما تذكره الأخرى نظر فيهما فإما أن تكون إحداهما صحيحة والأخرى غير صحيحة وإما أن تكون كلتاهما صحيحة ولكن لإحداهما مرجح دون الأخرى وإما أن تكون كلتاهما صحيحة ولا مرجح لإحداهما على الأخرى ولكن يمكن الأخذ بهما معا وإما أن تكون كلتاهما صحيحة ولا مرجح ولا يمكن الأخذ بهما معا فتلك صور أربع لكل منها حكم خاص.

Muḥammad ʿAbd al-ʿAẓīm al-Zarqānī, *Manāhil al-ʿIrfān* (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifa, 2005), 110.




Figure 2: Chains of Narrations that explicitly indicate the reason for Verse 3:59 being revealed was due to the Christians of Najran asking the Prophet ﷺ concerning the paternity of 'Isa عليه السلام.

(*tābiʿīn*) and those after them that simply commented on verse 3:59 by narrating this same question leveled by the Christian delegates of Najrān regarding the paternity of ʿĪsā ﷺ.[203]

In dealing with the causes of revelation, exegetes are not at liberty to concoct what they believe *may* have led to the revelation or to exercise personal opinion (*ijtihād*) in formulating a judgment as to what *possibly* occurred. Rather, the discipline of causes of revelation is strictly known through what has been historically narrated by those that were either eyewitness to the event itself or were familiar with what had occurred. Therefore, when we find a given exegete mentioning that event *X* led to the revelation of verse *Y*, we can rest assured, that this was not arrived at through mere speculation, fable-telling, or independent reasoning.[204] With regards to verse 3:59, the following exegetes narrated the question of paternity being raised by the Christians of Najrān leading to the revelation of verse 3:59 without any objection to it: al-Ṭabarī,[205] Ibn Abī Ḥātim al-Rāzī,[206] al-Naḥḥās (d. 338 h),[207] al-Samarqandī (d. 375 h),[208] al-Wāḥidī,[209] al-Baghawī (d. 516 h),[210] Ibn ʿAṭiyya,[211] al-Rāzī,[212] al-Qurṭubī,[213] al-Nasafī (d. 710 h),[214] al-Khāzin,[215]

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203 Musāʿid b. Sulayman al-Ṭayyār, *Mawsūʿat al-Tafsīr al-Maʾthūr* (Jeddah: Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 2017), 5:205-267.

204 Nūr al-Dīn ʿItr (d. 1442 h) states:

لما كان سبب النزول أمرا واقعا نزلت الآية بشأنه كان من البديهي ألا يدخل العلم بهذه الأسباب في دائرة الرأي والاجتهاد لهذا قال الإمام الواحدي في ديباجة كتابه أسباب النزول: ولا يحل القول في أسباب نزول الكتاب إلا بالرواية والسماع ممن شاهدوا التنزيل ووقفوا على الأسباب وبحثوا عن علمها وجدّوا في الطلاب.

Nūr al-Dīn ʿItr, *ʿUlūm al-Qurʾān al-Karīm* (Cairo: Dār al-Baṣāʾir, 2014), 48.

205 See his *Jāmiʿ al-Bayān* under verse 3:59.

206 See his *Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿAẓīm* under verse 3:59.

207 See his *Maʿānī al-Qurʾān* under verse 3:59.

208 See his *Baḥr al-ʿUlūm* under verse 3:59.

209 See his *Asbāb al-Nuzūl*, *al-Wajīz*, and *al-Wasīṭ* under verse 3:59.

210 See his *Maʿālim al-Tanzīl* under verse 3:59.

211 See his *al-Muḥarrar al-Wajīz* under verse 3:59.

212 See his *Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb* under verse 3:59.

213 See his *al-Jāmiʿ li Aḥkām al-Qurʾān* under verse 3:59.

214 See his *Madārik al-Tanzīl* under verse 3:59.

215 See his *Lubāb al-Taʾwīl fī Maʿānī al-Tanzīl* under verse 3:59.

Abū Ḥayyān al-Andalusī (d. 745 h),[216] Ibn Kathīr,[217] al-Thaʿālabī (d. 875 h),[218] al-Suyūṭī,[219] Abū al-Suʿūd (d. 982 h),[220] al-Ālūsī,[221] and Ibn ʿĀshūr (d. 1393 h).[222] Moreover, in my perusal of well over a hundred commentaries on verse 3:59, I was unable to locate a single scholar objecting to the authenticity concerning the Christians of Najrān questioning the Prophet ﷺ about the paternity of ʿĪsā ﷺ. In this vein, the contemporary Saudi specialist in *ʿulūm al-Qurʾān*, Musāʿid al-Ṭayyār, quotes Ibn Taymiyya's (d. 728 h) stipulation that when using successor-narrated reports in tafsīr, the reports should be of the kind that are accepted by the scholars (*talaqqī bi al-qabūl*) which would then lead to an order of certainty. Al-Ṭayyār further states that what could possibly indicate this scholarly acceptance is when the verifying specialists (*muhaqqiqīn*) among the exegetes (*mufassirīn*) continually mention throughout the ages, generation after generation, the same incident as the reason for revelation in their respective Qurʾānic exegeses for the very same verse without any objection, be it chain-criticism or textual-criticism.[223] Thus, the incident of the Christians of Najrān

216 See his *al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ* under verse 3:59.

217 See his *Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿAẓīm* under verse 3:59.

218 See his *al-Jawāhir al-Ḥisān* under verse 3:59.

219 See his *al-Durr al-Manthūr* under verse 3:59.

220 See his *Irshād al-ʿAql al-Salīm ilā Mazāyā al-Kitāb al-Karīm* under verse 3:59.

221 See his *Rūḥ al-Maʿānī* under verse 3:59.

222 See his *al-Taḥrīr wa al-Tanwīr* under verse 3:59.

223 Musāʿid al-Ṭayyār states:

وقد ذكر (ابن تيمية) ضوابط قبول هذه المراسيل وهي:

١. «أن لا يكون مصدرها مفردا بل يكون متعددا.

٢. أن تخلو من المواطأة

٣. أن يتلقاها العلماء بالقبول.»

وهذا القيد مهم معتبر وهو قد ذكره عند ذكره لحديث الآحاد حيث قال (ابن تيمية): «ولهذا كان جمهور أهل العلم من جميع الطوائف على أن خبر الواحد إذا تلقته الأمة بالقبول تصديقا له أو عملا به أنه يوجب العلم.»

وكذا يمكن القول بأن هذا؟ القيد معتبر في قبول المراسيل التي ترد في التفسير لكن قد يكون هناك مرتبة أخرى في قبول حكاية النزول الذي من قبيل الرأي وهو أن يتوارد المحققون من المفسرين على ذكره دون اعتراض عليه فإن هذا قرينة تشعر بقبوله أيضا.

questioning the Prophet ﷺ about the paternity of ʿĪsā ﷺ resulting in the revelation of verse 3:59 can rightfully be regarded as a matter of scholarly acceptance. Even if some of the chains of these narrations may individually be regarded as weak according to some scholars of ḥadīth or differ in their exact wording, as noted above, the overall import based on the totality of these narrations was accepted[224] as the primary reason for the revelation of verse 3:59 by the "verifying scholars of tafsīr".[225]

Musāʿid al-Ṭayyār, *Sharh Muqaddimat Uṣūl al-Tafsīr li Ibn Taymiyya* (Dammām: Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 2007), 169-170.

224 It may be objected as to why a similar charitable explanation cannot be granted towards recognizing that the many lines of evidence for evolution can perhaps yield certainty when looked at as a whole. However, the two are not the same in this regard. These verses and narrations are all explicitly speaking about one particular individual explicitly by name, "Ādam" ﷺ; whereas the many lines of evidence for evolution are generally theorizing about a particular genus and then universalizing these lines of evidence through inductive reasoning to broadly include any specific specie found within that genus. The epistemic value provided by the latter is not on par with the former, as shall be seen.

225 Aḥmad al-Ghumārī (d. 1380 h) quotes numerous authorities of ḥadīth mentioning how talaqqī bi al-qabūl can make up for a deficiency in the individual chain strength of a narration(s).

Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. al-Ṣiddīq al-Ghumārī, *Ibrāz al-Wahm al-Maknūn min Kalām Ibn Khaldūn* (Damascus: 1929), 446-448.

Additionally, al-Suyūṭī also mentions that some opined that a ḥadīth can be judged as authentic when the scholars accept it even if its actual chain is not authentic:

قال بعضهم: يحكم للحديث بالصحة إذا تلقاه الناس بالقبول وإن لم يكن له إسناد صحيح.

Al-Sakhāwī (d. 902 h) further states that if the scholars receive a weak narration with acceptance, then it can be acted upon according to sound opinion:

وكذا إذا تلقت الأمة الضعيف بالقبول يعمل به على الصحيح.

Al-Shabrakhītī (d. 1106 h) also said that a weak narration is not applied in juridical matters unless the scholars have received it with acceptance and in such a case it becomes a proof and can be applied in both juridical matters and others:

محل كونه لا يعمل بالضعيف في الأحكام ما لم يكن تلقاه الناس بالقبول فإن كان كذلك تعين وصار حجة يعمل به في الأحكام وغيرها كما قال الإمام الشافعي.

Ḥusayn b. Muḥsin al-Anṣārī al-Yamānī al-Hindī (d. 1327 h) says that talaqqī bi

In sum, the following facts become apparent based on the information mentioned above:

- Agreement of the vast majority of exegetes regarding the first eighty (80) verses of Sūrat Āl ʿImrān being revealed due to the dispute between the Christian delegates of Najrān and the Prophet ﷺ,
- The basis of the Najrān's visit to al-Madīna being narrated first and foremost in the *Ṣaḥīḥayn*,
- Authentic narrations from both the Companions and the Followers linked the question about ʿĪsā's (ʿalayh al-salām) paternity to being an actual reason for the revelation of verse 3:59,
- Commentary of numerous early authorities from the *Salaf* included the question about the paternity of ʿĪsā ﷺ being raised by the delegates of Najrān when explaining the meaning of 3:59,
- Consensus of the exegetes that verse 3:59 was revealed due to the deliberation that took place between the Prophet ﷺ and the Christians of Najrān, and
- Numerous books of tafsīr written by verifying exegetes throughout the ages mentioned the question of the paternity of ʿĪsā ﷺ being raised by the delegates of Najrān without any objection to its meaning or chain of transmission.

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al-qabūl can apply to successor-reported narrations as evidenced by such a report narrated by al-Tirmidhī (d. 279 h) whereby despite it being *muḍṭarib* too, it was still accepted on account of the scholarly acceptance it received.

Muḥammad Badr ʿĀlam Mīrthī (d. 1385 h) says that it was the opinion of Anwār Shāh Kāshmīrī (d. 1352 h) that if a ḥadīth was authenticated (*ṣaḥīḥ*) by way of external factors (*qarāʾin*) and has been practiced therewith, then abandoning it and not taking it into consideration on account of a weak narrator found within its individual chain is incorrect. For how can it be so when the continuous practice of it is a stronger form of evidence for its establishment?

ولكنه يريد أن الحديث إذا صح من القرائن وظهر به العمل فتركه وقطع النظر عنه بمجرد راو ضعيف ليس بسديد كيف وتسلسل العمل به أقوى شاهد على ثبوته عندهم.

ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Abū Ghudda, *al-Taʿlīqāt al-Ḥāfila ʿalā al-Ajwiba al-Fāḍila* (Aleppo: 2007), 229-239.

The Context (*siyāq*) of verse 3:59

In the preceding chapter, the reasons that led to the revelation of the first eighty verses[226] of Sūrat Āl ʿImrān including verse 3:59 were discussed at great length, as well as what role the reason for revelation can play in aiding us to understand the intended meaning (the illocutionary force) of this verse. Scholars of Qurʾānic hermeneutics usually categorize *reasons for the revelation* into one group of paralinguistic **indicative devices** that are independent of the text itself (*qarāʾin ḥāliyya*) but can shed light onto the intended meaning (*dalāla*) of the verse. Another group of indicative devices comprises those that are not independent of the text (*qarāʾin lafẓiyya*);[227] included within this group is what is referred to as the **textual context** (*siyāq*) of the verse; that which comes before and after the verse in the actual text itself.[228] Finally, there is another type of paralinguistic indicative device known as the rational indicative device (*qarīnat al-ʿaql*) that is also inde-

226 Al-Bayhaqī (d. 458) narrates that the first eighty verses (80) were revealed all at once regarding the delegation from Najrān:

قال ابن إسحاق : حدثني محمد بن سهل بن أبي أمامة ، قال : لما قدم أهل نجران على رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم يسألونه عن عيسى ابن مريم ثم نزلت فيهم فاتحة آل عمران إلى رأس الثمانين منها.

Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī, *Dalāʾil al-Nubuwwa* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1988), 385.

227 al-Juwaynī states:

القرائن تنقسم إلى قرائن حالية وإلى قرائن لفظية.

ʿAbd al-Mālik b. Yūsuf al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1997), 1:133.

228 The contemporary Syrian specialist in *uṣūl al-tafsīr*, Muḥammad Muḥammad Yāsīn, defines this type of linguistic, textual signifier (*qarīnat al-siyāq*):

pendent of the text itself but is based on rational principles relating to the speaker of the text,[229] i.e., Allah ﷻ. Through these indicative devices, the precise intended meaning of an utterance can be identified with certainty by eliminating potential meanings contrary to what they are signifying.[230]

I will begin by discussing the textual illocutionary force indicating device (IFID) (*qarīnat al-siyāq*) relating to verse 3:59 in the first section, followed by a discussion of the implications of the rational IFID (*qarīnat al-ʿaql*) in relation to it.

Linguistic, Textual IFID (*Qarīnat al-Siyāq*)

Al-Zarkashī explains that the *qarīnat al-siyāq* is one of the most powerful IFIDs which indicate the speaker's intended meaning (the illocutionary force of the utterance). Amongst the benefits it can provide are clarity for what may be ambiguous, definitively delimiting the intended meaning by eliminating other possible meanings, further specifying that which is

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ما يسبق الكلام المراد تفسيره وما يلحقه من المعاني والألفاظ الواردة في مقطع واحد متصل بموضوعه مع الغرض من إيراده.

Muḥammad Muḥammad Yāsīn, *Ḍawābiṭ al-Qaṭʿī min Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-Karīm* (Dubai: Government of Dubai, 2015), 2:275.

229 Muḥammad Muḥammad Yāsīn particularly highlights these same three signifiers (*qaraʾin*) as those that can explicate the text of the Qurʾān in a decisive (*qaṭʿī*) manner:

القرائن التي تعين على تفسير النص القرآني تفسيرا قطعيا هي: أ – قرينة سبب النزول القطعي...ب – قرينة السياق القطعي...ج – قرينة العقل القطعي.

Ibid, 2:157-158.

It is noteworthy to mention here that although sense-perception that is definitive (*al-hiss al-thābit*) can also fall under the broader heading of the rational signifier (*qarīnat al-ʿaql*), it is inapplicable in this case for the reasons stated previously in that there is no definitive empirical evidence that directly links back to how Ādam ﷺ, in particular, was created.

230 Al-Taftāzānī states that illocutionary force indicating devices (IFID) (*qarāʾin*) can aid to negate other possible meanings and objections until no doubts remain and certainty is obtained:

نعم قد ينضمّ إليه قرائن تنفي الاحتمال فيفيد القطع بالمطلوب وينفي المعارض في العقبات... والعلم بالإرادة يحصل بمعونة القرائن بحيث لا تبقى شبهة.

Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid* (Iran: al-Sharīf al-Raḍī 1989), 1:282, 284.

general, and finally restricting that which is absolute. He further states that whoever is remiss in having a proper understanding of it will err in his understanding and deliberation of the text.[231] We shall now proceed to establish the textual IFID for verse 3:59.

Verses Preceding and Following Verse 3:59

In the very name of the chapter which contains verse 59, "*Āl ʿImrān*", is a subtle indication pointing to the lineage of ʿĪsā ﷺ being human, and not divine.[232] Moving along to the second verse of this chapter,[233] Allah ﷻ declares that there is no divine being except Himself, the Living and All-Sustaining. In this verse lies a rational proof against those that attribute divinity to ʿĪsā ﷺ since he is evidently not the "All-Sustaining". Then in the sixth verse, Allah ﷻ declares that He is the One who shapes you in the wombs as He likes, followed by a second declaration of Him alone being divine.[234] This is a clear response to those confused about how a man could be born without a biological father and a further denial of anyone else being divine. Then again, in the eighteenth verse Allah ﷻ bears witness that He alone is

231 Al-Zarkashī states:

دلالة السياق فإنها ترشد إلى تبيين المجمل والقطع بعدم احتمال غير المراد وتخصيص العام وتقييد المطلق وتنوع الدلالة وهو من أعظم القرائن الدالة على مراد المتكلم فمن أهمله غلط في نظره وغالط في مناظرته.

Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī, *al-Burhān fī ʿUlūm al-Qurʾān* (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 2006) 445.

232 ʿImrān is recognized as the father of Maryam ﷺ. Thus, it is as if Allah ﷻ is declaring right from the onset of this chapter that the biological lineage of ʿĪsā ﷺ cannot be attributed to Himself.

al-ʿAqrabāwī, ʿAlī Hānī. *Maqsūd Sūrat Āl ʿImrān*. drive.google.com/file/d/1tBHS1lq66QTgDeOcUsctGcQiBrk1Bldp/view. Page 16.

233 Allah ﷻ says:

ٱللَّهُ لَآ إِلَٰهَ إِلَّا هُوَ ٱلْحَيُّ ٱلْقَيُّومُ.

"Allah: There is no god but He, the Living, and All-Sustaining."

234 Allah ﷻ says:

هُوَ ٱلَّذِى يُصَوِّرُكُمْ فِى ٱلْأَرْحَامِ كَيْفَ يَشَآءُ ۚ لَآ إِلَٰهَ إِلَّا هُوَ ٱلْعَزِيزُ ٱلْحَكِيمُ.

"He is the One Who shapes you in the wombs as He likes. There is no god but He, the Mighty, the Wise."

divine.[235] Furthermore, He commands the Prophet Muḥammad ﷺ in the twenty-sixth verse to state that He is omnipotent over all things.[236] Immediately following this verse, mention is made of how He makes the night enter the day, and makes the day enter the night, and further brings the living out from the dead and the dead out from the living.[237] All these proofs are being revealed unto them for the purpose of pausing and reflecting on whether such feats were performed by ʿĪsā ﷺ. Also, in the forty-seventh verse, Maryam ﷺ asks how she will have a son when she has never had a consort, yet Allah ﷻ responds by saying "so will it be, He creates what He wills, that when He decrees a matter, He simply says, 'Be!' And it is."[238] In the forty-ninth and fiftieth verses, ʿĪsā ﷺ states how he performed certain

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235 Allah ﷻ says:

شَهِدَ ٱللَّهُ أَنَّهُۥ لَآ إِلَـٰهَ إِلَّا هُوَ وَٱلْمَلَـٰٓئِكَةُ وَأُو۟لُوا۟ ٱلْعِلْمِ قَآئِمًۢا بِٱلْقِسْطِ ۚ لَآ إِلَـٰهَ إِلَّا هُوَ ٱلْعَزِيزُ ٱلْحَكِيمُ.

"Allah bears witness that there is no god but He and (so do) the angels and the men of knowledge, being the One who maintains equity. There is no god but He, the Mighty, the Wise."

236 Allah ﷻ says:

قُلِ ٱللَّهُمَّ مَـٰلِكَ ٱلْمُلْكِ تُؤْتِى ٱلْمُلْكَ مَن تَشَآءُ وَتَنزِعُ ٱلْمُلْكَ مِمَّن تَشَآءُ وَتُعِزُّ مَن تَشَآءُ وَتُذِلُّ مَن تَشَآءُ ۖ بِيَدِكَ ٱلْخَيْرُ ۖ إِنَّكَ عَلَىٰ كُلِّ شَىْءٍ قَدِيرٌ.

"Say, [Prophet], "O Allah! Lord over all authorities! You give authority to whoever You please and remove it from who You please; You honor whoever You please and disgrace who You please; all good is in Your Hands. Surely You alone are Most Capable of everything."

237 Allah ﷻ says:

تُولِجُ ٱلَّيْلَ فِى ٱلنَّهَارِ وَتُولِجُ ٱلنَّهَارَ فِى ٱلَّيْلِ ۖ وَتُخْرِجُ ٱلْحَىَّ مِنَ ٱلْمَيِّتِ وَتُخْرِجُ ٱلْمَيِّتَ مِنَ ٱلْحَىِّ ۖ وَتَرْزُقُ مَن تَشَآءُ بِغَيْرِ حِسَابٍ.

"You cause the night to pass into the day and the day into the night. You bring forth the living from the dead and the dead from the living. And You provide for whoever You will without limit."

238 Allah ﷻ says:

قَالَتْ رَبِّ أَنَّىٰ يَكُونُ لِى وَلَدٌ وَلَمْ يَمْسَسْنِى بَشَرٌ ۖ قَالَ كَذَٰلِكِ ٱللَّهُ يَخْلُقُ مَا يَشَآءُ ۚ إِذَا قَضَىٰٓ أَمْرًا فَإِنَّمَا يَقُولُ لَهُۥ كُن فَيَكُونُ.

miracles "by the permission of Allah", not by way of his own self.[239] This is a direct refutation of those that believed him to be divine because of the miracles he performed.[240] In the fifty-first verse, ʿĪsā ﷺ outright exclaims

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"Mary wondered, "My Lord! How can I have a child when no man has ever touched me?" An angel replied, "So will it be. Allah creates what He wills. When He decrees a matter, He simply says, 'Be!' And it is!"

Ibn Abī Ḥātim al-Rāzī narrates by way of Ibn Isḥāq under this verse:

ويخلق ما يشاء من بشر أو غير بشر... مما يشاء وكيف يشاء فيكون كما أراد.

ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Abī Ḥātim al-Rāzī, *Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿAẓīm* (Riyadh: Maktabat Nizār al-Bāz, 1997), 1:653.

239 Allah ﷻ says:

وَرَسُولًا إِلَىٰ بَنِيٓ إِسْرَٰٓءِيلَ أَنِّي قَدْ جِئْتُكُم بِـَٔايَةٍ مِّن رَّبِّكُمْ ۖ أَنِّيٓ أَخْلُقُ لَكُم مِّنَ ٱلطِّينِ كَهَيْـَٔةِ ٱلطَّيْرِ فَأَنفُخُ فِيهِ فَيَكُونُ طَيْرًۢا بِإِذْنِ ٱللَّهِ ۖ وَأُبْرِئُ ٱلْأَكْمَهَ وَٱلْأَبْرَصَ وَأُحْىِ ٱلْمَوْتَىٰ بِإِذْنِ ٱللَّهِ ۖ وَأُنَبِّئُكُم بِمَا تَأْكُلُونَ وَمَا تَدَّخِرُونَ فِي بُيُوتِكُمْ ۚ إِنَّ فِي ذَٰلِكَ لَـَٔايَةً لَّكُمْ إِن كُنتُم مُّؤْمِنِينَ. وَمُصَدِّقًا لِّمَا بَيْنَ يَدَيَّ مِنَ ٱلتَّوْرَىٰةِ وَلِأُحِلَّ لَكُم بَعْضَ ٱلَّذِي حُرِّمَ عَلَيْكُمْ ۚ وَجِئْتُكُم بِـَٔايَةٍ مِّن رَّبِّكُمْ فَٱتَّقُوا ٱللَّهَ وَأَطِيعُونِ.

"And make him a messenger to the Children of Israel to proclaim, 'I have come to you with a sign from your Lord: I will make for you a bird from clay, breathe into it, and it will become a real bird—by Allah's Will. I will heal the blind and the leper and raise the dead to life—by Allah's Will. And I will prophesize what you eat and store in your houses. Surely in this is a sign for you if you truly believe. And I will confirm the Torah revealed before me and legalize some of what had been forbidden to you. I have come to you with a sign from your Lord, so be mindful of Allah and obey me.'"

240 Al-Ṭabarī narrates that the Christians of Najrān also believed ʿĪsā ﷺ to be divine due to the miracles he performed:

عن ابن جريج قال "بلغنا أن نصارى نجران قدم وفدهم على النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم فيهم السيد، والعاقب، وهما يومئذ سيدا أهل نجران فقالوا: يا محمد فيم تشتم صاحبنا؟ قال: من صاحبكم؟ قالوا: عيسى ابن مريم تزعم أنه عبد. قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم: أجل إنه عبد الله، وكلمته ألقاها إلى مريم، وروح منه. فغضبوا وقالوا: إن كنت صادقاً فأرنا عبداً يحيي الموتى، ويبرئ الأكمه، ويخلق من الطين كهيئة الطير فينفخ فيه، لكنه الله. فسكت حتى أتاه جبريل فقال: يا محمد لقد كفر الذين قالوا إن الله هو المسيح ابن مريم... [المائدة: ١٧] الآية. فقال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم: يا جبريل إنهم سألوني أن أخبرهم

that Allah is *his* lord and *their* lord; and they ought to worship Him.[241]

As for those verses that follow 3:59, then, again, in the seventy-eighth and seventy-ninth verses Allah ﷻ accuses them of distortion and telling lies about Himself and that it is not appropriate for a messenger, like ʿĪsā ﷺ, who was given a book, wisdom, and prophethood, that he begins to call people towards worshipping himself aside from Allah ﷻ.[242] Finally, in the eightieth verse, Allah ﷻ asks them if it is sensible for ʿĪsā ﷺ to bid them towards disbelief after they had become true believers?[243] Thus, the context

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بمثل عيسى. قال جبريل إنّ مثل عيسى عند الله كمثل آدم خلقه من تراب ثم قال له كن فيكون فلما أصبحوا عادا فقرأ عليهم الآيات ".

Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Taʾwīl Āy al-Qurʾān* (Cairo: Maktabat Ibn Taymiyya), 6:470.

241 Allah ﷻ states:

إِنَّ ٱللَّهَ رَبِّي وَرَبُّكُمْ فَٱعْبُدُوهُ ۗ هَـٰذَا صِرَٰطٌ مُّسْتَقِيمٌ.

"Allah is surely my Lord and your Lord. So worship Him, this is the straight path."

242 Allah ﷻ says:

وَإِنَّ مِنْهُمْ لَفَرِيقًا يَلْوُۥنَ أَلْسِنَتَهُم بِٱلْكِتَـٰبِ لِتَحْسَبُوهُ مِنَ ٱلْكِتَـٰبِ وَمَا هُوَ مِنَ ٱلْكِتَـٰبِ وَيَقُولُونَ هُوَ مِنْ عِندِ ٱللَّهِ وَمَا هُوَ مِنْ عِندِ ٱللَّهِ وَيَقُولُونَ عَلَى ٱللَّهِ ٱلْكَذِبَ وَهُمْ يَعْلَمُونَ. مَا كَانَ لِبَشَرٍ أَن يُؤْتِيَهُ ٱللَّهُ ٱلْكِتَـٰبَ وَٱلْحُكْمَ وَٱلنُّبُوَّةَ ثُمَّ يَقُولَ لِلنَّاسِ كُونُوا۟ عِبَادًا لِّى مِن دُونِ ٱللَّهِ وَلَـٰكِن كُونُوا۟ رَبَّـٰنِيِّـۧنَ بِمَا كُنتُمْ تُعَلِّمُونَ ٱلْكِتَـٰبَ وَبِمَا كُنتُمْ تَدْرُسُونَ.

"There are some among them who distort the Book with their tongues to make you think this distortion is from the Book—but it is not what the Book says. They say, "It is from Allah"—but it is not from Allah. And so they attribute lies to Allah knowingly. It is not appropriate for someone who Allah has blessed with the Scripture, wisdom, and prophethood to say to people, "Worship me instead of Allah." Rather, he would say, "Be devoted to the worship of your Lord alone"—in accordance with what these prophets read in the Scripture and what they taught."

243 Allah ﷻ says:

وَلَا يَأْمُرَكُمْ أَن تَتَّخِذُوا۟ ٱلْمَلَـٰٓئِكَةَ وَٱلنَّبِيِّـۧنَ أَرْبَابًا ۗ أَيَأْمُرُكُم بِٱلْكُفْرِ بَعْدَ إِذْ أَنتُم مُّسْلِمُونَ.

"And he would never ask you to take angels and prophets as lords. Would he ask you to disbelieve after you have submitted?"

(*qarīnat al-siyāq*) becomes evident from the verses leading up to and following verse 3:59: A repeated negation of even a hint of divinity for ʿĪsā ﷺ.

This last verse supports the narrations whereby the Prophet ﷺ informed them that their attribution of divinity to ʿĪsā ﷺ is amongst the things that prevent them from being muslim.



Textual Analysis of Verse 3:59:[244] Bringing it all together

﴿إِنَّ مَثَلَ عِيسَىٰ عِندَ ٱللَّهِ كَمَثَلِ ءَادَمَ خَلَقَهُۥ مِن تُرَابٍ ثُمَّ قَالَ لَهُۥ كُن فَيَكُونُ﴾

"Indeed! the similitude of ʿĪsā, according to Allah, is just like the similitude of Ādam. He created him from dust, then He said unto him: Be! and he became." - *Āl ʿImrān*:59

The structure of this verse is one of simile (*tashbīh*) where ʿĪsā ﷺ is being likened to Ādam ﷺ. Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Mubarrad (d. 286 h) said that it wouldn't be farfetched to suggest that most of the speech of Arabs is in fact similes.[245] Given its frequent usage in the Arabic language, the rhet-

244 Textual analysis here will specifically refer to what is known as the "*naẓm*" of the verse. This falls into the broader heading of linguistic signifiers (*al-qarāʾin al-lafẓiyya*) mentioned earlier. Al-Taftāzānī defines "*Naẓm al-Qurʾān*" as the composition of the words used, the arrangement of its rhetorical meanings and devices (i.e., the co-text), and its agreement in meeting the requirements of both the context in which it lies and the literary standards of skilled rhetoricians:

نظم القرآن: تأليف كلماته مترتبة المعاني متناسقة الدلالات على حسب ما يقتضيه العقل.

Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Mukhtaṣar al-Maʿānī* (Karāchī: Maktabat al-Bushrā, 2010), 1:18.

See the respective marginalia of al-Dusūqī and al-Bannānī for further elucidation.

245 al-Mubarrad said in *al-Kāmil*:

التشبيه جار كثيرا في كلام العرب حتى لو قال قائل هو أكثر كلامهم لم يبعد.

oricians detailed the mechanisms of Arabic similes in the subsection of figures of speech (*ʿilm al-bayān*) under the broader discipline of Arabic semantics-rhetoric (*ʿilm al-balāgha*). By virtue of the Qurʾān being inimitable (*muʿjiz*), knowledge of figures of speech in the Arabic language in general, and of tashbīh in particular, is necessary for anyone seeking to fully understand verse 3:59. If the Qurʾān is inimitable in its literary style, then it must concord with what the masterful Arab rhetoricians (*bulaghāʾ*) viewed as being eloquent (*faṣīḥ*) and effective speech (*balīgh*).[246] Al-Taftāzānī states that by understanding what qualifies as "*balīgh*" according to the ancient Arabic rhetoricians, one will understand not only why the Qurʾān is inimitable but why it is *the* pinnacle of eloquence beyond human capability.[247] Al-Sakkākī (d. 626 h) mentions that anyone pursuing exegesis of the Qurʾān is ever so in need of having adequate knowledge of the use of figures of speech in classical Arabic, and that disaster awaits the one negligent therein.[248]

Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Mubarrad, *al-Kāmil fī al-Lugha wa al-Adab* (al-Maktaba al-Dhahabiyya), 96.

246 Consider the *taḥaddī* verses (2:23, 10:38, 11:13, 17:88, 28:49, and 52:34) of the Qurʾān and how it would be a futile attempt to challenge the masterful Arab rhetoricians of the day if the Qurʾān did not even abide by what they considered as eloquent. Rather, its inimitability is what led them to accuse the Prophet ﷺ of being a poet, a magician, and a sorcerer, but never as inarticulate.

247 Al-Taftāzānī states:

(ويكشف عن وجوه الاعجاز في نظم القرآن أستارها) أي : به يعرف أن القرآن معجز لكونه في أعلى مراتب البلاغة لاشتماله على الدقائق والأسرار الخارجة عن طوق البشر وهذا وسيلة إلى تصديق النبي عليه السلام.

Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Mukhtaṣar al-Maʿānī* (Karāchī: Maktabat al-Bushrā, 2010), 1:17.

Moreover, al-Māturīdī states that the Qurʾān is *both* inimitable in its form and content:

ثم القرآن قصد به الوجهان جميعا: ضبط حروفه ونظمه، وتعرف ما أودع فيه من المعاني؛ إذ صار حجة بنظمه ولفظه، وبالمعاني المودعة فيه.

Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, *Taʾwīlāt Ahl al-Sunna* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2005), 10:346.

248 al-Sakkākī states:

وفيما ذكرنا ما ينبه على الواقف على تمام مراد الحكيم تعالى وتقدس من كلامه مفتقر على

Al-Taftāzānī adds that Allah ﷻ is far beyond including even one ineloquent word in the Qurʾān such that it would lead to Him being attributed with ignorance (*jahl*) or impotence (ʿ*ajz*).[249] Al-Khaṭṭāʾī (d. 901 h) explains that ignorance would result if Allah ﷻ included something without knowing that it is ineloquent, or if He deemed the ineloquent to be better than the eloquent; while impotence would result if He knew of all this yet was unable to bring forth that which is eloquent in place of the ineloquent.[250] Al-Dusūqī further adds that if it is hypothetically supposed that Allah ﷻ has both the ability and knowledge to bring forth something more eloquent but chose not to on account of the ineloquent being clearer in conveying His intended meaning, or if it was done due to a wisdom in knowing that the people of that time could not comprehend it; then we would reply to this by asserting that from among the objectives of the Qurʾān is to incapacitate (*iʿjāz*) others from being able to replicate its perfect rhetorical style (*balāgha*) and eloquence (*faṣāḥa*) in order to confirm the messengership of Prophet Muḥammad ﷺ. Whereas the use of something that is ineloquent in the Qurʾān would necessitate that *that* specific portion is inarticulate, rendering it no longer an incapacitating (*muʿjiz*), literary miracle. Moreover, al-Dusūqī further contends that failing to fulfil this primary objective due to some external factor would itself be counted as foolishness (*safah*) and further ignorance (*jahl*) for not knowing better, ergo impossible by One

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هذين العلمين كل الافتقار فالويل كل الويل لمن تعاطى التفسير وهو فيهما راجل.

Yusuf b. Abi Bakr al-Sakkākī, *Miftāḥ al-ʿUlūm* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1987), 1:162.

249 Al-Taftāzānī states:

فمجرد اشتمال القرآن على كلام غير فصيح بل على كلمة غير فصيحة مما يقود إلى الجهل أو العجز إلى الله تعالى الله عن ذلك علوا كبيرا.

Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Mukhtaṣar al-Maʿānī* (Karāchī: Maktabat al-Bushrā, 2010), 1:36-37.

250 Al-Khaṭṭāʾī states:

لأن اشتماله على غير الفصيح إما لعدم علمه تعالى بأنه غير فصيح أو بأن الفصيح أولى من غير الفصيح فيلزم الجهل وإما لعدم قدرته تعالى على إيراد الفصيح بدل غير الفصيح فليلزم العجز.

Zādah Niẓām al-Dīn ʿUthmān al-Khaṭṭāʾī, *Ḥāshiyat al-Khaṭṭāʾī ʿalā Mukhtaṣar al-Maʿānī* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2020), 114.

attributed with absolute wisdom.[251] Accordingly, what can be derived from this is a rational IFID (*qarīnat al-ʿaql*) that whenever an interpretation or exegesis is laid forth which necessitates that the Qurʾān failed to meet the foundational principles of what constitutes eloquence in the Arabic language, then this meaning will be rejected on grounds of attributing ignorance (*jahl*), impotence (*ʿajz*), and/or foolishness (*safah*) to Allah ﷻ. With that said, it is imperative the reader understands how the Arabs defined "eloquence" itself.[252]

251 Al-Dusūqī states:

فإن قلت يمكن أنه أورد غير الفصيح مع علمه بذلك وقدرته على الإتيان بالفصيح بدله، وإنما أورد غير الفصيح لكونه أوضح دلالة على المعنى المراد من الفصيح، أو لحكمة لا تصل إليها عقولنا وحينئذ فلا محذور في اشتمال القرآن على غير فصيح، قلت: المقصود من القرآن إنما هو الإعجاز بكمال بلاغته وفصاحته، لأجل تصديق النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم ووجود كلمة غير فصيحة فيه موجب لعدم فصاحة ما اشتمل عليه من المقدار المعجز بالاتفاق، وعدم فصاحة ذلك القدر موجب لعدم بلاغته، فلا يكون معجزا، ومخالفة ذلك المقصود لأمر عارض تعد سفها وخروجا عن الحكمة، وهو لا يليق بحال الحكيم، وحينئذ فيكون الإتيان بغير الفصيح مع العلم به والقدرة على تبديله مستلزما للجهل بأنه سفه إذ الحكيم إنما يضع الأشياء في محلها، فظهر لك من هذا أن الإتيان بالسفه نتيجة للجهل بأنه سفه فتكون نسبة السفه داخلة تحت نسبة الجهل.

Muḥammad b. ʿArafa al-Dusūqī, *Ḥāshiyat al-Dusūqī ʿalā Mukhtaṣar al-Maʿānī* (Cairo: Bulāq Miṣr, 1855), 1:67.

Al-Khaṭṭāʾī explains similarly with al-Yazdī affirming it too in his own respective gloss. See ʿAbd Allāh al-Yazdī, *Ḥāshiyat al-Yazdī ʿalā Ḥāshiyat al-Khaṭṭāʾī ʿalā Mukhtaṣar al-Maʿānī* (Kayseri: Erciyes University, 2022), 180.

252 Those Arabs who directly heard the Qurʾān when it was first revealed understood the distinct, literary style of the Qurʾān purely by their familiarity of what constitutes eloquence and what does not. As a result of this, they understood and experienced the inability to replicate something of its nature by way of necessity as first-hand witnesses. Whereas those who came after and fell short of this level of comprehension resorted to understanding the Qurʾān's inimitability through a variety of deductive and inductive methods. However, both arrived at the same conclusion in that its inimitability is certain (*yaqīnī*) and the proof of this lies in the fact that neither of them were able to counter the challenges made by the Qurʾān. Ibn ʿAṭiyya explains:

فهمت العرب بخلوص فهمها في ميز الكلام ودربتها به ما لا نفهمه نحن ولا كل من خالطته حضارة ففهموا العجز عنه ضرورة ومشاهدة وعلمه الناس بعدهم استدلالا ونظرا ولكل

Defining Eloquence (*faṣāḥa*)

Al-Taftāzānī defines "eloquence" as that speech whose individual words themselves are eloquent, and additionally that its cotext be **devoid** of a.) weakness in composition (i.e., does not follow the known rules of classical Arabic grammar); b.) phonetic incompatibility (i.e., the word-choice used in a sentence impedes proper pronunciation); and c.) lexical/semantic incompatibility.[253] Al-Taftāzānī further defines balāgha as meeting everything that defines faṣāḥa above along with the additional caveat that it conforms with the dictates and requirements of the context (*muṭābaqa li-muqtaḍā al-ḥāl*).[254]

In what follows, extensive quotes culled from classical works on Arabic rhetoric will be presented. It is highly crucial that the reader understands throughout the forthcoming discussion that none of these quotes are specific to verse 3:59. Rather, these reference-works will be generally defining and highlighting simile (*tashbīh*) as a rhetorical device and what it must consist of for its usage to not only be proper but to moreover be faṣīḥ and balīgh according to the most skilled of classical Arabic rhetoricians.[255]

حصل علم قطعي لكن ليس في مرتبة واحدة.

Abū Muḥammad b. ʿAṭiyya al-Andalusī, *al-Muharrar al-Wajīz* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2001), 3:483.

253 Al-Taftāzānī states:

الفصاحة في الكلام خلوصه من ضعف التأليف وتنافر الكلمات والتعقيد مع فصاحتها.

Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Mukhtaṣar al-Maʿānī* (Karāchī: Maktabat al-Bushrā, 2010), 1:40.

254 Al-Taftāzānī states:

(والبلاغة في الكلام مطابقته لمقتضى الحال مع فصاحته) : أي فصاحة الكلام.

Ibid, 1:54.

255 The reason for heavy reliance on understanding the nuances of the Arabic language is because Allah ﷻ highlights the importance of it in understanding the Qurʾān:

"We have not sent a messenger except in the language of his people to clarify the message for them." – 14:4.

وَمَآ أَرْسَلْنَا مِن رَّسُولٍ إِلَّا بِلِسَانِ قَوْمِهِۦ لِيُبَيِّنَ لَهُمْ.

Al-Qarāfī (d. 684 h) states that because of the Qurʾān having been revealed in Arabic, it necessitates that whatever is deemed permissible and eloquent in Arabic

Refuting Maxim Misuses

Muslim evolutionists pointedly assert that verse 3:59 is simply a general comparison between Ādam ﷺ and ʿĪsā ﷺ as per its use of the word "*mathal*" which is an indefinite word. Moreover, they argue that as per the legal-theory maxim of "consideration is given to the generality of the verse, not the specificity of the actual reason for revelation," (*al-ʿibra bi-ʿumūm al-lafẓ lā bi-khuṣūṣ al-sabab*) there is no reason to consider the reason for the revelation.

This line of reasoning can be replied to in at least two different ways:

First, it was mentioned earlier that ʿilm al-bayān is the science that deals with the use of figures of speech in the Arabic language and within this broad science lies the use of rhetorical devices such as the simile. Al-Taftāzānī defines the science dealing with figures of speech in the Arabic language as a science that requires a certain ability or an understanding of known rhetorical precepts, whereby an intended meaning can be expressed in *varying degrees of clarity* that concords with the linguistic requirements of the context (*muqtaḍā al-ḥāl*).[256] Al-Taftāzānī explains that what is meant by "varying degrees of clarity" excludes the mere lexical difference found in synonyms.[257] In other words, the use of figures of speech, such as similes,

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must be the standard in the Qurʾān too, and whatever is considered inappropriate or ineloquent in Arabic must also hold true for the Qurʾān:

> كُلُّ ما كان حسَنًا في كلامِ العرب كان كذلك في كلام الله تعالى، وما كان ممتنِعًا كان ممتنِعًا؛ لأن الله تعالى أخبَرَ أنه إنما أنزَلَ القرآن على لغةِ العرب لا على غيرها، ولا معنى لكونه على لغةِ العرب إلا أنه مهما جازَ جازَ، ومهما امتَنَع امتَنع في كلام الله تعالى فتأمَّل هذه القاعدةَ فإنها يَتخرَّج عليها أحكامٌ كثيرةٌ وأسئلة صعبة في كلام الله تعالى.

Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad b. Idrīs al-Qarāfī, *al-Istighnāʾ fī al-Istithnāʾ* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1986), 447.

256 Al-Taftāzānī states:

> (وهو علم) أي ملكة يقتدر بها على إدراكات جزئية أو أصول وقواعد معلومة (يعرف به ايراد المعنى الواحد) أي المدلول عليه بكلام مطابق لمقتضى الحال (بطرق) وتراكيب (مختلفة في وضوح الدلالة عليه) أي على ذلك المعنى بان يكون بعض الطرق واضح الدلالة عليه وبعضها أوضح.

Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Mukhtaṣar al-Maʿānī* (Karāchī: Maktabat al-Bushrā, 2010), 2:3.

257 Al-Taftāzānī states:

in this science is not, for example, expressing that Zayd is a giving person by merely stating: "Zayd is generous", whereby "giving" is simply substituted with its synonym "generous". Rather, this science not only requires understanding the mere definitions of the individual words being used, but additionally requires a cognitive effort in the mind of the addressee/reader to mentally transition from the antecedent (*malzūm*) in the figure of speech to its consequent (*lāzim*).[258] That is to say, if one wishes to employ rhetorical devices in a manner that genuinely qualifies himself as being eloquent, then one's use of simile cannot be mere substitution with synonyms or equivalents between things being compared. The skilled rhetoricians of this field demand that words or phrases be used in a manner that both enables and petitions the addressee/reader to exert mental effort in discerning the actual degree or extent of comparison being made in the simile. Moreover, nor do the dictates of figures of speech permit any meaning that can possibly be conjured in the mind to be of consideration in the simile. They are rather explicit in stating that the understood meaning must be one that is being intended by the speaker.[259] By this, the folly of those who attempt to understand and interpret verse 3:59 by plainly considering the

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وتقيد الاختلاف بالوضوح ليخرج معرفة ايراد المعنى الواحد بطرق مختلفة في اللفظ والعبارة.

Ibid, 2:4.

258 Al-Taftāzānī states:

وهذه الدلالة (إما على تمام ما وضع) اللفظ (له) كدلالة الإنسان على الحيوان الناطق (أو على جزئه) كدلالة الإنسان على الحيوان أو الناطق (أو على خارج منه) كدلالة الإنسان على الضاحك (وتسمى الأولى) أي الدلالة على تمام ما وضع له (وضعية) لأن الواضع إنما وضع اللفظ لتمام المعنى (و) يسمى (كل من الأخيرتين) أي الدلالة على الجزء والخارج (عقلية) لأن دلالة اللفظ على كل من الجزء والخارج إنما هي من جهة حكم العقل بأن حصول الكل أو الملزوم يستلزم حصول الجزء أو اللازم.

Ibid, 2:5-6.

259 Al-Taftāzānī states:

(وهو علم) أي ملكة يقتدر بها على إدراكات جزئية أو أصول وقواعد معلومة (يعرف به ايراد المعنى الواحد)...واللام في «المعنى الواحد» للاستغراق العرفي أي كل معنى واحد يدخل تحت قصد المتكلم وإرادته.

Ibid, 3-4.

standalone, generic definition of each individual word in the verse, or applying whatever comparison they wish to apply in the simile, becomes evident. A proper understanding of this Qur'ānic verse is dependent on knowing the definitions of each word, employing the framework of the science dealing with figures of speech in classical Arabic, utilizing the textual and rational indicative devices, and considering the reason for the revelation. Had the verse fallen short of this, then it would not have qualified as being eloquent according to the established precepts of figures of speech in classical Arabic. Thus, it behooves the reader to not ignore any of these considerations when attempting to completely understand this verse.

Secondly, the legal theory maxim of "consideration is given to the generality of the verse, not the specificity of the actual context" does not entail or permit interpreting words in a vacuum nor does it entail conveniently ignoring the reason for the revelation. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ḥabannaka al-Mīdānī explains how many have misconstrued this maxim to mean that interpretations ought to be conducted in a piecemeal, word-by-word manner devoid of context and cues. He states that it is not permitted to parse the text into parts whereby each expression is analyzed individually divorced from its context/cotext, but rather the entire text should be treated as a single, cohesive unit.[260] Furthermore, despite the differing opinions surrounding this maxim, no one of repute ever held that it indicates disregarding the reason for the revelation and context/co-text. Both al-Zarqānī[261] and al-Zarkashī

260 ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ḥabannaka al-Mīdānī states:

ويتجاوز بعض الناس الحد المراد في تطبيق هذه القاعدة فيقتطعون من الآية جملة ويجردونها عن سياقها ويفهمون منها عاما أو معنى خارجا عما وردت له في السياق كليّا مع أن الجملة لم تأت على أنها قاعدة كليّة وما جاء في النص بعض تطبيقاتها أو بعض أفرادها. وبهذا التجاوز يتوهمون أن سياق النص هو «خصوص السبب» فيقطعون النص عن سياقه ويقولون: «العبرة بعموم النص لا بخصوص السبب» مع أن النص كله وحدة متماسكة وليس بعضه سببا لبعض. لذلك فلا يصح أن تجزأ كل فكرة وردت في جملة من الآية ثم يقال: «العبرة بعموم النص لا بخصوص السبب».

ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ḥabannaka al-Mīdānī, *Qawāʿid al-Tadabbur al-Amthal li Kitāb Allah* (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 2012), 203.

261 Al-Zarqānī states:

معرفة أن سبب النزول غير خارج عن حكم الآية إذا ورد مخصص لها. وذلك لقيام الإجماع على أن حكم السبب باق قطعا. فيكون التخصيص قاصرا على ما سواه. فلو لم يعرف سبب النزول لجاز أن يفهم أنه مما خرج بالتخصيص مع أنه لا يجوز إخراجه قطعا

emphatically state that the reason for the revelation cannot be excluded from the meaning of the text even in the presence of a textual specifier (*mukhaṣṣis*), and that its consideration will decidedly remain as per the consensus of the scholars. Moreover, excluding consideration of the reason for the revelation results in grave implications. Al-Zarkashī mentions that it could result in the implication that Allah ﷻ is skirting around answering what has been leveled to the Prophet ﷺ and being ambiguous in His reply to the interlocutor; all of which is invalid with regards to Allah ﷻ.[262] The rhetoricians would demand considering the reason for the revelation to ascertain conformity with the muqtaḍā al-ḥāl as mentioned above, while Muslim legal theorists (*uṣūliyyūn*) would demand considering the reason for the revelation to ensure the judgment being issued is not at odds with it. Thus, it becomes apparent that Muslim evolutionists have no recourse but to consider the reason for the revelation due to the individual demands of both the rhetoricians and legal theorists.

Determining the "Muqtaḍā al-Ḥāl"

Concerning the aspect of upholding the rhetorical style of the Qur'ān as defined above, it must be asked of Muslim evolutionists, that in addition to meeting all the requirements for eloquence, how exactly does their own interpretation of verse 3:59 fulfill the additional requirement of "*muṭābaqa li-muqtaḍā al-ḥāl*". "Muṭābaqa li-muqtaḍā al-ḥāl" is to appropriately consider what the context is calling towards such that it be correctly factored

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للإجماع المذكور.

Muḥammad ʿAbd al-ʿAẓīm al-Zarqānī, *Manāhil al-ʿIrfān* (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifa, 2005), 107.

Al-Zarkashī states:

ومنها أنه قد يكون اللفظ عاما ويقوم الدليل على التخصيص فإن محل السبب لا يجوز إخراجه بالاجتهاد والإجماع كما حكاه القاضي أبو بكر في مختصر التقريب لأن دخول السبب قطعي.

Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī, *al-Burhān fī ʿUlūm al-Qurʾān* (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 2006) 28.

262 Al-Zarkashī states:

أن فيه عدولا عن محل السؤال وذلك لا يجوز في حق الشارع لئلا يلتبس على السائل.

Ibid.

alongside the intended meaning that the speaker is trying to convey.[263] Furthermore, al-Shāṭibī explicitly states that the science of figures of speech in classical Arabic, through which the inimitability of the Qur'ān becomes known, revolves around knowing the muqtaḍā al-ḥāl, and moreover, knowing the *reason for the revelation* is akin to knowing the muqtaḍā al-ḥāl.[264] Likewise, Nur al-Din 'Itr states that studying the Qur'ān's balāgha and understanding it can prove to be difficult without first studying the *reason for the revelation* due to the latter providing an understanding of how the Qur'ān factors in the muqtaḍā al-ḥāl, and then consequently expresses itself

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263 Al-Taftāzānī states:

والحال هو الأمر الداعي إلى أن يعتبر مع الكلام الذي يؤدى به أصل المراد خصوصية ما، وهو مقتضى الحال.

Sa'd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Mukhtaṣar al-Ma'ānī* (Karāchi: Maktabat al-Bushrā, 2010), 1:54-55.

264 Al-Shāṭibī's discussion concerning the interplay between the sabab al-nuzūl and muqtaḍā al-ḥāl:

معرفة أسباب التنزيل لازمة لمن أراد علم القرآن والدليل على ذلك...أن علم المعاني والبيان الذى يعرف به إعجاز نظم القرآن فضلا عن معرفة مقاصد كلام العرب إنما مداره على معرفة مقتضيات الأحوال حال الخطاب من جهة نفس الخطاب أو المخاطب أو المخاطب أو الجميع إذ الكلام الواحد يختلف فهمه بحسب حالين وبحسب مخاطبين وبحسب غير ذلك كالاستفهام لفظه واحد ويدخله معان أخر من تقرير وتوبيخ وغير ذلك وكالأمر يدخله معنى الإباحة والتهديد والتعجيز وأشباهها ولا يدل على معناها المراد إلا الأمور الخارجة وعمدتها مقتضيات الأحوال وليس كل حال ينقل ولا كل قرينة تقترن بنفس الكلام المنقول وإذا فات نقل بعض القرائن الدالة فات فهم الكلام جملة أو فهم شيء منه ومعرفة الأسباب رافعة لكل مشكل في هذا النمط فهي من المهمات في فهم الكتاب بلا بد ومعنى معرفة السبب هو معنى معرفة مقتضى الحال.

Abū Isḥāq al-Shāṭibi, *al-Muwāfaqāt* (Riyadh: Dār Ibn 'Affān, 1997), 4:146.

In this same respect, al-Sanūsī states that the muqtaḍā al-ḥāl is the reason (*sabab*) for which that speech is revealed:

السبب الذي ورد الكلام لأجله.

Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Sanūsī, *Sharḥ al-'Aqīda al-Kubrā* (Damascus: Dār al-Taqwā, 2019), 590.

in the highest form of inimitability.[265] It was shown in an earlier chapter that the *reason for the revelation* for verse 3:59 was when the Christians of Najrān attempted to make a case for the divinity of ʿĪsā ﷺ by questioning who his father was, whilst it being known to both Christians and Muslims alike that he did not have a biological father. The obvious implication being that God Himself must have been his father. It was also shown in the preceding chapter that the context (*siyāq*) of the first eighty (80) verses of Sūrat Āl ʿImrān, those coming both before and after verse 59, are seeking to negate divinity for ʿĪsā ﷺ. As such, if we were to combine both indicative devices (*qarīna*), i.e., the *reason for the revelation* and the co-text, it would lead us to how exactly verse 3:59 should correspond to the muqtaḍā al-ḥāl: **To cogently prove that the absence of biological paternity in the case of ʿĪsā ﷺ does not merit a case for his divinity.**

One of the examples al-Taftāzānī gives to illustrate how something would qualify as meeting its contextual requirements (muqtaḍā al-ḥāl) is the case of someone who refuses to believe that "Zayd is inside the house." Consequently, the individual's adamant denial demands the speaker declare with emphasis that "**Indeed** Zayd is inside the house!"[266] Similarly, the adamant denial of the Christians of Najrān to accept the mortal nature of ʿĪsā ﷺ and their resorting to making a case for his divinity by suggesting that in the absence of his biological father, God, Himself, is his father, is what drives verse 3:59 to begin with "indeed" (*inna*) to underscore what is soon to follow in refuting their fallacious reasoning. If Muslim evolutionists do not accept the contextual dictates, then it must be asked of them: what is the very first word in verse 3:59 emphasizing?[267]

265 Nūr al-Dīn ʿItr states:

إن ركن البلاغة الأساسي هو مطابقة الكلام لمقتضى الحال ومن العسير إذن لدراسة أسباب النزول التي بها يدرك خصوصيات مقاصد الأسلوب بل يصل لما هو أعلى وأجلّ حيث يجد أن القرآن الكريم راعى مقتضى حال المخاطبين على أعلى مستوى معجز.

Nūr al-Dīn ʿItr, *al-Qurʾān al-Karīm wa al-Dirāsāt al-Adabiyya* (Damascus: Manshūrat Jāmiʿa Dimashq, 2003), 58.

266 Al-Taftāzānī states:

مثلا: كون المخاطب منكرا للحكم حال يقتضي تأكيد الحكم، والتأكيد مقتضى الحال، وقولك له إن زيدا في الدار مؤكدا ب «إنّ» كلام مطابق لمقتضى الحال.

Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Mukhtaṣar al-Maʿānī* (Karāchī: Maktabat al-Bushrā, 2010), 1:55.

267 Al-Taftāzānī explains that "*inna*" occurs to strengthen with emphasis what

Breaking Down the Arabic Simile Proper (*Tashbīh*)

Arabic rhetoricians describe tashbīh as comprising certain components:

a. Tenor (*mushabbah*): The subject of the simile which is being likened to something else.

b. Vehicle (*mushabbah bihi*): The thing used to describe the tenor.

c. Comparator (*adāt al-tashbīh*): The particle used to indicate that a similitude is being struck between the tenor and vehicle.

d. Ground (*wajh al-shabah*): The common meaning shared by both the tenor and vehicle.

When applied to verse 3:59 it would look like this:

tenor — comparator

"*Indeed! the similitude of Īsā, according to Allah, is just like the similitude of Ādam. He created him from dust, then He said unto him: Be! and he became.*"

vehicle

Instead of outright identifying the ground now, which is at the heart of the contention, I will first proceed to discuss how it ought to be identified.

Al-Taftāzānī mentions that among any two things being compared, such as Zayd and a lion, the two can potentially share in several things including essential traits such as both possessing a body and being animals. However, despite these and other commonalities, none of them will be deemed the ground merely by virtue of them being shared. The ground is only that common feature which the speaker is particularly intending.[268] Therefore, to posit the opinion that "*mathal*" (similitude) in this verse could virtually

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the addressees are seeking to know and are skeptical about:

وأما كلمة «إنّ» بدون الفاء...وقعت في هذه المواقع لتقوية الجملة التي يطلبها المخاطب ويتردد فيها ويسأل عنها.

Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ al-Talwīḥ* (Beirut: al-Maktaba al-ʿAṣriyya, 2005), 2:158.

268 Al-Taftāzānī states:

(ووجهه) أي وجه التشبيه (ما يشتركان فيه) أي : المعنى الذي قصد اشتراك الطرفين فيه وذلك أن زيدا والأسد يشتركان في كثير من الذاتيات وغيرها كالحيوانية والجسمية والوجود وغير ذلك مع أن شيئا منها ليس وجه الشبه.

be anything in which both Ādam ﷺ and ʿĪsā ﷺ have in common stands as patently incorrect. This has been mistakenly repeated by many a Muslim evolutionist.

Which type of Objective is used in the Simile of verse 3:59?

One of the ways whereby the intended simile feature, the ground, can be identified is by determining the objective (*gharaḍ*) of the simile being used. This objective of similes relates to some feature concerning the tenor.[269] The objective could be either:

a. to explain a peculiarity found within the tenor that is being contested or denied (*bayān al-imkān*),

b. to explain a particular state or attribute that the tenor possesses (*bayān al-ḥāl*),

c. to explain the magnitude or extent of possessing a certain attribute (*bayān miqdār al-ḥāl*), or

d. to firmly establish a peculiarity or state within the tenor that is being contested or denied, **with cogency** (*taqrīr al-ḥāl/al-imkān*).[270]

As is evident, the objective of (d), taqrīr al-ḥāl/al-imkān, is the same as the objectives found in (a) through (c) except that (d) executes it in a persuasive manner whereby the explanation takes root and becomes strengthened within the mind of the addressee.[271] Recalling that the contextual dictate (muqtaḍā al-ḥāl) requires verse 3:59 to prove that a deficiency in the biological paternity of ʿĪsā ﷺ does not merit a case for his divinity, it would therefore seem that the objective in verse 3:59 would necessarily have to be type (d), that of taqrīr al-ḥāl/al-imkān. What further lends support to this is what we find earlier in verse 3:47:

Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Mukhtaṣar al-Maʿānī* (Karāchī: Maktabat al-Bushrā, 2010), 2:26.

269 Al-Taftāzānī states:

(والغرض منه) أي من التشبيه (في الأغلب يعود إلى المشبه وهو) أي الغرض العائد إلى المشبه.

Ibid, 2:54.

270 Ibid, 2:54-56.

271 Al-Taftāzānī states:

تقرير حال المشبه في نفس السامع وتقوية شأنه.

Ibid, 2:56.

"She said, "My Lord, how will I have a child when no man has touched me?" [The angel] said, "Such is Allah; He creates what He wills. When He decrees a matter, He only says to it, 'Be!' and it is."[272]

In this earlier verse, Allah ﷻ had already indicated how it is possible for a man to be created without a biological father. However, as seen in the various narrations found in the previous chapter on the reason for the revelation of verse 3:59, the Christians of Najrān were *not* disputing ʿĪsā ﷺ not having a biological father. Rather, their dispute revolved around using the lack of parentage in ʿĪsā ﷺ as a *means* for establishing his divinity. In contrast, here in verse 3:47, Maryam ﷺ posed the question from the standpoint of how it could be possible (*imkān*) for conception to take place without a biological father. Her intention was never to engage in a dispute, let alone to argue for the divinity of her unborn son. As such, we see that Allah ﷻ offers her a gentle explanation corresponding to the muqtaḍā al-ḥāl,[273] about His omnipotence in that He is fully able to create what He so wills once it has been decreed, without resorting to using words connoting emphasis or intensity. This incident with Maryam ﷺ was recited unto the Christians of Najrān to relay the same message about the extent of His omnipotence. However, the mood seemingly shifts, as we saw in an earlier narration where the Christians of Najrān claimed they were already "true believers" before the Prophet Muḥammad ﷺ himself! The extent of the heated exchange between them can be gauged by the narration of the Companion, ʿAbd Allah b. al-Ḥārith al-Zubaydī (d. 86 h), wherein he states that he heard the Prophet ﷺ wish for a barrier to arise between himself and the Najrān such that he would not see them, and they would not see him, due to the

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272 3:47

قَالَتْ رَبِّ أَنَّىٰ يَكُونُ لِي وَلَدٌ وَلَمْ يَمْسَسْنِي بَشَرٌ ۖ قَالَ كَذَٰلِكِ اللَّهُ يَخْلُقُ مَا يَشَاءُ ۚ إِذَا قَضَىٰ أَمْرًا فَإِنَّمَا يَقُولُ لَهُ كُن فَيَكُونُ.

273 Al-Sanūsī explains that according to the rules of balāgha, if the addressee is unaware of the subject matter at hand, then what is suitable is that they be addressed with words that do not carry strong emphasis:

الوارد لإفادة خالي الذهن من الحكم يناسبه أن يلقى إليه الكلام غير مؤكد.

Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Sanūsī, *Sharh al-ʿAqīda al-Kubrā* (Damascus: Dār al-Taqwā, 2019), 590.

This is precisely the type of response we see in verse 3:47 unlike in verse 3:59.

sheer intensity by which they were disputing with him.[274] Furthermore, in just two verses after verse 3:59, a call towards self-imprecation (*mubāhala*) is issued for whoever is speaking falsely amongst the disputing parties,[275] suggesting that verse 3:59 was the "closing argument" and the final blow to their beliefs. One of the known functions of tashbīh is in fact to act as a proof (*dalīl*) and evidence (*ḥujja*)[276] that is presented to remonstrate an interlocutor. Therefore, in view of how the discussion escalated, it is only fitting to the situation (*muṭābiq li-muqtaḍā al-ḥāl*) that verse 3:59's use of tashbīh is for the objective (*gharad*) of "taqrīr al-ḥāl/al-imkān".

Delineating the Taqrīr al-Ḥāl/al-Imkān

Concerning taqrīr al-ḥāl/al-imkān, al-Taftāzānī states that what is required in this type of tashbīh is that the vehicle is both i.) more renowned (*aśhar*); and ii.) more complete (*akmal*) than the tenor with respect to the ground.[277]

274

حدثني يونس، قال: أخبرنا ابن وهب، قال: وثني ابن لهيعة، عن سليمان بن زياد الحضرمي عن عبد الله بن الحارث بن جزء الزبيدي، أنه سمع النبي صلى عليه وسلم يقول: ليت بيني وبين أهل نجران حجابا فلا أراهم ولا يروني من شدة ما كانوا يمارون النبي صلى عليه وسلم.

Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmi' al-Bayān fī Ta'wīl al-Qur'ān* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, 2009), 3:296.

275

فَمَنْ حَآجَّكَ فِيهِ مِن بَعْدِ مَا جَآءَكَ مِنَ ٱلْعِلْمِ فَقُلْ تَعَالَوْا۟ نَدْعُ أَبْنَآءَنَا وَأَبْنَآءَكُمْ وَنِسَآءَنَا وَنِسَآءَكُمْ وَأَنفُسَنَا وَأَنفُسَكُمْ ثُمَّ نَبْتَهِلْ فَنَجْعَل لَّعْنَتَ ٱللَّهِ عَلَى ٱلْكَـٰذِبِينَ.

"Then whoever argues with you about it after [this] knowledge has come to you - say, "Come, let us call our sons and your sons, our women and your women, ourselves and yourselves, then supplicate earnestly [together] and invoke the curse of Allah upon the liars [among us]." (3:61).

276 Al-Dusūqī states:

فيؤتى بالتشبيه على طريق الدليل على إثباته...قوله :(احتجّ لهذه الدعوى) أي : أقام الحجة أي : الدليل على إثبات هذه الدعوى.

Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Dusūqī, *Ḥāshiyat al-Dusūqī 'alā Mukhtaṣar al-Ma'ānī* (Cairo: Bulāq Miṣr, 1855), 2:202.

277 al-Taftāzānī states:

وأما تقرير الحال فيقتضي الأمرين جميعا لأن النفس إلى الأتمّ الأشهر أميل فالتشبيه به

Indeed, it would defy logic to draw a comparison with something that is even more vague and unclear as it would only compound the problem. Abū al-ʿAbbās b. Yaʿqūb al-Wallālī (d. 1128 h) explains the reason for this requirement is that the entire objective in taqrīr is to establish and firmly root the ground into the mind of the addressee such that he becomes certain of it, thereby leaving no possibility to oppose it by way of mere conjecture.[278] Al-Wallālī adds that according to the rhetoricians, using a vehicle that is both more renowned and complete than the tenor is mandatory (*wājib*) in taqrīr lest it amounts to neglect for what the situation requires of it (i.e., the muqtaḍā al-ḥāl) or leaving oneself open to rebuttal, even if by erroneous rejoinders.[279] What is worthy of mention here is that the ground relating to Ādam ﷺ must be accounted for with respect to the understanding of the actual addressees of this verse, i.e., the Christians of Najrān and the Muslims alive at that time and need not be in accordance with the understanding of anyone else.[280] Continuing in this vein, al-Taftāzānī states

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لزيادة التقرير والتقوية أجدر وأليق.

Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Mukhtaṣar al-Maʿānī* (Karāchī: Maktabat al-Bushrā, 2010), 2:56.

278 Ibn Yaʿqūb al-Wallālī states:

وأما التقرير فيقتضي الأتمية والأشهرية معا لأن المراد تمكين ذلك الوجه في النفس وتقريره عندها حتى تطمئن إليه ولا يمكن لها مدافعة فيه بالوهم.

Abū al-ʿAbbās b. Yaʿqūb al-Wallālī, *Mawāhib al-Fattāḥ fī Sharḥ Talkhīṣ al-Miftāḥ* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2003), 2:171.

279 Ibn Yaʿqūb al-Wallālī states:

وقد تقرر أن تحقق الشيء بالأقوى الأظهر مع قصد ذلك التحقق واجب لأنه بالأضعف بسبيل التساهل فيه والتغافل عن مقتضاه ودفاعه عن النفس بإثبات ضده وهما وبالأخفى كذلك.

Abū al-ʿAbbās b. Yaʿqūb al-Wallālī, *Mawāhib al-Fattāḥ fī Sharḥ Talkhīṣ al-Miftāḥ* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2003), 2:171.

280 Al-Dusūqī states:

ويكون المشبه به معروفا بذلك الحكم الذي هو ثبوت وجه الشبه عند المخاطب لا عند كل أحد.

Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Dusūqī, *Ḥāshiyat al-Dusūqī ʿalā Mukhtaṣar al-Maʿānī* (Cairo: Bulāq Miṣr, 1855), 2:233.

that the vehicle should possess a degree of familiarity and intimacy to the addressee[281] while Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa al-Maḥbūbī (d. 747 h) states that it should moreover be the pinnacle of sense-perceptibles (*maḥsūsāt*) in possessing the intended ground (*wajh al-shabah*).[282] Al-Dusūqī elaborates that what is intended by the vehicle being "more renowned" (*aśhar*) is that it be "extremely well-known" (*shiddat al-maʿrifa*)[283], in order for the comparison to even be considered as valid and for the sake of completeness when used as a form of evidence (*iḥtijāj*).[284] Moreover, Ibn Yaʿqūb al-Wallālī adds that the vehicle's prominence in taqrīr is not just in comparison to the tenor in a relative sense, but rather in an absolute sense in its own right.[285] Lastly, Ibn ʿAṭiyya states that the use of two simile comparators "*mathal*" and "*kāf*" in conjunction ("*kamathali*") occurring immediately before "Ādam" in verse 3:59 specifically emphasizes *the* similarity in Ādam ﷺ.[286]

281 A-Taftāzānī states:

فرط إلف النفس بها.

Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Mukhtaṣar al-Maʿānī* (Karāchī: Maktabat al-Bushrā, 2010), 2:56.

282 Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa al-Maḥbūbī states:

إذا كان الغرض إلحاق الناقص بالكامل كتشبيه الخدّ بالورد أو زيادة التقرير يجب كون المشبه به أكمل محسوسات متصفة بذلك الوصف.

ʿUbayd Allah b. Masʿūd al-Maḥbūbī, *al-Wishāḥ* (Istanbul: Dār Bāb al-ʿIlm, 2020), 67.

283 Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Dusūqī, *Ḥāshiya al-Dusūqī ʿalā Mukhtaṣar al-Maʿānī* (Cairo: Bulāq Miṣr, 1855), 2:204.

284 Al-Taftāzānī states:

ليصح القياس ويتم الاحتجاج.

Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Mukhtasar al-Maʿānī* (Karāchī: Maktabat al-Bushrā, 2010), 2:56.

285 Ibn Yaʿqūb al-Wallālī states:

لا يخفى أن المراد بالأشهرية هنا مطلق المعرفة والشهرة وإلا فلو أريد معنى اسم التفضيل لزم أن يكون الحال والإمكان والمقدار مشهورة في المشبه لكن هي في المشبه به أشهر وهو فاسد.

Abū al-ʿAbbās b. Yaʿqūb al-Wallālī, *Mawāhib al-Fattāḥ fī Sharḥ Talkhīṣ al-Miftāḥ* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2003), 2:172.

286 Ibn ʿAṭiyya states:

Determining the Ground (*Wajh al-Shabah*)

A critical point worthy of consideration is that at times in the Qur'ān, Allah ﷻ mentions that He reveals unknown information:

> "This is one of the stories of the unseen, which we reveal to you [Prophet]. Neither you nor your people knew it before this."[287]

The revelation of such new information can be contrasted to other verses wherein Allah ﷻ instead corroborates information that was already previously known to the addressees:

> "There are messengers whose stories We have narrated to you already."[288]

> "Has the story of Moses reached you [Prophet]?"[289]

> "And when there came to them a Book (the Qur'ān) from Allah confirming that which was with them—although before they used

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جَمَعَ بَيْنَ أَدَاتَيْ تَشْبِيهٍ عَلَى طَرِيقِ التَّأْكِيدِ لِلشَّبَهِ.

Abū Muḥammad b. ʿAṭiyya al-Andalusī, *al-Muḥarrar al-Wajīz* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2001), 2:501.

287 11:49

تِلْكَ مِنْ أَنبَآءِ ٱلْغَيْبِ نُوحِيهَآ إِلَيْكَ ۖ مَا كُنتَ تَعْلَمُهَآ أَنتَ وَلَا قَوْمُكَ مِن قَبْلِ هَـٰذَا.

288 4:164

وَرُسُلًا قَدْ قَصَصْنَـٰهُمْ عَلَيْكَ مِن قَبْلُ.

289 20:9

وَهَلْ أَتَىٰكَ حَدِيثُ مُوسَىٰٓ.

Al-Rāzī states that it is possible that the story of Mūsā ﷺ had already reached the Prophet ﷺ from before the revelation such that the meaning of the verse would then be: "Has not this reached you already?" Al-Rāzī attributes this opinion to Ibn ʿAbbās. In view of this, Allah's ﷻ mentioning of the "account of Mūsā" would be a corroboration of what the Prophet ﷺ had already heard about prior to its revelation.

ويحتمل أن يكون قد أتاه ذلك في الزمان المتقدم فكأنه قال أليس قد أتاك وهذا قول مقاتل والضحاك عن ابن عباس.

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb* (Beirut: Dār al-Fikar, 1981), 22:14.

to pray for victory against those who disbelieved—but [then] when there came to them that which they recognized, they disbelieved in it; so, the curse of Allah will be upon the disbelievers."[290]

We can thus conclude that the ground as expressed in the vehicle in verse 3:59 cannot be from the type of revelation that is conveying "new" information since anything that is relatively new cannot already be "extremely well-known" and "intimately familiar" in the minds of the addressees. Therefore, to opine that Allah ﷻ was revealing something unknown or new about Ādam ﷺ in verse 3:59 is undoubtedly incorrect. That leaves us with the ground found in the vehicle necessarily being from the second type of conveyance wherein Allah ﷻ uses information that is already commonly known and well-recognized.

Finally, given that verse 3:59 continues with "He created (*khalaqa*) him from dust" necessitates that the ground expressed in the vehicle, i.e., Ādam ﷺ, must have something to do with how he was created.

Knowing that Allah ﷻ explicitly mentions "ʿĪsā" ﷺ as the tenor and "Ādam" ﷺ as the vehicle in the simile structure of verse 3:59, we can now recapitulate the defining elements of tashbīh as discussed above and readily apply it accordingly to this verse. Specifically viewing the tashbīh from the perspective of Ādam ﷺ being the vehicle, we can say that the use of his name in this verse should necessarily fulfill the following eight (8) conditions listed in Table III based on the preceding discussion:

290 2:89

وَلَمَّا جَآءَهُمْ كِتَٰبٌ مِّنْ عِندِ ٱللَّهِ مُصَدِّقٌ لِّمَا مَعَهُمْ وَكَانُوا۟ مِن قَبْلُ يَسْتَفْتِحُونَ عَلَى ٱلَّذِينَ
كَفَرُوا۟ فَلَمَّا جَآءَهُم مَّا عَرَفُوا۟ كَفَرُوا۟ بِهِۦ ۚ فَلَعْنَةُ ٱللَّهِ عَلَى ٱلْكَٰفِرِينَ.

See also verses: 2:41, 2:91, 2:97, 2:101, 3:3, 3:50, 3:81, 4:47, 5:46, 5:48, 6:92, and 35:31.

Table III.

i.		must pertain to how he was created (*khalq*) by Allāh ﷻ.
ii.		*must not* be "new" information that is being revealed for the first time.
iii.	The ground (*wajh al-shabah*) found in Ādam ؑ...	is *not* merely more renowned (*aśhar*) than in ʿĪsā ؑ in a relativistic sense, but is rather *extremely well-known* to the addressees, intimately familiar to them, and famous in an absolute manner in its own individual right.
iv.		is more complete (*akmal*) than in ʿĪsā ؑ
v.		refutes divinity for other than Allāh ﷻ.
vi.		categorically proves that the absence of biological paternity in ʿĪsā ؑ does not merit a case for the latter's alleged divinity.
vii.		proves "vi." with cogency in a manner that does not leave open any door for rebuttal.
viii.	Ādam ؑ...	is the pinnacle in terms of possessing the ground (*wajh al-shabah*) according to the knowledge of the addressees.

Knowing the above eight conditions will enable one to identify what the ground must be and what it must *not* be.[291] The identification of the ground at this point is no longer a guessing game where we childishly veil our eyes with our hands and naively say "It is not known what the ground could be here." This is because whatever is *not* "known," is immediately disqualified as the ground in this verse in view of the stipulations put forth above. It is now a matter of what *must necessarily* is the ground considering the outline formed above.

291 Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa al-Maḥbūbī states in this vein:

إذا عرفت أسباب قبوله عرفت أسباب ردّه.

ʿUbayd Allah b. Masʿūd al-Maḥbūbī, *al-Wishāh* (Istanbul: Dār Bab al-ʿIlm, 2020), 67.

Discussion on the *Wajh al-Shabah* in Ādam ﷺ being Prevalent

In this regard, I consulted with Vern Poythress,[292] Roger Olson,[293] Mark S. Smith,[294] David Livingstone,[295] Jack Collins,[296] Robert Wilson,[297] Mark Noll,[298] and Richard Averbeck[299] through private correspondences and asked all of them the following question: "According to your scholarly opinion, would you say that prior to the theory of evolution becoming prevalent, it was "extremely well-known" to Christians around the globe, both scholars and laymen alike, that Adam was an original creation without a set of biological parents?"

Poythress replied saying "yes, they thought Adam and Eve did not have biological parents, on the basis of Gen. 2:7 and 2:21-22." Olson said: "So far as I know, as a historical theologian, all people…believed that Adam was the original human being and was created *de novo* by God…." Smith replied, "Yes based on what I have read about the premodern era." Livingstone likewise said that "most Christians believed that Adam was specially created and was the father of the entire human race." He also stated that he was "pretty sure that many of the confessions of faith dating from the Reformation contained belief that we are all descended from Adam" and that he does not "think that any entire denomination (of Christianity) adopted the pre-Adamite theory". Similarly, Collins informed me that "the vast majority of Jewish and Christian scholars and scientists took it for granted that Adam and Eve were the literal parents of the entire human race, and that they did not have parents themselves." Wilson replied by stating that "it is likely that both Christians and Jews accepted the idea

292 American philosopher, theologian, New Testament scholar, and professor of Systematic Theology at Westminster Theological Seminary.

293 Chair of Christian Theology at Baylor University.

294 Professor of Old Testament Literature and Exegesis at Princeton Theological Seminary.

295 Professor of Intellectual History of the Queen's University of Belfast and author of multiple works on evolution including a book on Ādam ﷺ.

296 Professor of the Old Testament at Covenant Seminary and author of publications on evolution and Christianity.

297 Former Chair of Yale University's Department of Religious Studies and currently professor of Religious Studies and the Old Testament at Yale University.

298 Professor Emeritus at Notre Dame and author of works dealing with Darwinism and Christianity.

299 Professor of the Old Testament and Semitic Languages at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School.

that Adam was an original creation without a set of biological parents. In short, they understood the Genesis creation story literally". When I replied by asking Wilson if he believed it to be "well-known even amongst average Christians throughout history," he replied with "I would say yes". Noll stated that the "assumption throughout Christendom was that God created Adam and Eve directly (some scholars even thought it was important to ask if Adam and Eve had a navel-belly button, since they would not have had ordinary parents)." Averbeck replied saying, "Yes, as far as I know, before evolutionary theory developed, Adam was considered an original creation of God without parents, etc.".

William Lane Craig, the renowned Christian apologist, philosopher and theologian, writes towards the end of his landmark work on evolution and Ādam ﷺ after a detailed genre analysis of the primaeval history of Genesis 1-11 and Paul's New Testament (NT):

> [T]he ordering presence of genealogies terminating in persons who were indisputably taken to be historical and the teaching of Paul in the NT about Adam's impact on the world, which bursts the bounds of a purely literary figure, oblige the biblically faithful Christian to affirm the historicity of Adam and Eve. Adam and Eve are asserted to be the fount of all humanity, the genealogical ancestors of every human being who has ever lived on the face of this planet.[300]

Peter Enns[301] states that there was a "consensus" for two thousand years regarding the "historical Adam" being an original creation.[302]

The Christian Arab poet, Ufnūn al-Taghlibī, who died approximately six years before the birth of the Prophet ﷺ, referred to all of humanity being "from the children of Ādam" in one of his poems.[303]

300 William Lane Craig, *In Quest of the Historical Adam* (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2021), 363.

301 American Biblical scholar and theologian. He has written widely on hermeneutics, Christianity and science, historicity of the Bible, and Old Testament interpretation. He completed his PhD at Harvard University and is currently a senior fellow of Biblical Studies for The BioLogos Foundation.

302 Peter Enns, *The Evolution of Adam* (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2012), xvi.

303 Ufnūn al-Taghlibī states:

قد كنت أسبق من جاروا على مهل

من ولد آدم ما لم يخلعوا رسني.

In the 6th year Hijrī, the Prophet ﷺ dispatched Jaʿfar b. Abī Ṭālib (d. 8 h) with a letter to the Christian ruler of the Kingdom of Aksum, al-Najāshī (d. 9 h), inviting him to Islam. In this letter, he ﷺ informs al-Najāshī that Allah ﷻ is One with no partners and that ʿĪsā ﷺ was created similar (*kamā*) to how Ādam ﷺ was created (*khalq*).[304] It is noteworthy that this letter was sent after the revelation of verse 3:59. The Prophet ﷺ is explaining to a regionally foreign Christian how ʿĪsā ﷺ is not divine by drawing an analogy between his creation and the creation of Ādam ﷺ. His use of the same analogy as verse 3:59 would only make sense if he had reason to believe that this Christian ruler also shared the same beliefs as the Christians of Najrān, namely that Ādam ﷺ was created without biological parents. Therefore, it is entirely plausible to derive from this letter that their belief

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Louis Cheikho, *Shuʿarāʾ al-Naṣrāniyya qabla al-Islām* (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1991), 192-194.

Incidentally, al-Ghazālī, after quoting a stanza from the Christian Arab poet, al-Akhṭal al-Taghlibī (d. 69 h), mentions in passing that whatever poets utter are indicative of that thing being from the most manifest of things, whereby all of mankind understands it.

وما ينطق به الشعراء يدل على أنه من الجليات التي يشترك كافة الخلق في دركها.

Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *al-Iqtiṣād fī al-Iʿtiqād* (Jeddah: Dār al-Minhāj, 2019), 252.

304 Al-Bayhaqī narrates:

وفي كتاب عن أبي عبد الله الحافظ في الجزء الذي أجاز لي روايته عنه، قال: أخبرني أبو الحسن محمد بن عبد الله الفقيه، بمرو، قال: حدثنا حماد ابن أحمد، قال حدثنا محمد بن حميد، قال حدثنا سلمة بن الفضل، عن محمد ابن إسحاق، قال: بعث رسول الله صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم عمرو بن أمية الضمري إلى النجاشي في شأن جعفر بن أبي طالب وأصحابه، وكتب معه كتابا: «بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم من محمد رسول الله إلى النجاشي الأصحم ملك الحبشة سلام عليك فإني أحمد إليك الله الملك القدوس المؤمن المهيمن وأشهد أن عيسى ابن مريم روح الله وكلمته ألقاها إلى مريم البتول الطيبة الحصينة فحملت بعيسى فخلقه من روحه ونفخه كما خلق آدم بيده ونفخه، وإني أدعوك إلى الله وحده لا شريك له والموالاة على طاعته، وأن تتبعني وتؤمن بي وبالذي جاءني فإني رسول الله، وقد بعثت إليكم ابن عمي جعفرا ومعه نفر من المسلمين فإذا جاءوك فأقرهم ودع التجبر فإني أدعوك وجنودك إلى الله وقد بلغت ونصحت فاقبلوا نصيحتي والسلام على من اتبع الهدى.

Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī, *Dalāʾil al-Nubuwwa* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2008), 2:308-309.

concerning Ādam ﷺ was not an isolated one but known to Christians across the lands.

From the beliefs of the Muslims at that time, there are narrations by the Successors of the Followers[305] (*tābiʿ al-tābiʿīn*). For example, Muḥammad b. Jaʿfar b. al-Zubayr b. al-ʿAwwām (d. 113 h) explicitly states verbatim that Ādam ﷺ was created "without a mother or a father" in his commentary of verse 3:59.[306] The word "Ādam" occurs in the Qurʾān twenty-eight (28) times with the last chronological mention of him within the context of his creation occurring in verse 3:59. Familiarity with the name "Ādam" reached such an extent that once after describing to his Companions what angels and *jinns* were originally created from, the Prophet ﷺ simply stated "and Ādam was made from what was [already] described to you"[307] without proceeding to list any details. It is as if he was saying that there is no reason to reiterate anything about "Ādam" ﷺ due to the frequency of his creation having been previously described to you. This conforms to how Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa counts the sheer frequency of sense-perception of the ground being a primary reason for the simile (tashbīh) being immediate and intimate.[308]

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305 The third generation of Muslims.

306 Al-Ṭabarī narrates:

> حدثنا ابن حميد قال: ثنا سلمة عن ابن إسحاق عن محمد بن جعفر بن الزبير (إن مثل عيسى عند الله) فاسمع! (كمثل آدم خلقه من تراب ثم قال له كن فيكون الحق من ربك فلا تكن من الممترين) فإن قالوا: خلق عيسى من غير ذكر فقد خلقت آدم من تراب بتلك القدرة من غير أنثى ولا ذكر فكان كما كان عيسى لحما ودما وشعرا وبشرا فليس خلق عيسى من غير ذكر بأعجب من هذا.

Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmiʿ al-Bayān fī Taʾwīl al-Qurʾān* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2009), 3:294.

307 The Prophet ﷺ stated:

> خُلِقَتِ الْمَلَائِكَةُ مِنْ نُورٍ، وَخُلِقَ الْجَانُّ مِنْ مَارِجٍ مِنْ نَارٍ، وَخُلِقَ آدَمُ مِمَّا وُصِفَ لَكُمْ.

Muslim b. al-Hājjaj, *Sahīḥ al-Imām Muslim* (Jeddah: Dār al-Minhāj, 2013), 8:226.

308 Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa states:

> بعض التشبيهات قريب نازل وبعضها غريب وأسباب قربه ونزوله كون وجه الشبه... متكررا على الحس.

ʿUbayd Allah b. Masʿūd al-Maḥbūbī, *al-Wishāḥ* (Istanbul: Dār Bāb al-ʿIlm, 2020), 67.

All the above suggests that both Christians and Muslims already held the belief that Ādam ﷺ was created without a set of biological parents and that this was a part of the theological milieu of that time. For the sake of argument, if the premise that Ādam ﷺ did not have any parents was not well known, or even completely unknown, it would be unreasonable for verse 3:61 to ask the Prophet ﷺ to issue a call towards self-imprecation (*mubāhala*) with anyone who disputes the non-divinity of ʿĪsā ﷺ.[309]

Thus, to claim that the ground in Ādam ﷺ, as the vehicle, is something other than him not having a set of biological parents results in severe implications, unbefitting for Allah ﷻ.

Using Islamic legal theory (*uṣūl al-fiqh*) and the *qarīnat al-ʿaql* to confirm the Ground

In addition to the science of balāgha, several other sciences speak at great lengths about the use of simile, or analogical reasoning. The discipline of logic (*manṭiq*) refers to it as "*tamthīl*", while in Islamic systematic theology (*kalām*), it is called "*al-ghāʾib ʿalā al-shāhid*", and in Islamic legal theory, it is referred to as "*qiyās*". ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ḥabannaka al-Mīdānī says that Muslim legal theorists (*uṣūliyyūn*) are particularly concerned with the use of similes and have developed principles and stipulations defining it and how to identify the ground—"*ʿilla*" (*ratio legis*) in their terminology—either by way of what the text (*naṣṣ*) itself denotes, through consensus (*ijmāʿ*),[310] by what is most befitting to the context, or other accepted methods of legal derivation.[311] One such method is "*al-īmāʾ*". Al-Taftāzānī defines al-īmāʾ as a method of determining the ground/*ratio legis* by noting that if a specific

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309 3:61

فَمَنْ حَآجَّكَ فِيهِ مِنۢ بَعْدِ مَا جَآءَكَ مِنَ ٱلْعِلْمِ فَقُلْ تَعَالَوْا۟ نَدْعُ أَبْنَآءَنَا وَأَبْنَآءَكُمْ وَنِسَآءَنَا وَنِسَآءَكُمْ وَأَنفُسَنَا وَأَنفُسَكُمْ ثُمَّ نَبْتَهِلْ فَنَجْعَل لَّعْنَتَ ٱللَّهِ عَلَى ٱلْكَـٰذِبِينَ.

310 The issue of consensus was discussed in an earlier chapter.

311 ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ḥabannaka al-Mīdānī states:

أن علماء أصول الفقه هم أعظم من اعتنى بوضع ضوابطه وتحديد شروطه وبيان كل ما يتعلق به...ولعلماء لأصول الفقه الإسلامي طرائق في إثبات علة الحكم الشرعي ترجع إلى النص أو إلى الإجماع أو إلى استنباط الوصف المناسب أو إلى الاستنباط بالدوران أو بالسبر والتقسيم أو بغير ذلك من أمارات.

ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ḥabannaka al-Mīdānī, *Ḍawābiṭ al-Maʿrifa* (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 2015), 289-291.

characteristic was not the ground, then the statement would not have any semantic value. Consequently, it would be highly far-fetched for this specific characteristic to *not* be the ground.[312] Others added that what is meant by being far-fetched and non-beneficial is that without this specific characteristic being the ground, the statement would not correspond to the muqtaḍā al-ḥāl.[313] Al-Mardāwī[314] (d. 885 h) and Ibn Najjār al-Futūḥī (d. 976 h) explain that farfetched here means that the usage would be alien to the eloquence (*faṣāḥa*) of the Qur'ān and would then imply that Allah ﷻ used words not in their proper context, while it is known that the Speech of Allah ﷻ is transcendent above what is trivial and useless.[315] Again, bearing

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312 Al-Taftāzānī states:

وأما الإيماء فهو أن يقرن بالحكم ما لو لم يكن هو أو نظيره للتعليل لكان بعيدا فيحمل على التعليل دفعا للاستبعاد...لو لم يكن علة لم يفد.

Sa'd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ al-Talwīḥ* (Beirut: al-Maktaba al-'Asriyya, 2005), 2:158-159.

Muḥibb Allah al-Bihārī (d. 1119 h) states similarly:

عرف الإيماء بالاقتران بما لو لم يكن هو أو نظيره علة كان بعيدا.

'Abd al-'Alī al-Anṣārī al-Laknawī, *Fawātiḥ al-Raḥamūt* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, 2002), 2:350.

313 Ibn al-Amīr al-San'ānī (d. 1182 h) states:

واعلم أن حقيقة التنبيه والإيماء هو أن يقترن الوصف الملفوظ به بحكم ولو مستنبط لو لم يكن هو أو نظيره للتعليل عن ذلك الاقتران بعد وقوعه من الشارع لمعرفته بأسباب الكلام ومطابقة مقتضى الحال.

Muḥammad b. Isma'īl al-San'ānī, *Ijābat al-Sā'il Sharḥ Bughyat al-Āmil* (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Risāla, 1988), 191.

314 Al-Mardāwī states:

هو اقتران الوصف بحكم لو لم يكن هو أو نظيره للتعليل لكان ذلك الاقتران بعيدا من فصاحة كلام الشارع وإتيانه بالألفاظ في غير مواضعها لتنزه كلامه عن الحشو الذي لا فائدة فيه.

'Alā' al-Dīn al-Mardāwī, *al-Taḥbīr Sharḥ al-Taḥrīr* (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rushd, 2000), 1:3324.

315 Ibn al-Najjār al-Futūḥī says:

in mind what the co-text and *reason for the revelation* signify in verse 3:59, the question posed by the Christians of Najrān warrants a satisfactory answer. Al-Taftāzānī in his discussion on al-īmā' states that when a question has been posed to the Lawgiver, it warrants a timely answer which is fully appreciated and satisfies the needs of the questioner.[316] Al-Rāzī further expounds under his discussion on al-īmā' that for Allah ﷻ to provide a useless answer is impossible (*muḥāl*) for two reasons. Firstly, because He declared: "Did you think that We created in vain?"[317] and secondly, because there is consensus that it is impossible for Allah's ﷻ speech to be without value and meaning.[318] Moreover, the co-text itself suggests this by the very

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الإيماء: هو اقتران الوصف بحكم لو لم يكن الوصف أو نظيره للتعليل لكان ذلك الاقتران بعيدا من فصاحة كلام الشارع وكان إتيانه بالألفاظ في غير مواضيعها مع كون كلام الشارع منزها عن الحشو الذي لا فائدة فيه.

Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Futūḥī, *Sharḥ al-Kawkab al-Munīr* (Riyadh, Maktabath al-ʿUbaykan, 1993), 4:125.

316 Al-Taftāzānī states:

وذكر الحكم جواب له ليحصل غرضه لئلا يلزم إخلاء السؤال عن الجواب وتأخير البيان عن وقت الحاجة فيكون السؤال مقدرا في الجواب.

Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ al-Talwīḥ* (Beirut: al-Maktaba al-ʿAsriyya, 2005), 2:158.

Likewise, ʿAbd al-ʿAlī al-Anṣārī al-Laknawī in his discussion on al-īmā' states that an answer that does not provide this would be meaningless:

لَمَا كان للجواب معنى.

ʿAbd al-ʿAlī al-Anṣārī al-Laknawī, *Fawātiḥ al-Raḥamūt* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2002), 2:348.

al-Laknawī then gives examples of how al-īmā' indicates the *ratio legis* (ʿilla), or in our case here, the ground (wajh al-shabah). Ibid, 348-350.

317 al-Mu'minūn:115

أَفَحَسِبْتُمْ أَنَّمَا خَلَقْنَـٰكُمْ عَبَثًا وَأَنَّكُمْ إِلَيْنَا لَا تُرْجَعُونَ.

318 Al-Rāzī states:

والعبث على الله تعالى محال للنص والإجماع والمعقول: أما النص فقول تعالى: « أَفَحَسِبْتُمْ أَنَّمَا خَلَقْنَـٰكُمْ عَبَثًا وَأَنَّكُمْ إِلَيْنَا لَا تُرْجَعُونَ»...وأما المعقول فهو أن العبث سفه والسفه

word that precedes verse 3:59 being "the Wise" (*al-Ḥakīm*) which occurs again in verse 3:62. Indeed, it is a cause for reflection as to why Allah ﷻ has placed verse 3:59 between two reminders that He is the Wise, which is the very opposite of speaking in nonsensical terms. Al-Qurṭubī defines the use of al-Ḥakīm in verse 3:58 as One whose actions are never incoherent, inconsistent, or unintelligible. Rather, He is masterful in His literary style and composition.[319]

In sum, what has been shown in the preceding pages is that although verse 3:59 utilizes an analogical argument containing an implicit premise, i.e., the ground, it is the theologically constrained rhetorical demands of this same structure that necessarily leads to identifying it in a manner that precludes all other possibilities.[320] Given this, alleging that the ground in

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صفو نقص والنقص على الله تعالى محال.

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Maḥṣūl fī ʿIlm Uṣūl al-Fiqh* (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Risāla, 1996), 5:173.

319 Al-Qurṭubī states:

ممنوع من الخلاف مبرم السرد متقن التأليف والنظم. فالحكيم الذي أفعاله محكمة متقنة ولا تفاوت فيها ولا اضطراب لوضع كل شيء موضعه.

Shams al-Dīn al-Qurṭubī, *al-Asnā fī Sharḥ Asmā' Allah al-Ḥusnā wa Ṣifātih* (Beirut: al-Maktaba al-ʿAsriyya, 2008), 305.

Al-Rāzī states that Allah ﷻ being al-Ḥakīm means that He is transcendent from doing that which is unbefitting for Him by virtue of being the Divine:

أن الحكمة عبارة عن كونه مقدسا عن فعل ما لا ينبغي.

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Kitāb Lawāmiʿ al-Bayyināt Sharḥ Asmā' Allah wa al-Ṣifāt* (Egypt: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Sharqiyya, 1906), 210.

320 In this respect, despite verse 3:59 being an apparent example of a "*ḥujja jadaliyya*", where arguments needn't consist of certain (*yaqīnī*) premises but can rather suffice with mutually agreed-upon premises (*musallam*), it is by way of our primary doctrinal principles which we know to be certain, that come to safeguard any implicit premise (i.e., the ground) in this verse from being false. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ḥabannaka al-Mīdānī highlights this crucial point on taking into consideration these decisive, sacred principles on which the entire edifice of this religion rests:

هذه المقدمات لا ترقى في حقيقة حالها إلى مرتبة اليقين التامّ...ولكن هذا إذا لم نضع في اعتبارنا تعاليم الشرائع الربانية وما ثبت فيها بيقين. أما إذا وضعنا ذلك في اعتبارنا فإنّ كثيرا من القضايا المشهورة ترتقي ببيانات الشريعة القاطعة إلى مرتبة اليقين الجازم فتكون

Ādam ﷺ is other than his lack of biological parentage results in affirming for Allah ﷻ things that are impossible for Him— which the rational indicative device (qarīnat al-ʿaql) does not permit.

لدى المؤمنين بالشريعة – العارفين لما ثبت فيها بيقين – يقينيّات.

ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ḥabannaka, *Ḍawābiṭ al-Maʿrifa* (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 2015), 299.



Objections

Defending the Necessary Ground (*Wajh al-Shabah*)

One objection usually put forth by Muslim evolutionists against the ground arrived at above is that it can alternatively be the "special process" whereby the first rational ensouled man, Ādam ﷺ, was created through a series of evolutionary steps as popularly delineated today by evolutionary biologists; and in like manner, ʿĪsā ﷺ was created through his own "special process" without a biological father.

First, in addressing this interpretation, it is important to bear in mind the requirements of faṣāḥa, as defined above, specifically the requirement of being free from any "semantic convolutedness" (*al-taʿqīd al-maʿnawī*). Al-Taftāzānī asserts that semantic convolutedness occurs when the sentence does not affect a quick transition of meanings into the mind of the addressee. This occurs due to a semantic gap where the words being used do not reasonably allow the addressee to arrive at the intended meaning, mainly due to a series of far-fetched, concealed, and subsumed meanings with no external indicators present to unveil those layers.[321] For the Muslim evolutionist's alleged interpretation to semantically flow in the mind of the addressees of verse 3:59 and to simultaneously meet the requirements of the muqtaḍā al-ḥāl, the addressees would first have to understand that in

321 Al-Taftāzānī states:

(وإما في الانتقال) عطف على قوله: (إما في النظم) أي لا يكون الكلام ظاهرة الدلالة على المراد، لخلل واقع في انتقال الذهن من المعنى الأول المفهوم بحسب اللغة إلى الثاني المقصود، وذلك بسبب إيراد اللوازم البعيدة المفتقرة إلى الوسائط الكثيرة مع خفاء القرائن الدالة على المقصود.

Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Mukhtaṣar al-Maʿānī* (Karāchī: Maktabat al-Bushrā, 2010), 1:47.

addition to Ādam ﷺ having a set of biological parents (as per the Muslim evolutionist's claim), he has also evolved from prehistoric hominids millions of years ago; and prior to that, from mammals over two-hundred million years ago, and so on, until they eventually evolved from asexually reproducing (i.e., lacking a biological parent akin to ʿĪsā ﷺ) organisms over five hundred million years ago. In other words, as per this interpretation, the "similitude" here in this verse has nothing to do with "Ādam" ﷺ himself anymore, but rather demands the addressees to readily imagine the evolutionary steps of man dating back tens of thousands of years ago and upwards to hundreds of millions of years ago.[322] Moreover, such an interpretation

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322 It is important to note that the word "Ādam" ought to be understood in the way it was understood by those who received the revelation. Al-Rāzī explains that Arabic lexis and grammar are of two types: i.) Those words that are in common usage across the generations, and their meanings are self-evident (*darūrī*), such as "heaven" (*al-samā'*) and "earth" (*al-arḍ*). These words were coined in the past and further known during the time of the Prophet ﷺ. Skepticism about the meanings of such words is not even worthy of a reply; and ii.) Rare, unfamiliar words which are very few in number. Al-Rāzī then asserts that most words and their derivatives found in the Qur'ān are of the first (i.) type and that only this type ought to be used in matters of doctrine.

أن اللغة والنحو على قسمين أحدهما المتداول المشهور والعلم الضروري حاصل بأنها في الأزمنة الماضية كانت موضوعة لهذه المعاني فإننا نجد أنفسنا جازمة بأن لفظ السماء والأرض كانتا مستعملتين في زمان الرسول صلى الله عليه وسلم في هذين المسميين ونجد الشكوك التي ذكروها جارية مجرى شبه السوفسطائية القادحة في المحسوسات التي لا تستحق الجواب وثانيهما الألفاظ الغريبة والطريق إلى معرفتها الآحاد إذا عرفت هذا فنقول أكثر ألفاظ القرآن ونحوه وتصريفه من القسم الأول فلا جرم قامت الحجة به وأما القسم الثاني فقليل جدا وما كان كذلك فإنا لا نتمسك به في المسائل القطعية ونتمسك به في الظنيات ونثبت وجوب العمل بالظن بالإجماع ونثبت الإجماع بآية واردة بلغات معلومة لا مظنونة وبهذا الطريق يزول الإشكال والله أعلم.

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Maḥṣūl fī ʿIlm Uṣūl al-Fiqh* (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Risāla, 1997), 1:216-217.

Likewise, al-Āmidī (d. 631 h) describes this first (i.) type of words being decisively known through mass-transmission (*al-tawātur al-qāṭiʿ*).
Ḥasan al-Shāfiʿī, *al-Madkhal ilā Dirāsat ʿIlm al-Kalam* (Cairo: Maktabat Wahba), 163-164.

Al-Taftāzānī also states that words of this type are known via mass-transmission (*tawātur*):

begs the question: Why even mention "Ādam" ﷺ as being analogous to ʿĪsā ﷺ when the former's own physical process of creation was, allegedly, no different than that of any other man?[323] If indeed the purpose of this verse is to strike a "similitude" in the mind of the addressee between the "special" physical process of ʿĪsā ﷺ being created without a biological father, and the "special" evolutionary process of mankind as a whole, then the verse could have simply sufficed by using a number of other analogies such as: ʿĪsā's ﷺ similitude is just like the similitude of the addressees of this verse, just like the similitude of man, just like the similitude of Muḥammad ﷺ, or *even* like the similitude of ʿĪsā ﷺ himself![324] As such, this interpretation by Muslim evolutionists fails to fulfil the requirement for semantic compatibility to uphold the faṣāḥa of the Qurʾān. Moreover, it fails to consider the fact that

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قلنا لا نسلم عدم التواتر في الكل فإن منها ما هو متواتر لغة كمعنى السماء والأرض ونحوا كقاعدة رفع الفاعل وصرفا.

Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ al-Talwīḥ ʿalā al-Tawḍīḥ* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1996), 1:274.

323 See footnote above where both al-Mardāwī and Ibn Najjār al-Futūḥī state that for Allah ﷻ to use words that are unsuitable for the context impugns the Qurʾān's eloquence.

324 Once the muqtaḍā al-ḥāl is established, potentially speaking, a number of individual words/phrases (*afrād*) can be brought forth to fulfill that muqtaḍā al-ḥāl. Thus, if one particular word/phrase is then singled out to be used (*khuṣūṣiyya*) then there must be a specific advantage associated with it. Al-Taftāzānī explains:

والحال هو الأمر الداعي إلى أن يعتبر مع الكلام الذي يؤدى به أصل المراد خصوصية ما، وهو مقتضى الحال...وتحقيق ذلك أنه من جزئيات ذلك الكلام الذي تقتضيه الحال.

Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Mukhtaṣar al-Maʿānī* (Karāchī: Maktabat al-Bushrā, 2010), 1:55.

Al-Dusūqī comments on al-Taftāzānī's words above and further elaborates concerning the meaning of the particular word/phrase that is ultimately selected ("khuṣūṣiyya"):

(قوله : إلى أن يعتبر) أي : يلاحظ ويقصد، وأشار الشارح بهذا إلى أنه لا بد في بلاغة الكلام من كون النكات والخصوصيات مقصودة للمتكلم، ولا يكفي في البلاغة حصولها من غير قصد، فإن وجدت من غير قصد لم تكن مقتضى حال، ولا يقال للكلام حينئذ إنه مطابق لمقتضى الحال...

(قوله : خصوصية)... لأن المراد بها النكتة والمزية المختصة بالمقام...

the direct addressees of the verse had no knowledge whatsoever about the theory of evolution. Peter Enns writes regarding Paul of Tarsus (d. 67 AD), author of multiple books forming the New Testament, including Romans 5:12-21 and Corinthians 15:21, 15:22, and 15:44-49 that deal with human origin, that the supposition that Ādam ﷺ may have instead evolved "does not preserve Paul's theology" because "this would hardly have occurred to Paul."[325] In other words, using "Ādam" to denote the human evolutionary process has no precedent; not in the Muslim tradition nor in the Biblical tradition. When speaking about what contributes to "difficulty in understanding" (*ṣuʿūbat al-fahm*) that impedes the quick transition of meanings into the mind of the addressee, al-Dusūqī mentions the foremost cause being its lack of use by the skilled rhetoricians (*al-bulaghā'*) and what is not in accordance with their style of rhetoric (*uslūb*).[326]

As such, given this interpretation has no prior precedent coupled with a plurality of concealed and ambiguous sub-meanings with no external indicators available towards clarifying them, not to mention failing to fulfill any of the mandatory conditions outlined earlier for the vehicle (*mushabbah bihi*), it will therefore necessarily be rejected.

(قوله : وتحقيق ذلك)... فمقتضى الحال: هو الكلام الكلي المشتمل على الخصوصية، ومعنى مطابقة الكلام لذلك المقتضى كون الكلام الجزئي الصادر من المتكلم الذي يلقيه للمخاطب المشتمل على الخصوصية من أفراد ذلك الكلام الكلي الذي يقتضيه الحال، فإن ذلك المقتضى صادق عليه.

Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Dusūqi, *Ḥāshiyat al-Dusūqī ʿalā Mukhtaṣar al-Maʿānī* (Cairo: Bulāq Miṣr, 1855), 1:95-97.

Thus, to ignore the "khuṣūṣiyya", i.e., the particular selection of "Ādam" ﷺ by Allah ﷻ in this verse, and to casually bypass it and ignore it is completely at odds with the rules of balāgha.

325 Peter Enns, *The Evolution of Adam* (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2012), 120.

326 Al-Dusûqi states:

واعلم أن المدار في صعوبة الفهم على خفاء القرائن كثرت الوسائط أولا لا على كثرة الوسائط فقط. فإنها قد تكثر ولم هناك صعوبة في فهم المعنى الثاني كما في قولهم فلان كثير الرماد كناية عن كرمه فإن الوسائط فيه كثيرة مع أنه لا تعقيد فيه. وخفاء القرائن وعدم خفاءها بواسطة جريان الكلام على أسلوب البلغاء واستعمالهم وعدم جريانه على أسلوبهم واستعمالهم.

Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Dusûqi, *Ḥāshiyat al-Dusūqī ʿalā Mukhtaṣar al-Maʿānī* (Cairo: Bulāq Miṣr, 1855), 1:82-83.

Refuting a Maternal Figure for Ādam ﷺ

Another objection that is often heard is that verse 3:59 can only be used to show that Ādam ﷺ did not have a biological father like ʿĪsā ﷺ but cannot be used to indicate he did not have a mother.

Al-Taftāzānī and Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa al-Maḥbūbī[327] both state that when using tashbīh, if the intention is to regard both the tenor and vehicle as equals in terms of the ground, i.e., without intending to treat the vehicle as being superlative (akmal) over the tenor, then it is more eloquent (*aḥsan*)[328] to *leave* the use of simile/tashbīh for the use of resemblance (*tashābuh*).[329] Al-Dusūqī explains "resemblance" here as words that indicate equivalence between two or more entities, such as saying something resembles (*tashākul*), or is similar (*tamāthul*), or is equal (*tasāwī*), or is parallel to

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327 Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa states:

التشبيه في جميع المواضع إلحاق الناقص بالكامل وإن تساويا نحو لون هذا الثوب كلون ذلك يترك التشبيه ونرجع إلى التشابه فيقول هما متشابهان فالتشبيه الذي بين المتساويين مسوغ من الطرفين أما تشبيه الناقص بالكامل فلا ينعكس.

ʿUbayd Allah b. Masʿūd al-Maḥbūbī, *al-Wishāḥ* (Istanbul: Dār Bāb al-ʿIlm, 2020), 67-68.

328 Ibn Yaʿqūb al-Wallālī states that when "aḥsan" is mentioned in the science of balāgha then it entails obligation (*wujūb*):

أن «الأحسن» في باب البلاغة بالوجوب.

Abū al-ʿAbbās b. Yaʿqūb al-Wallālī, *Mawāhib al-Fattāḥ fī Sharḥ Talkhīṣ al-Miftāḥ* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2003), 2:183.

The Mosul-based Iraqi specialist in the science of balāgha, Muḥammad Dhannūn Yūnus al-Fatḥī, confirmed to me through private correspondence that it will remain an obligation so long as there is no external indicator (*qarīna*) to prevent it.

329 Al-Taftāzānī states:

فإن أريد الجمع بين شيئين في أمر من الأمور من غير قصد إلى كون أحدهما ناقصا والآخر زائدا سواء وجدت الزيادة والنقصان أم لم توجد فالأحسن ترك التشبيه إلى الحكم بالتشابه ليكون كل واحد من الشيئين مشبها ومشبها به احترازا من ترجيح أحد المتساويين في وجه الشبه.

Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Mukhtaṣar al-Maʿānī* (Karāchī: Maktabat al-Bushrā, 2010), 2:60.

(*taḍāruʿ*) something else.[330] However, as we clearly see in verse 3:59, Allah ﷻ does *not* use words of tashābuh, but instead uses "*mathal*" and "*kāf*" which are particles of tashbīh.[331] Therefore, the assertion that Allah ﷻ intended ʿĪsā ﷺ and Ādam ﷺ to be equal in terms of their parentage is proven false. Additionally, it was explained above why the taqrīr form of tashbīh in this context is necessary, which requires the vehicle to not only be better known (aśhar) than the tenor, but that it also be more complete (akmal) in terms of the ground. Al-Taftāzānī states that if the ground being proposed is neither accepted by the addressee (let alone being unknown to them!), nor found to exist more prominently in the vehicle or to be more complete in that regard, then it is an interpretation that must be rejected (*mardūd*).[332] Al-Ghazālī reiterates the same sentiment as al-Taftāzānī.[333] The importance of the vehicle, i.e., Ādam ﷺ being "intimately familiar" to the Christians of Najrān cannot be overstated.

330 Al-Dusūqī states:

ينبغي أن يلحق بلفظ التشابه ما وازنه من التماثل والتشاكل والتساوي والتضارع وكلاهما سواء لا ما كان له فاعل ومفعول مثل شابه وساوى وضارع فإن فيه إلحاق الناقص بالزائد.

Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Dusūqī, *Ḥāshiyat al-Dusūqī ʿalā Mukhtaṣar al-Maʿānī* (Cairo: Bulāq Miṣr, 1855), 2:210.

331 Al-Taftāzānī states:

(وأداته الكاف وكأن ومثل وما في معناه) مما يشتق من المماثلة والمشابه وما يؤدي هذا المعنى (والأصل في نحو الكاف) أي في الكاف ونحوها كلفظة نحو ومثل وشبه بخلاف كأن وتماثل وتشابه.

Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Mukhtaṣar al-Maʿānī* (Karāchī: Maktabat al-Bushrā, 2010), 2:51-52.

332 Al-Taftāzānī states:

(إما مقبول...أو مردود) عطف على «مقبول» (وهو بخلافه) أي: ما يكون قاصرا عن إفادة الغرض بأن يكون على شرط المقبول كما سبق.

Ibid, 2:78-79.

333 Al-Ghazālī states:

فكلا أصلي هذا القياس ممنوع لأنه غير معلوم والعلم الخفي يوزن بالعلوم الجلية وما ذكره غير جلي ولا مسلم.

Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī, *al-Qisṭās al-Mustaqīm* (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 2007), 76.

Furthermore, it could very well be asked why Allah ﷻ did not make a comparison with the she-camel of the Prophet Ṣāliḥ ﷺ since it too was presumably not created from a set of parents.[334] The same question could be asked regarding the staff of Prophet Mūsā ﷺ, and how it was changed into a serpent, ostensibly without ever having parents;[335] or the bird which ʿĪsā ﷺ himself created miraculously from clay without parents,[336] or even asexually reproducing organisms and animals alive at that time of revelation. However, Allah ﷻ did not use any of these examples because they do not fulfill the rhetorical and literary requirements for what constitutes a valid tashbīh in Arabic. Recall that Ṣadr al-Shariʿa goes to the extent of saying that the vehicle should be the most complete realization of all sense-perceptibles (*maḥsūsāt*) in terms of possessing the ground in the eyes of the addressee. When these other alternatives are measured up against Ādam ﷺ while bearing these conditions in mind, it becomes evident that they simply lack the degree of familiarity and immediate recognition in comparison to how "Ādam" ﷺ strikes in the minds of those who hear it.[337] Had Ādam ﷺ possessed a mother, then using him as the vehicle would

334 7:73

وَإِلَىٰ ثَمُودَ أَخَاهُمْ صَٰلِحًا ۗ قَالَ يَٰقَوْمِ ٱعْبُدُوا۟ ٱللَّهَ مَا لَكُم مِّنْ إِلَٰهٍ غَيْرُهُۥ ۖ قَدْ جَآءَتْكُم بَيِّنَةٌ مِّن رَّبِّكُمْ ۖ هَٰذِهِۦ نَاقَةُ ٱللَّهِ لَكُمْ ءَايَةً ۖ فَذَرُوهَا تَأْكُلْ فِىٓ أَرْضِ ٱللَّهِ ۖ وَلَا تَمَسُّوهَا بِسُوٓءٍ فَيَأْخُذَكُمْ عَذَابٌ أَلِيمٌ

335 27:10

وَأَلْقِ عَصَاكَ ۚ فَلَمَّا رَءَاهَا تَهْتَزُّ كَأَنَّهَا جَآنٌّ وَلَّىٰ مُدْبِرًا وَلَمْ يُعَقِّبْ ۚ يَٰمُوسَىٰ لَا تَخَفْ إِنِّى لَا يَخَافُ لَدَىَّ ٱلْمُرْسَلُونَ.

336 3:49

وَرَسُولًا إِلَىٰ بَنِىٓ إِسْرَٰٓءِيلَ أَنِّى قَدْ جِئْتُكُم بِـَٔايَةٍ مِّن رَّبِّكُمْ ۖ أَنِّىٓ أَخْلُقُ لَكُم مِّنَ ٱلطِّينِ كَهَيْـَٔةِ ٱلطَّيْرِ فَأَنفُخُ فِيهِ فَيَكُونُ طَيْرًۢا بِإِذْنِ ٱللَّهِ ۖ وَأُبْرِئُ ٱلْأَكْمَهَ وَٱلْأَبْرَصَ وَأُحْىِ ٱلْمَوْتَىٰ بِإِذْنِ ٱللَّهِ ۖ وَأُنَبِّئُكُم بِمَا تَأْكُلُونَ وَمَا تَدَّخِرُونَ فِى بُيُوتِكُمْ ۚ إِنَّ فِى ذَٰلِكَ لَءَايَةً لَّكُمْ إِن كُنتُم مُّؤْمِنِينَ.

337 ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Dimashqī al-Ḥanafī (d. 893 h) gives an example of how it would not be proper to use the sun for the purpose of highlighting a thing's roundness or using the example of a lion to highlight someone's gait, etc. because they are not relatively well-known nor the touchstones for these traits.

لأن الأسد أعرف شيء بالشجاعة والشمس بالضياء والغراب بالسواد بخلاف ما لو شبه بالأسد في البخر وبالشمس في الاستدارة وبالغراب في أخفاء السواد فإنه يكون ناقصا لأن الأسد ليس أعرف شيء بالبخر ولا الشمس بالاستدارة ولا الغراب بالأخفاء.

not be a strong form of argument against the polytheists, for there lies no rationally-guiding principle that truly prevents them from affirming yet another divine in addition to ʿĪsā ﷺ. If they had retorted that Ādam ﷺ is also a son of God, thus implying him too as divine,[338] then this line of argument against the Christians of Najrān would have immediately fallen apart. But lacking <u>full</u> parentage gives greater force to the argument in dispelling any relationship between divinity and parentage whatsoever.

Using Unsubstantiated Evidence

An additional objection that arises is that verse 3:59 may simply be a style of argumentation whereby a certain belief of the interlocutor is turned against him without oneself necessarily believing it to be true.[339] That is to say that the widely held belief of that time regarding Ādam ﷺ not having any biological parents is used against the Christians of Najrān in this verse, without Allah ﷻ assigning any truth value to this belief.

This objection can be refuted by the sheer fact that Allah ﷻ explicitly utilizes the phrase "according to Allah" (*ʿind Allah*) in verse 3:59. Exegetes such as al-Biqāʿī (d. 885 h) explain that this phrase means that Allah ﷻ has the omniscience and omnipotence to execute anything.[340] Of the twelve

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ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Dimashqī al-Ḥanafī, *Ḥall al-Wishāḥ fī ʿIlm al-Maʿānī wa al-Bayān* (Istanbul: Dār Bāb al-ʿIlm, 2020), 232-233.

338 This is not a whimsical hypothetical argument; well-known Christians such as Brigham Young (d. 1877), Joseph Smith (d. 1844), and others were known to affirm the divinity of Ādam ﷺ in addition to ʿĪsā ﷺ.

339 This alludes to what is known as the *jadalī* type of argumentation, as defined previously, where all that is required is the premises to be widely known (*mashūr*) and accepted (*musallam*), not that they be congruent with reality. Al-Dusūqī describes it as:

(واما جدلي يتألف من المشهورات والمسلمات)...والمراد أن المشهورات لا يعتبر فيها مطابقة الواقع.

Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Dusūqī, *al-Tajrīd al-Shāfī ʿalā Tadhhīb al-Manṭiq al-Kāfī* (Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābi al-Ḥalabī, 1936), 422-423.

However, this does not then entail that the premises *can't* be true. Al-Shurnūbi (d. 1348 h) comments in this vein:

إذ شهرة مقدماته أو تسليمها لا ينافي أن تكون يقينية.

ʿAbd al-ʿAlī al-Laknawī, *Sharḥ Baḥr al-ʿUlūm* (Kuwait: Dār al-Ḍiyāʾ, 2017), 740.

340 Al-Biqāʿī states:

(12) unique meanings for ʿ*inda* that appear in the Qurʾān,[341] all of them, when used in relation to Allah ﷻ, indicate congruence with Allah's ﷻ knowledge. Allah ﷻ Himself emphatically declares:

> "With Him are the keys of the unseen—no one knows them except Him. And He knows what is in the land and sea. Not even a leaf falls without His knowledge, nor a grain in the darkness of the earth or anything—green or dry.[342]

He also said,

> "He created all things and has perfect knowledge of everything."[343]

Al-Sharqāwī explains that Allah ﷻ knows all details as they truly are,[344] including the processes by which things were created and came to be.[345] It

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{عند الله} أي المحيط بكل شيء قدرة وعلماً

Ibrāhīm b. ʿUmar al- Biqāʿī, *Naẓm al-Durar fī Tanāsub al-Āyāt wa al-Suwar* (Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb al-Islāmī, 1984), 9:234.

341 Al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad al-Damghanī, *al-Wujūh wa al-Naẓāʾir fī al-Qurʾān al-Karīm* (Beirut: Dār al-ʿIlm, 1983), 334-335.

342 6:59

وَعِندَهُۥ مَفَاتِحُ ٱلْغَيْبِ لَا يَعْلَمُهَآ إِلَّا هُوَ ۚ وَيَعْلَمُ مَا فِى ٱلْبَرِّ وَٱلْبَحْرِ ۚ وَمَا تَسْقُطُ مِن وَرَقَةٍ إِلَّا يَعْلَمُهَا وَلَا حَبَّةٍ فِى ظُلُمَٰتِ ٱلْأَرْضِ وَلَا رَطْبٍ وَلَا يَابِسٍ إِلَّا فِى كِتَٰبٍ مُّبِينٍ.

343 6:101

بَدِيعُ ٱلسَّمَٰوَٰتِ وَٱلْأَرْضِ ۖ أَنَّىٰ يَكُونُ لَهُۥ وَلَدٌ وَلَمْ تَكُن لَّهُۥ صَٰحِبَةٌ ۖ وَخَلَقَ كُلَّ شَىْءٍ ۖ وَهُوَ بِكُلِّ شَىْءٍ عَلِيمٌ.

344 Al-Sharqāwī explains:

قوله (على ما هو به): أي حالة كون المعلوم على الوجه – أي الحالة – التي هو – أي المعلوم – متلبس بها في الواقع. مثال ذلك: ما إذا أدركت أن في بيت «زيد» خبزا وأنه من الشعير فإن كان في الواقع كذلك فإدراكك علم أو كان البر وقد أدركت أنه من الشعير فليس بعلم لأنه ليس على الوجه الذي هو به والله تعالى محيط علمه بالأشياء على ما هي به عليه تفصيلا.

ʿAbd Allah b. Ḥijāzī al-Sharqāwī, *Ḥāshiyat al-Sharqāwī ʿalā Sharḥ al-Hudhudī ʿalā al-ʿAqīda al-Sanūsīyya* (Cairo: Dār al-Iḥsān, 2017), 247.

345 Al-Sharqāwī states:

would be inane to suggest that Allah ﷻ would use categorical propositions containing untruths[346] while He Himself mentions in the Qur'ān that

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(وكلّ جائز): فيعلم ما كان منه وما لا يكون وأنه لو كان-أي وجد-كيف يكون أي يعلم أن المعلوم لو فرض وجوده كانت حالته التي يوجد عليها كذا وكذا.

Ibid, 250-251.

346 Al-Āmidī states that supposing a report about something, [emanating from personal divine speech] that subsists with Allah ﷻ, was wrong, contrary to what that thing truly is, then there are only two options: either the report is mistaken even though Allah ﷻ has knowledge of that thing, or it is mistaken while He does not have knowledge of the thing. The latter option is impossible as it implies that He is ignorant of some things—which is rationally impossible. If the former, then it would be impossible for the One who knows a thing, not to have a true [personal] report about it—this is known by necessity. In such a case, if the report contrary to reality also subsists in Him, then it would result in both a report that is true as well as a report that is false subsisting in His self regarding the same thing in the same respect. This again is known to be necessarily false.

فلو تعلق خبر الرب ـ تعالى ـ القائم بنفسه بأمر ما على خلاف ما هو عليه لم يخل : إما أن يكون ذلك مع العلم به ، أو لا مع العلم به. لا جائز أن يقال لا مع العلم به : وإلا كان الرب ـ تعالى ـ جاهلا ببعض الأشياء ؛ وهو ممتنع كما سبق في الصفات. وإن كان ذلك مع العلم به : فمن كان عالما بالشيء يستحيل أن لا يقوم بنفسه الإخبار عنه على ما هو به ؛ وهو معلوم بالضرورة. وعند ذلك : فلو قام بنفسه الإخبار عنه على خلاف ما هو عليه حالة كونه عالما به ومخبرا عنه على ما هو عليه ؛ لقام بالنفس الخبر الصادق والكاذب ، بالنظر إلى شيء واحد من جهة واحدة ؛ وذلك معلوم بطلانه بالضرورة.

Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī, *Abkār al-Afkār fī Uṣūl al-Dīn* (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub wa al-Wathā'iq al-Qawmiyya, 2004), 2:83-84.

The above quote of al-Āmidī concerns the divine attribute of eternal, personal speech (*kalām nafsī*) being safeguarded from falsehood. As for the revealed speech (*kalām lafẓī*), such as the Qur'ān, consisting of created utterances which convey the meanings contained in His personal speech, its immunity from falsehood is also a necessity as it signifies and conveys the personal speech. In other words, if being safeguarded from falsehood is a rational necessity in the personal speech of Allah ﷻ, while simultaneously believing in the Qur'ān that we recite is divine revelation corresponding to said personal speech and mass-transmitted from a true prophet, it then necessarily follows that this Qur'ān must likewise be free from falsehood; lest it cast aspersions on the truthfulness of the personal speech which it directly indicates or on the prophethood of the Prophet Muḥammad ﷺ. ʿAbd al-Ḥakīm al-Siyālkotī (d. 1067 h) explains:

"Falsehood cannot approach it from before it or from behind it; [it is] a revelation from a [Lord who is] Wise and Praiseworthy,"[347]

"Whose word is more truthful than Allah's?",[348] and

"Do they not reflect upon the Qur'ān? If it had been from [any] other than Allah, they would have found within it much contradiction."[349]

It is worth highlighting here that verse 4:82's use of *min ʿindi ghayri Allah* is diametrically opposed in meaning to verse 3:59's use of *ʿinda Allah*. Al-Shawkānī (d. 1250 h) comments on verse 4:82 saying that amongst these "contradictions" is when words do not correspond to reality (*muṭābiq lil-wāqiʿ*), which is a characteristic found in the speech of mortal men.[350] Furthermore, the concept of divinity demands that the Divine be attributed

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وقد يقال لما دلّ الدليل على صدق الكلام النفسي ولا شكّ أن من أثبت المعنى النفسي جعل هذه الألفاظ والعبارات دوالّ بالنسبة إليه ومن لوازم كونها دوالّ عليه وأنه لا كذب فيه أن لا يكون فيها أيضا كذب إذ وقوع الكذب فيها دون النفسي يمنع كونها دوالّ عليه... والأصحاب إنما قالوا يكون الكلام اللفظي دليلا على المعنى النفسي القائم بذاته تعالى في نفس الأمر بعد ما تقرّر عندهم من امتناع الكذب فيه فليتأمل.

ʿAbd al-Ḥakīm al-Siyālkūtī, *Ḥāshiya ʿalā Sharḥ al-Mawāqif* (Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya lil-Turāth, 2011), 8:102-103.

347 41:42

لَّا يَأْتِيهِ ٱلْبَٰطِلُ مِنۢ بَيْنِ يَدَيْهِ وَلَا مِنْ خَلْفِهِۦ تَنزِيلٌ مِّنْ حَكِيمٍ حَمِيدٍ.

348 4:122

وَمَنْ أَصْدَقُ مِنَ ٱللَّهِ قِيلًا.

349 4:82

أَفَلَا يَتَدَبَّرُونَ ٱلْقُرْءَانَ ۚ وَلَوْ كَانَ مِنْ عِندِ غَيْرِ ٱللَّهِ لَوَجَدُوا۟ فِيهِ ٱخْتِلَٰفًا كَثِيرًا.

350 Al-Shawkānī states:

(ولو كان من عند غير الله لوجدوا فيه اختلافا كثيرا) أي تفاوتا وتناقضا، ولا يدخل في هذا الاختلاف مقادير الآيات والسور، لأن المراد اختلاف التناقض والتفاوت وعدم المطابقة للواقع، وهذا شأن كلام البشر لا سيما إذا طال وتعرض قائله للإخبار بالغيب، فإنه لا يوجد منه صحيحا مطابقا للواقع إلا القليل النادر... وقد أخرج عبد بن حميد وابن جرير وابن المنذر وابن أبي حاتم عن قتادة (ولو كان من عند غير الله لوجدوا فيه اختلافا كثيرا) يقول: إن قول الله لا يختلف وهو حق ليس فيه باطل.

with perfect and complete attributes. This entails that the Speech of Allah ﷻ is perfect and to even hint that His words assert falsehood would be an explicit defect (*naqṣ*). Likewise, to believe that Allah ﷻ is attributed with omnipotence necessitates that He not be incapable (*ʿajz*) of basing His arguments on that which is true, instead of resorting to assertions of falsehood. Finally, to believe that Allah ﷻ is omniscient necessitates that He knows that which is undoubtedly true, as opposed to being ignorant (*jahl*) or oblivious (*nisyān/wasin*) concerning the details of His very own creation.[351] Allah ﷻ Himself castigates those who follow mere conjecture:

> "Most of them follow nothing but conjecture. And surely assumptions can in no way replace the truth. Allah is indeed All-Knowing of what they do."[352]

He further reprimands those who formulate arguments based on an unfounded basis:

> "And they argue, 'Had the Most Compassionate willed, we would have never worshipped [the angels].' They have no knowledge in support of this claim. They do nothing but lie."[353]

Based on these verses, Muḥammad Abū Zahra (d. 1394 h) states that the Qurʾān uses syllogisms whose premises and conclusions are certain (*yaqīnī*) and true (*ḥaqāʾiq*) with no scope for presumption (*ẓann*).[354] Thus, it comes as no surprise that Abū al-Suʿūd refers to the argument used by Allah ﷻ

Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Shawkānī, *Fatḥ al-Qadīr* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1997), 1:621.

351 67:14

أَلَا يَعْلَمُ مَنْ خَلَقَ وَهُوَ ٱللَّطِيفُ ٱلْخَبِيرُ.

"How could He not know His Own creation? For He alone is the Most Subtle, All-Aware."

352 10:36

وَمَا يَتَّبِعُ أَكْثَرُهُمْ إِلَّا ظَنًّا ۚ إِنَّ ٱلظَّنَّ لَا يُغْنِى مِنَ ٱلْحَقِّ شَيْـًٔا ۚ إِنَّ ٱللَّهَ عَلِيمٌۢ بِمَا يَفْعَلُونَ.

353 43:20

وَقَالُوا۟ لَوْ شَآءَ ٱلرَّحْمَـٰنُ مَا عَبَدْنَـٰهُم ۗ مَّا لَهُم بِذَٰلِكَ مِنْ عِلْمٍ ۖ إِنْ هُمْ إِلَّا يَخْرُصُونَ.

354 Muḥammad Abū Zahra states:

القرآن يعلو عن الخطابة في أن كل مقدماته ونتائجه يقينية لا مجال للظن فيها ف «إِنَّ ٱلظَّنَّ

against the Christians of Najrān as establishing a decisive, binding proof.[355] Supposing that Allah ﷻ makes false assertions would result in all of the above contradictions. Therefore, as per verse 4:82, Muslim evolutionists must choose between either affirming that the Qur'ān is "from other than Allah", or that Allah ﷻ made a mistake, both of which are kufr.[356] Thus, once verse 3:59 states that the "similitude" mentioned is "according to Allah ﷻ", then it leaves no doubt that the "similitude" is indeed true, and the premises being used in this line of argument are similarly true.

Against Mythologizing the Qur'ān

Yet, others have borrowed arguments from Christian evolutionists and Muslim reformists to allege that perhaps Allah ﷻ is merely stating all of this is "true" but only according to what fictionally took place in the "story of Ādam ﷺ". The parallel is that there is a widely popular "[mythical] story of Ādam ﷺ" known to us of how he was created, and that Allah ﷻ is merely affirming what is "true" within this fictional parable. Therefore, *ʿinda Allah* only means with respect to what occurs in this "fictional story of Ādam ﷺ".

This belief can be replied to by first noticing that the latter part of verse 3:59[357] speaks about the creative action (*khalq/takwīn*) of Allah ﷻ in that

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لَا يُغْنِي مِنَ ٱلْحَقِّ شَيْـًٔا» فكل ما في القرآن حقائق يقينية ولا ينبع منهاجه إلا من اليقين وقد لام على مخالفيه أنهم يتبعون الظن وإن هم إلا يخرصون.

Muḥammad Abū Zahra, *al-Muʿjiza al-Kubrā: al-Qurʾān* (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, 1998), 397-398.

355 Abū al-Suʿūd states:

(ما جاءك من العلم) أي ما يوجبه إيجابا قطعيا من الآيات البينات.

Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-ʿImādī al-Ḥanafī, *Irshād al-ʿAql al-Salīm ilā Mazāyā al-Kitāb al-Karīm* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2010), 2:73.

356 Abū al-Muʿīn al-Nasafī describes those who affirm contradictions for Allah ﷻ and His *Kalām*:

لما جوزوا إثبات التناقض في القرآن كانوا بين أمرين: إما أن جعلوا القرآن من عند غير الله وإما أن نسبوا الله تعالى إلى الخطأ بجعله الاختلاف دليل كون القرآن من عند غيره حيث ثبت الاختلاف ولم يكن من عند غيره وكلا الأمرين كفر صريح وبالله العصمة.

Abū al-Muʿīn al-Nasafī, *Tabṣirat al-Adilla* (Damascus: al-Jaffan & al-Jabi, 1990), 129.

357 "...He created him from dust, then He said unto him: Be! and he became."

...خَلَقَهُۥ مِن تُرَابٍ ثُمَّ قَالَ لَهُۥ كُن فَيَكُونُ.

He attributes this act of creating Ādam ﷺ directly to Himself. His use of the words "He created" (*khalqa*), "Be!" (*kun*), and "So he became" (*fa yakūn*) denote actual, physical occurrence and precludes it from being a fictional story of creation.[358] Furthermore, this creative action's description occurs immediately after Allah ﷻ strikes a similitude between ʿĪsā ﷺ and Ādam ﷺ; it thus follows that this creative action bears a correlation with what Allah ﷻ has *just* stated regarding Ādam ﷺ; in that this creative action necessarily indicates (*dāll*) what Allah ﷻ has affirmed about Ādam ﷺ.[359]

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358 Al-Ghazālī explains that when Allah ﷻ gives a command, such as in the case of "*kun*!", then it must be that the existence of what is being commanded is from the possible, as opposed to being from the impossibilities (*mustahīlāt*).

فلذلك لا نقول: إن الله تعالى يقوم بذاته اقتضاء فعل ممن يستحيل وجوده بل ممن علم وجوده وذلك غير محال.

Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *al-Iqtiṣād fī al-Iʿtiqād* (Jeddah: Dār al-Minhāj, 2019), 293.

This further corroborates that the creation of a human without any biological parentage on Earth is from the rational possibilities, for reasons detailed in the first part of this study.

359 An action does not signify (*dāll*) anything or comment on something's truth value unless it's intended as such by the agent of the action. For example, the action of a teacher placing his pen on the desk does not intrinsically signify much. However, if the students were previously informed that when their teacher places his pen on the desk it signals the end of class, then his action would signify a specific meaning: the class has ended. This action is in fact indicating the meaning in the agent's personal speech or mind, which is in accordance with his knowledge. Similarly, when Allah ﷻ says that He created Ādam ﷺ from dust and through the divine fiat "Be!" (*kun*), as stated in the latter part of verse 3:59, then in addition to this creative action being a manifested physical reality, it must also be congruent with what the verse is speaking about earlier regarding the lack of parentage of Ādam ﷺ. This action cannot be at odds with that or else it would result in contradictions and ignorance in Allah's ﷻ speech. Therefore, the stance of some Muslim evolutionists who allege that the verses about human creation lead to an irreconcilable incongruence (*muḍṭarib*), is undeniably false because they have failed to understand what is necessarily required of actions that Allah ﷻ explicitly attributes to Himself in the Qur'ān.
Saʿīd Fūda captures this crucial point:

ومجرد حصول تلك المعجزة على يد مدعي النبوة يدل دلالة قاطعة على صدقه وعلى تصديق الله تعالى إياه بما أظهر على يديه من أفعال دالة على ذلك فإن الله تعالى لا يمكن تجويز الكذب عليه فإن أفعاله هذه دالة على كلامه النفسي والكلام النفسي لا يكون إلا مطابقا

Once it has been established that this act of creating indicates what Allah ﷻ has stated, it too will necessarily carry the same qualities that the speech of Allah ﷻ necessarily carries, i.e., that it cannot be untrue or be described with ignorance as explained before. Therefore, to suggest that this creative action by Allah ﷻ never occurred would amount to saying that it is unreal, an obvious impossibility. To suggest that Allah ﷻ is merely following along in this parable would imply that all the verses that were revealed prior to 3:59 and speak of the creation of Ādam ﵇ are likewise unreal. Such a notion would result in gross misunderstandings of the fundamentals of Arabic grammar, let alone Arabic rhetoric and stylistics.

Additionally, the idea that those verses that speak about the creation of Ādam ﵇ are fictitious and are to be understood as allegories of morality is not only absurd for the reasons stated above but resembles the approach of disbelievers in interpreting the Qur'ān. Ibn al-Athīr (d. 630 h) states that one of the wisdoms behind Allah ﷻ narrating incidents of previous prophets in the Qur'ān is because "surely in this is a reminder for whoever has a mindful heart and lends an attentive ear"[360] and so the one who suggests that Allah ﷻ is merely narrating fictitious parables has adhered to the deviation of those who said "these revelations are only ancient fables which he has written down."[361] [362] Al-Ghazālī remarks that the one who

لعلمه الكاشف عن الحق في نفسه فإن الدال يستحيل أن يكون غير دال فلو فرضنا الفعل دالا وأنا عرفنا ذلك بالعقل فيستحيل فرض أن دلالته على ما يدل عليه ليست دلالة صحيحة لأن ما دلنا عليه عقلا هو كلام الله تعالى وكلام الإله لا يكون كذبا قط.

Sa'īd Fūda, *al-Sharḥ al-Kabīr* (Beirut: Dār al-Dhakhā'ir, 2014), 1:468.

360 50:37

إِنَّ فِى ذَٰلِكَ لَذِكْرَىٰ لِمَن كَانَ لَهُۥ قَلْبٌ أَوْ أَلْقَى ٱلسَّمْعَ وَهُوَ شَهِيدٌ.

361 25:5

وَقَالُوٓا۟ أَسَٰطِيرُ ٱلْأَوَّلِينَ ٱكْتَتَبَهَا فَهِىَ تُمْلَىٰ عَلَيْهِ بُكْرَةً وَأَصِيلًا.

See also verses: 6:25, 8:31, 16:24, 23:83, 25:5, 27:68, 46:17, 68:15, and 83:13.

362 Ibn al-Athīr states:

ولهذه الحكمة وردت القصص في القرآن المجيد (إن في ذلك لذكرى لمن كان له قلب أو ألقى السمع وهو شهيد) فإن ظن هذا القائل أن الله سبحانه أراد بذكرها الحكايات والأسمار فقد تمسك من أقوال الزيغ بمحكم سببها حيث قالوا هذه أساطير الأولين اكتتبها.

'Alī b. Muḥammad, *al-Kāmil fī al-Tārīkh* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, 1987), 1:11.

includes the parables (*amthāl*) and stories (*qaṣaṣ*) of the Qur'ān as being from the ambiguous (*mutashābihāt*) verses of the Qur'ān is even farther from the truth.[363] Al-Shāṭibī further comments that since the Qur'ān refers to itself as a criterion (*furqān*) for judging good and evil, guidance (*hudā*), a clarification (*bayān*), and an exposition (*tibyān*), the idea of it containing false parables is rejected.[364] Finally, Allah ﷻ rejects this belief about the fictitious nature of the "story of Ādam ﷺ" outright within just two verses wherein He states that "certainly, this is the true narrative,"[365] thereby leaving no merit to this line of argument.

In conclusion, the creative act (*khalq/takwīn*) of forming Ādam ﷺ from dust without any biological parents occurred in reality in accordance with how Allah ﷻ affirmed it through His divine speech in this and other verses.

"Brevity is a great charm of eloquence"[366]

Another objection leveled is: "Why didn't Allah just explicitly say that Ādam did not have parents in verse 3:59"?

Brevity and subtle allusions are marks of eloquence in the Arabic language, so long as there isn't a genuine need to state the obvious. There are many works that are entirely dedicated to those words that have been left unstated in the Qur'ān due to a variety of reasons.[367] Al-Zarkashī mentions that one of the reasons why something may not be explicitly stated

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363 Al-Ghazālī states:

ولا يناسبه قولهم:...«والمتشابه: القصص والأمثال» وهذا أبعد.

Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *al-Mustaṣfā min ʿIlm al-Uṣūl* (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1997), 1:202.

364 Al-Shāṭibī states:

الدليل على صحته من نفس الحكاية وإقرارها، فإن القرآن سُمي فرقانا، وهدىً، وبرهانا، وبيانا، وتبيانا لكل شيء، وهو حجة على الخلق على الجملة والتفصيل والإطلاق والعموم، وهذا المعنى يأبى أن يحكى فيه ما ليس بحق ثم لا ينبه عليه.

Abū Isḥāq al-Shāṭibī, *al-Muwāfaqāt* (Saudi Arabia: Dār Ibn ʿAffān, 1997), 4:160.

365 3:62

إِنَّ هَـٰذَا لَهُوَ ٱلْقَصَصُ ٱلْحَقُّ.

366 Marcus Tullius Cicero (d. 43 BC)

367 See ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Suhaylī, *al-Taʿrīf wa al-Aʿlām fīmā Ubhima fī al-Qurʾān min al-Asmāʾ al-Aʿlām* (Tarablous: Lajnat al-Huffāẓ ʿalā al-Turāth al-Islāmī, 1992).

is due to its sheer popularity and familiarity with the people who directly received the revelation.[368] As clarified above, the belief that Ādam ﷺ was created without parents was already well-known amongst Muslims and Christians alike.

"Allah meant another Similarity between ʿĪsā and Ādam"

Another objection heard is that if the ground (*wajh al-shabah*) between ʿĪsā ﷺ and Ādam ﷺ is in fact the lack of parentage, why do we find some classical exegetes listing up to fifteen (15) different similarities between the two?

The reason why some exegetes mentioned this is not because they opined that all of these similarities could potentially be the ground in this verse, since they themselves clearly stated what is the one and only ground. Rather, it's because these fifteen similarities between the two are congruent with the context of the first eighty verses of Surah Āl ʿImrān in negating divinity for ʿĪsā ﷺ. These similarities indicate that both Ādam ﷺ and ʿĪsā ﷺ underwent changes (*taghayyurāt*), and therefore are originated (*ḥādith*), and thus not divine[369]. As mentioned earlier, the context of the first eighty verses of Sūrat Āl ʿImrān are geared towards denying divinity for ʿĪsā ﷺ. This is why Abū Ḥafṣ al-Nasafī (d. 537 h), after listing these same fifteen similarities between the two, remarks, "All of these [similarities] refute the Christian claims, "Indeed, Allah is the Messiah, son of Maryam," (Q. 5:17), and "Indeed, Allah is the third of three." (Q. 5:73)."[370] Moreover, nearly 1100 years ago, exegetes such as al-Qaṣṣāb (d. 360 h), went further to declare

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368 Al-Zarkashī specifically mentions an example of this by citing how Ḥawwāʾ ﷺ was known to be the wife of Ādam ﷺ:

أن يتعين لاشتهاره كقوله اسكن أنت وزوجك الجنة ولم يقل" حواء» لأنه ليس غيرها .

Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī, *al-Burhān fī ʿUlūm al-Qurʾān* (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 2006), 112.

369 Recall from the Introduction where it was plainly stated how the position of affirming parents for Ādam ﷺ is at complete odds with negating parentage for him. The reason for stating this at the outset was to show that these two opinions can never coexist, unlike the fifteen similarities mentioned by some classical exegetes, all of which can coexist with maintaining that the ground must still be the lack of parentage.

370 Abū Ḥafṣ al-Nasafī states:

وكل ذلك يردّ على النصارى حيث قالوا: «إنّ الله هو السميع ابن مريم» وقالوا: «إنّ الله ثالث ثلاثة».

that there is no value in even mentioning these other similarities since they are not the actual intended ground of the simile.[371] Additionally, what is worthy of noting here is that those exegetes who did list these fifteen similarities, included within this list how both ʿĪsā ﷺ and Ādam ﷺ lack a biological father,[372] but never did they include the two possessing a mother as a commonly shared similarity. They further included both to be similar in that neither of them was created through the typical phases that other humans are created by.[373]

An easy of way of ruling out the possibility of any proposed ground (wajh al-shabah) is to consider how well it fulfills the eight conditions for a valid tashbīh in verse 3:59 listed above in Table III. For example, of these eight conditions, proposing that the wajh al-shabah could be the "special evolutionary process" that Ādam ﷺ allegedly descended from (as discussed previously) would only fulfill conditions i. and v., yet utterly fails to meet the remaining six conditions. Even if one obstinately decided to reject the reports about the *reason for the revelation* on grounds that each report is a lone-narrator report (*āḥād*), and therefore not beyond reasonable doubt, this proposed interpretation would still fail to fulfill the remaining five conditions. As such, it will undeniably be rejected. On the other hand, "lacking parentage" fulfills all eight conditions and thus qualifies as the one and only ground.

Analogical Reasoning and Verse 3:59

Another objection that has been raised is that verse 3:59 is essentially a type of analogical reasoning, and these are known to not yield certainty.

Abū Ḥafṣ al-Nasafī, *al-Taysīr fī al-Tafsīr* (Beirut: Dār al-Lubāb, 2019), 4:84.

371 Al-Qaṣṣāb stated:

فأيّ فائدة تكون حينئذ في ضرب المثل به (عيسى) مع آدم عليهما السلام؟

Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Qaṣṣāb, *Nukat al-Qurʾān al-Dālla ʿalā al-Bayān fī Anwāʿ al-ʿUlūm wa al-Aḥkām* (Cairo: Dār Ibn ʿAffān, 2003), 1:218-219.

372 Abū Ḥafṣ al-Nasafī states:

واستويا في استغنائهما عن أب يكونان منه.

Abū Ḥafṣ al-Nasafī, *al-Taysīr fī al-Tafsīr* (Beirut: Dār al-Lubāb, 2019), 4:83.

373 Abū Ḥafṣ al-Nasafī states:

لأنهما لم يخلقا أطوارا كغيرهما.

Ibid, 4:84.

Although this objection holds true for many applications involving analogical reasoning in general, it does not however apply here. ʿAbd al-ʿAlī al-Laknawī states that so long as the premises of an analogy are definitive (*qaṭʿī*), then it will yield certainty similar to that yielded by a deductive syllogism (*al-qiyās al-manṭiqī*).[374] On the other hand, if the premises are speculative (*ẓannī*), then it will only yield presumption (*ẓann*), like that of an inductive argument, at best. The overall import of verse 3:59 in the form of a logical syllogism would be as follows:

1. ʿĪsā ﷺ lacks full parentage, like Ādam ﷺ.
2. Every human that lacks full parentage is still not divine.
3. Therefore, ʿĪsā ﷺ is not divine.[375]

It was explained above why the premises used in verse 3:59 must necessarily be certain. Therefore, the conclusion reached is likewise certain and beyond doubt.[376]

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374 Al-Laknawī states:

قالوا: هو (التمثيل) حجة ظنية وبعضهم شددوا وقالوا دون الاستقراء والشيخ أفرط في ذلك وقال هو أيضا حجة ضعيفة وهذا كله من سوء فهم الشيخ وأتباعه والنصير الطوسي قد انتهى في هذا الأمر حدّ البلادة وظنّ أنه لا يلزم منه شيء فإنا بينا سابقا أن طريق الإيصال فيه قطعي فإنه راجع إلى القياس فإن كانت مقدماته قطعية تورث القطع كالقياس المنطقي. وهل يشكّ عاقل إذا ثبت أن حكم الجزئي معلول لعلة قطعا وهي موجودة في جزئي آخر قطعا في أن يثبت ذلك الحكم في ذلك الجزئي قطعا لا سيما إذا علم قطعا أن العلة إنما وعت علة ليتعدّى الحكم بها. وإن كانت ظنية تورث الظن فمن أين ضعف هذه الحجة؟ ولعل الفقهاء أعلى الله أعلامهم إنما حكموا بالظنية لأن الأغلب في مقدماته الظن ومن ههنا ترى بعضهم يقدمون بعض التمثيلات على بعض النصوص. وبالجملة تضعيف هذه الحجة لا يصدر إلا عمن انتهى حدّ البلادة ولا يليق أن يخاطب في المباحث العلمية.

ʿAbd al-ʿAlī al-Laknawī, *Sharḥ Baḥr al-ʿUlūm ʿalā Sullam al-ʿUlūm* (Kuwait: Dār al-Ḍiyāʾ, 2017), 699-700.

375 First figure in logic, *al-shakl al-awwal*.

376 Ismāʿīl Gelenbevī (al-Kalanbawī) explains that Muslim legal theorists believed analogical reasoning to yield certainty when the ground/*ratio legis* (*wajh al-shabah/ʿilla*) is stated explicitly in the primary textual sources:

أما القدح بأن القياس لا يفيد اليقين فيدفعه ما ذكره أهل الأصول من أن القياس بعلّة منصوصة في المقيس عليه يفيد العلم القطعي...كان في حكم القياس بعلّة منصوصة إذ

Using other Verses to Suggest Ādam ﷺ could have Evolved

The verses used by contemporary authors like Amr Sherif and Muhammad Shahrour do not decisively express anything of this nature. When discussing the implications that the theory of evolution presents, it would not be permissible to hold fast to ambiguous meanings of select verses while casting aside verses, such as 3:59, that speak to the heart of the matter in decisive terms. Within the first eighty verses of Sūrat Āl ʿImrān that address the Christians of Najrān, Allah ﷻ scolds "in whose hearts is deviation following the ambiguous verses seeking to spread doubt through their false interpretations."[377] Al-Zarkashī, under the section on balancing between what may potentially have multiple meanings versus those with a single meaning, lays forth a guiding precept: When contentions arise, it is mandatory to return things to their decisively-known roots.[378] Al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ further lays down a principle that after a legitimate proof (*dalīl*) has been established, it is not permissible to regress and bring forth indecisive and ambiguous meanings which seemingly counter the afore-established evidence.[379] These same verses that speak to the creation of humanity that are relied upon by

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الاحتياج إلى التنصيص في الأدلّة النقلية لتعيين العلّة قطعا.

Ismāʿīl b. Muṣṭafā al-Kalanbawī, *Ḥāshiya ʿalā Sharḥ al-Dawānī ʿalā al-ʿAqāʾid al-ʿAḍudiyya* (Turkey: Dār al-Ṭibāʿa al-ʿĀmira, 1898), 1:273.

377 3:7

هُوَ ٱلَّذِىٓ أَنزَلَ عَلَيْكَ ٱلْكِتَـٰبَ مِنْهُ ءَايَـٰتٌ مُّحْكَمَـٰتٌ هُنَّ أُمُّ ٱلْكِتَـٰبِ وَأُخَرُ مُتَشَـٰبِهَـٰتٌ ۖ فَأَمَّا ٱلَّذِينَ فِى قُلُوبِهِمْ زَيْغٌ فَيَتَّبِعُونَ مَا تَشَـٰبَهَ مِنْهُ ٱبْتِغَآءَ ٱلْفِتْنَةِ وَٱبْتِغَآءَ تَأْوِيلِهِۦ ۗ وَمَا يَعْلَمُ تَأْوِيلَهُۥٓ إِلَّا ٱللَّهُ ۗ وَٱلرَّٰسِخُونَ فِى ٱلْعِلْمِ يَقُولُونَ ءَامَنَّا بِهِۦ كُلٌّ مِّنْ عِندِ رَبِّنَا ۗ وَمَا يَذَّكَّرُ إِلَّآ أُو۟لُوا۟ ٱلْأَلْبَـٰبِ

378 Al-Zarkashī states:

الأشياء التي يجب ردّها عند الإشكال إلى أصولها.

Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī, *al-Burhān fī ʿUlūm al-Qurʾān* (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 2006), 371.

379 Al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ states:

تجويز ما قام الدليل على خلافه باطل.

ʿIyāḍ b. Mūsā, *Ikmāl al-Muʿlim bi Fawāʾid Muslim* (Cairo: Dār al-Wafāʾ, 1998), 7:87. This principle highlights the folly of those who take verses such as 71:14

وَقَدْ خَلَقَكُمْ أَطْوَارًا.

Muslim evolutionists have already been shown to be in complete harmony with one another in numerous works.[380] Muḥammad Bakhīt al-Muṭīʿī (d. 1354 h), in his book on reconciling the apparent contradictions between science and scripture, states that scholars such as al-Rāzī said that what is compulsory is that one only proceeds to figurative interpretations (taʾwīl) in the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth when its outward import opposes that which is certain.[381] Consequently, in consideration of verse 3:59, those verses that speak about Ādam ﷺ being created from earthly materials, i.e., from dust, without parents, will be taken literally in the absence of definitive (*yaqīnī*) evidence suggesting otherwise.

"He truly created you in stages of development",
and interpret "stages" to indicate the human evolutionary cycle and subsequently take it as a "proof" against verse 3:59.

380 See for example Ibn Kathīr's *al-Bidāya wa al-Nihāya* in the section dealing with the creation of man.

381 Bakhīt al-Muṭīʿī states:

فكلام الإمام الرازي ومثله لغيره صريح في أن اللازم أن يصار إلى التأويل في كل ما كان ظاهره من الآيات والأحاديث على خلاف اليقين.

Muḥammad Bakhīt al-Muṭīʿī, *Tawfīq al-Raḥmān* (Jeddah: Dār al-Minhāj, 2016), 393.

An example of this would be regarding the verse:

حَتَّىٰٓ إِذَا بَلَغَ مَغْرِبَ ٱلشَّمْسِ وَجَدَهَا تَغْرُبُ فِى عَيْنٍ حَمِئَةٍ وَوَجَدَ عِندَهَا قَوْمًا.

> "Until he reached the setting point of the sun, he found it to be setting in a spring of murky water, where he found some people". 18:86.

Al-Rāzī states in his tafsīr, under this verse, that the evidence for the sun being round, located in outer-space, being larger than Earth, that no group of people are sitting by its side, etc. are all known with certainty. Therefore, it would be necessary to interpret this verse figuratively in that the sun merely *appeared* as if it were setting into "a spring of murky water", not that it *actually* set into it.

Conclusion

It was stated in an earlier chapter that if a "stronger piece of evidence" was found to completely invalidate the application of the nomic judgment, "all humans possess a pair of biological parents", to Ādam ﷺ, then it would become necessary (wājib) to apply this evidence, and no call towards figurative interpretations (ta'wīl) of scripture could then be adopted.[382] In his tract covering the etiquettes of disputation (*jadal/munāẓara*), al-Juwaynī states that deliberations will come to a terminal end once an argument results either in an internal contradiction (*tanāquḍ*), incoherence (*tahāfut*), rejecting that which is necessarily known (*al-maʿlūm ḍarūratan*), and/or implies a rational impossibility (*mustaḥīl*) for Allah ﷻ.[383] It was shown in

382 Ashraf ʿAlī al-Thānvī states:

في الاستقراء إنما يشاهد الرجل بعض الجزئيات، فيرى فيها قدراً مشتركاً، فيحكم بذلك القدر المشترك على سائر الجزئيات التي لم يشاهدها، فهذا حكم غير مقطوع به. نعم، إنه يثبت به الحكم في الجزئيات الأخرى بمرتبة الظن، والظن إنما يكون دليلاً وحجة فيما لا يعارضه دليل أقوى منه. ثم إن الحكم الظني الذي يستفاد بالاستقراء لا يكون إلا بالدوام، وبالدوام لا تثبت الضرورة - أي نفي الإمكان عن الجانب المخالف - بل يحتاج إلى دليل مستقلّ على نفي الإمكان، والظن لا أثر له فيما عارضه الدليل الأقوى منه، حتى إن الواجب حينئذ: العمل بالأقوى فحيث لا يوجد دليل على نفي الإمكان، والدليل الأقوى قائم على خلاف الحكم الظني: فأي داع يدعوهم إلى ألا يحتجوا بالأقوى ويميلوا إلى التأويل البعيد؟ مع أن التأويل صرف عن الظاهر فلا يصار إليه إلا عند الحاجة، ولا حاجة هنا، فلماذا يصار إلى التأويل؟ ولو فسح المجال لمثل هذه التأويلات لما بقي شيء من العبارات والشهادات حجة لمضمونها، لكونها عرضة للتأويلات والاحتمالات الناشئة من غير دليل.

Ashraf ʿAlī al-Tahānwī, *al-Intibāhāt al-Mufīda fī Ḥall al-Ishtibāhāt al-Jadīda* (Karāchī: Maktabat Dār al-ʿUlūm Karāchī, 2018), 96-97.

383 Al-Juwaynī states:

the preceding chapters why adhering to the opinion that Ādam ﷺ had a parent(s) can result in some or all of these egregious consequences,[384] especially grave implications unbefitting for Allah the Omniscient (*al-ʿAlīm*), the Omnipotent (*al-Qādir*), the All-Wise (*al-Ḥakīm*), and the Transcendent (*al-Quddūs*).[385] It is imperative to understand that the crux of the argument put forth here did not primarily rely upon a claim to ijmāʿ from the onset, thereby bypassing altogether Guessoum's cries for relying upon consensuses that predate the theory of evolution. Indeed, the probative force of the argument put forth rests upon the perennial belief of what rationally must hold true regarding the will, omniscience, omnipotence, wisdom, and speech of the one and only divine, Allah ﷻ. What actually results from using this approach is a vindication of the scholarly consensus on the original creation of Ādam ﷺ, both *before* and *after* the rise of the theory of evolution.

It was further demonstrated how the arguments put forth for Ādam ﷺ possessing biological parentage reflect ignorance of a variety of subjects. Al-Sanūsī remarks that the origin of all misguided opinions results from a lack of mastery particularly in the sciences of Arabic semantics-rhetoric (balāgha) and being unable to properly apply the rational sciences (*al-ʿulūm al-ʿaqliyya*) in harmony with the exigencies of the Sharīʿa. Al-Sanūsī concludes by stating that despite lacking in all of this, what further compounds the issue is having the audacity to nonetheless delve into matters requiring not only knowledge of additional areas and advanced concepts, proper training, and a good opinion of those instructing therein, but also

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يكون فيما يريبه من كلامه تهافت وتناقض يدفع بعضه بعضا...أو ينتهي بنا الكلام إلى حدّ يلزمه دفع المعلوم ضرورة أو إثبات ما يستحيل كونه.

ʿAbd al-Mālik b. Yūsuf al-Juwaynī, *al-Kāfiya fī al-Jadal* (Cairo: ʿĪsā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1979), 553.

384 Once it has been established that there is no equivalence between how Ādam ﷺ was created and the rest of humanity, the inductive reasoning initially used can no longer be upheld. Burhān al-Dīn al-Bukhārī highlights this point succinctly:

اعتبار الغائب بالشاهد من غير إثبات دليل التسوية بينهما فاسد فعند قيام دليل التفرقة أولى أن يكون فاسداً.

Burhān al-Dīn b. Maḥmūd al-Bukhārī, *Sharh al-Tamhīd li Qawāʿid al-Tawhīd* (Amman: Maktabat al-Ghānam, 2021), 276.

385 Recall that this was the only prerequisite required for the reader to benefit from the current monograph, as stated in the Introduction.

Divine support.[386] Can "Divine support" reasonably be expected when one continues to intentionally dismiss the Muslim community's consensus even after its reasons are made clear? Allah ﷻ forewarns the believers:

> "And whoever defies the Messenger after guidance has become clear to them and follows a path other than that of the believers, we will let them pursue what they have chosen, and we shall admit him to Jahannam, which is an evil place to return."[387]

Adherence to the opinion that Ādam ﷺ possessed biological parentage results in imputing gross ignorance to virtually all Muslims before the advent of the theory of evolution. Islamic scholars have asserted that there lies no doubt in the invalidity of a doctrinal opinion that has hitherto never been held and moreover diametrically opposes what has always been regarded as a theological tenet. For the truth of a given matter could never have been concealed upon the entire *Umma* beginning from the era of the Prophet ﷺ till now, only for its polar opposite to be made clear today.[388] Al-Bāqillānī comments on the degree of stringency that he noticed from scholars before him, stating that they would not retain anything they were not sure was truly found in Mālik's (d. 193 h) *al-Muwaṭṭa'*, al-Muzanī's (d. 264 h) *Mukhtaṣar*, al-Mubarrid's (d. 285 h) *al-Muqtaḍab*, Euclid's geom-

386 Al-Sanūsī states:

> لا شكّ أن الجهل باللسان وعدم إتقان فني البلاغة والبيان والبعد من ممارسة العلوم العقلية على مقتضى التنبيهات الشرعية، ثم التجاسر مع عدم ذلك كله على الخوض فيما يحتاج إلى علوم عديدة، وفكرة منتقدة، وتأييد إلهي من غير أخذ عن أهل العلوم، وحسن أدب في التلقي منهم أصل لكل ضلالة وكفر والعياذ بالله.

Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Sanūsī, *Sharḥ al-ʿAqīda al-Kubrā* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2006), 224-225.

387 4:115

> وَمَن يُشَاقِقِ ٱلرَّسُولَ مِنۢ بَعْدِ مَا تَبَيَّنَ لَهُ ٱلْهُدَىٰ وَيَتَّبِعْ غَيْرَ سَبِيلِ ٱلْمُؤْمِنِينَ نُوَلِّهِۦ مَا تَوَلَّىٰ وَنُصْلِهِۦ جَهَنَّمَ ۖ وَسَآءَتْ مَصِيرًا.

388 Al-Subkī states:

> فإن قولا لم يقل به قائل من سبعمائة سنة ونيف إلى اليوم لا شكّ في بطلانه وليس يخفى الصواب على الأمة من زمن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم إلى اليوم ويظهر لنا.

Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī, *Fatāwā al-Subkī* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2015), 1:165.

etry, Ptolemy's *Almagest*, and Arabic poetry, **let alone** the Book of Allah![389] To suggest that the early Muslims, one and all, would not only be aloof to understanding the reality of Ādam's ﷺ original creation, but would embrace what is contrary to it is inconceivable.

For all the above reasons, the necessary nomic judgment (*wājib ʿādī*) that "all humans possess a pair of biological parents" will not overturn the certainty of Ādam ﷺ being an original creation[390]; this is a certain (*yaqīnī*) judgment obtained through scripture and demonstratively grounded in what must hold true for Allah ﷻ. The epistemic value it provides regarding the specific creation of Ādam ﷺ is greater than the epistemic value generally provided by the necessary nomic judgment that "all humans possess a pair of biological parents."

At this juncture, Muslim evolutionists are left at a crossroads to decide if they will accept the truth or will obstinately tarry on in delusion despite Allah ﷻ informing them that they were never "witnesses to…***the creation of their own selves***".[391]

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389 Al-Bāqillānī states:

وكذلك ما لا يجد الفقهاء والمتكلمون والشعراء والمتأدبين والفلاسفة والمنجمين يستجيزوا أن يلحقوا بموطأ مالك ومختصر المزني والمقتضب وإقليدس والمجسطي وقفا نبك من ذكرى حبيب ومنزل ما يرد عليهم الورود الشاذ الذي لا يعرفونه ولا يحققونه تحقيق معرفتهم بما تضمنته هذه الكتب من الأمر الظاهر المشهور هذا معلوم بالعادة والطباع فكتاب الله أولى بذلك.

Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī, *al-Intiṣār lil-Qurʾān* (Amman: Dār al-Fatḥ, 2001), 1:121-122.

390 Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī states that preponderance can never be given to what diametrically opposes certainty (*yaqīn*):

قال الإمام الرازي: «ولا يجوز الترجيح في الأدلة اليقينية». إذ اليقيني لا تعارض فيه إذ لو تعارض يقينيان لثبت مدلولهما فيجتمع المتنافيان فلا وجود ليقينين متنافيين عقليين أو نقليين أو عقلي ونقلي.

Zakariyyā b. Muḥammad al-Anṣārī, *Fatḥ al-Raḥmān Sharḥ Luqaṭat al-ʿAjlān* (Amman: Dār al-Nūr, 2016), 95.

391 18:51

مَّآ أَشْهَدتُّهُمْ خَلْقَ ٱلسَّمَـٰوَٰتِ وَٱلْأَرْضِ وَلَا خَلْقَ أَنفُسِهِمْ

Coincidentally, al-Qurṭubī states that this verse is a refutation of those scientists who embark rashly and impetuously into such matters:

In parting, given the many intricacies surrounding the topic of "Evolution and Islam" found in our times, it is highly advised that authorized instructors of Sunni doctrine address this matter in an exhaustive manner.[392] For it is an issue that begins as a mere prick of a thorn, but when left unattended, has the potential to metastasize into a theological malady as regrettably experienced and witnessed by so many today.

Success is from Allah ﷻ alone.
Completed on:
February 2, 2023/Rajab 10, 1444


فتتضمن الآية الرد على طوائف من المنجمين وأهل الطبائع والمتحكمين من الأطباء وسواهم من كل من ينخرط في هذه الأشياء.

Abū ʿAbd Allah al-Qurṭubī, *al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2013), 11:3.

392 Saʿīd Fūda advocates the need for contemporary topics that impinge on Sunni doctrine to be addressed when teaching *ʿaqīda*.

إن ذكر مسائل تتعلق بالمساواة التي ينادون فيها بين الرجل والمرأة في هذا العصر ومسائل تتعلق بطريقة الحكم ونظرة الإسلام نحو الديمقراطية ونقد العلمانية ونحوها من نظرات تؤثر على حقيقة الإسلام كمسألة تاريخية الأحكام الإسلامية أقول: أنا أرى أن إيراد نحو هذه المسائل واجب الآن في علم التوحيد وعلم الكلام.

Saʿīd Fūda, *al-Sharḥ al-Kabīr* (Beirut: Dār al-Dhakhāʾir, 2014), 2:1058.



ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Tahseen N. Khan was born and raised in the Philadelphia region. He completed the renowned *Dars Niẓāmī* curriculum mainly through private, in-person studies under numerous authorized Islamic scholars. He currently resides with his family in the suburbs of Chicago while working full-time as a chemical engineer and pursuing advanced studies in Islamic theology under the tutelage of his teachers.



Soon after the inception of the theory of evolution, Muslim scholars were met with the challenge of reconciling Islam's traditional beliefs concerning the origin of man with certain dictates of the evolutionary narrative. Perhaps the most gripping and pertinent of these was the issue of assigning biological parentage to Ādam (ʿalayh al-salām). For over 140 years, Muslim scholars have sought to preserve belief in the original creation of Ādam (ʿalayh al-salām) by formulating a variety of rejoinders focusing on different aspects of the theory of evolution and through an array of apologetics. Oftentimes, many of the arguments were directed foremost against fellow Muslims who sought to make way for evolutionary theory through differing hermeneutical approaches.

This monograph investigates the original creation of Ādam (ʿalayh al-salām) by utilizing the logical two-tier approach of Muslim dialecticians whereby firstly, the mere rational possibility (imkān) of a human being created without biological parentage will be demonstrated, and secondly, to prove its actual occurrence (wuqūʿ). The author takes a critical approach to prove that irreconcilable theological inconsistencies would arise from denying Ādamic originality, thereby proving that belief in his original creation remains certain (qaṭʿī) notwithstanding the demands of the theory of evolution.



PHILASUFICAL PUBLICATIONS